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Abstract
Social networking extending the social circle of people has already become an impor-
tant integral part of our daily lives. As reported by ComScore, social networking sites
such as Facebook and Twitter have reached 82 percent of the world’s online population,
representing 1.2 billion users around the world. In the meantime, fueled by the dramatic ad-
vancements of smartphones and the ubiquitous connections of Bluetooth/WiFi/3G/LTE
networks, social networking further becomes available for mobile users and keeps them
posted on the up-to-date worldwide news and messages from their friends and families
anytime anywhere. The convergence of social networking, advanced smartphones, and sta-
ble network infrastructures brings us a pervasive and omnipotent communication platform,
named mobile social network (MSN), helping us stay connected better than ever. In the
MSN, multiple communication techniques help users to launch a variety of applications
in multiple communication domains including single-user domain, two-user domain, user-
chain domain, and user-star domain. Within different communication domains, promising
mobile applications are fostered. For example, nearby friend search application can be
launched in the two-user or user-chain domains to help a user find other physically-close
peers who have similar interests and preferences; local service providers disseminate adver-
tising information to nearby users in the user-star domain; and health monitoring enables
users to check the physiological signals in the single-user domain.
Despite the tremendous benefits brought by the MSN, it still faces many technique
challenges among of which security and privacy protections are the most important ones
as smartphones are vulnerable to security attacks, users easily neglect their privacy preser-
vation, and mutual trust relationships are difficult to be established in the MSN. In this
thesis, we explore the unique characteristics and study typical research issues of the MSN.
We conduct our research with a focus on security and privacy preservation while con-
sidering human factors. Specifically, we consider the profile matching application in the
two-user domain, the cooperative data forwarding in the user-chain domain, the trustwor-
thy service evaluation application in the user-star domain, and the healthcare monitoring
application in the single-user domain. The main contributions are, i) considering the hu-
man comparison behavior and privacy requirements, we first propose a novel family of
comparison-based privacy-preserving profile matching (PPM) protocols. The proposed
protocols enable two users to obtain comparison results of attribute values in their profiles,
while the attribute values are not disclosed. Taking user anonymity requirement as an
evaluation metric, we analyze the anonymity protection of the proposed protocols. From
the analysis, we found that the more comparison results are disclosed, the less anonymity
protection is achieved by the protocol. Further, we explore the pseudonym strategy and
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an anonymity enhancing technique where users could be self-aware of the anonymity risk
level and take appropriate actions when needed; ii) considering the inherent MSN nature
— opportunistic networking, we propose a cooperative privacy-preserving data forwarding
(PDF) protocol to help users forward data to other users. We indicate that privacy and
effective data forwarding are two conflicting goals: the cooperative data forwarding could
be severely interrupted or even disabled when the privacy preservation of users is applied,
because without sharing personal information users become unrecognizable to each other
and the social interactions are no longer traceable. We explore the morality model of users
from classic social theory, and use game-theoretic approach to obtain the optimal data
forwarding strategy. Through simulation results, we show that the proposed cooperative
data strategy can achieve both the privacy preservation and the forwarding efficiency; iii)
to establish the trust relationship in a distributed MSN is a challenging task. We propose a
trustworthy service evaluation (TSE) system, to help users exchange their service reviews
toward local vendors. However, vendors and users could be the potential attackers aiming
to disrupt the TSE system. We then consider the review attacks, i.e., vendors rejecting and
modifying the authentic reviews of users, and the Sybil attacks, i.e., users abusing their
pseudonyms to generate fake reviews. To prevent these attacks, we explore the token tech-
nique, the aggregate signature, and the secret sharing techniques. Simulation results show
the security and the effectiveness of the TSE system can be guaranteed; iv) to improve
the efficiency and reliability of communications in the single-user domain, we propose a
prediction-based secure and reliable routing framework (PSR). It can be integrated with
any specific routing protocol to improve the latter’s reliability and prevent data injection
attacks during data communication. We show that the regularity of body gesture can be
learned and applied by body sensors such that the route with the highest predicted link
quality can always be chose for data forwarding. The security analysis and simulation
results show that the PSR significantly increases routing efficiency and reliability with or
without the data injection attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Mobile Social Network and Applications
Social networking makes digital communication technologies sharpening tools for extending
the social circle of people. It has already become an important integral part of our daily
lives, enabling us to contact our friends and families. In the meantime, fueled by the
pervasive adoption of smartphones, users have a growing tendency to access their social
networks more often by smartphones via pervasive networking infrastructures than desktop
computers or laptops [1]. With smartphones, users are able to check the digital personal
schedules when lying in bed; read and reply to emails in the meeting room; contact friends
to have a lunch together on the way to the mall; and send photos to families in the
tourist areas. In other words, users can apply various communication techniques to share
and request information to and from different kinds of information sources, and users are
capable to choose the comfortable techniques to create and manage of social networking
applications. The convergence of social networking, advanced smartphones, and various
communication techniques brings us a pervasive and omnipotent communication platform,
named mobile social network (MSN), helping us stay connected better than ever.
Over the past decade, smartphones evolve dramatically from appearance to functional-
ity; they are no longer the clumsy devices with basic calling and messaging functions but
nice-looking and portable “toys” with integrated sensing functions and countless mobile
applications. Observing the potential commercial opportunity, developers and researchers
design a wide range of mobile applications for different scenarios to keep up with the
demand from users. As such, in nowadays, the MSN becomes the most popular commu-
nication platform with countless mobile applications. It also becomes a research focus
1
  
Mobile social networking in a city
User
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Internet
Vendor
Figure 1.1: Mobile social network
where many research challenges and solutions become much urgent to be explored. In this
section, we present the MSN architecture by introducing the communication entities, the
communication patterns, and the MSN characteristics [2].
1.1.1 MSN Communication Entities
An MSN, as shown in Fig. 1.1, is a virtual environment composed of the users moving
in a local geographical area, the local service providers (LSPs), and the Internet service
providers (ISPs). It is formed upon the agreement of the participating users and LSPs. If
a user/LSP is fully non-cooperative, the user/LSP should not belong to the MSN.
Smartphone Users
The users are able to not only access the Internet via cellular/WiFi networks but also
communicate with neighboring users via Bluetooth and near field communication (NFC)
techniques. The users choose the communication technologies for different applications.
For example, the users may choose the Internet to obtain the service information, and
2
use Bluetooth to communicate with nearby users to obtain the service reviews. The users
also consider their mobility model and their social behavior patterns when choosing the
communication techniques.
Local Service Providers
The LSPs, either mobile or static, provide services to the users in vicinity. When an LSP
is mobile, it can be equipped with a smartphone which disseminates service information
to the encountered users. When an LSP is static, it could be a local shopping store or
a restaurant that are visited by nearby users. The static LSP is equipped with better
communication and storage devices which are placed on, in or around their buildings.
Internet Service Providers
The mobile access to the Internet service becomes available due to the pervasive deployment
of cellular network infrastructures. Besides, the users can also access the Internet via WiFi
hotspots which are widely distributed in restaurants, shopping malls, or even residential
communities. As a result, the ISPs can be reached almost anytime anywhere. They provide
service information to the users in the MSN whenever and wherever the users need it.
1.1.2 MSN Communication Patterns and Techniques
The communication patterns in the MSN can be generally divided into user-to-ISP, user-
to-LSP, and user-to-user categories.
User-to-ISP
Two common communication techniques that are enabled on smartphones help user-to-
ISP communications. One is the cellular networks. The users purchase the data plan from
communication companies, such as Rogers and Bell. Their smartphones can connect to
the Internet through the cellular network infrastructures maintained by the companies.
For example, the users spend $5/$17/$37 to purchase a monthly plan which provides
10mb/250mb/5gb Internet data to their smartphones. The other one is the WiFi technique.
Compared to the previous, WiFi technique can offer the pervasive Internet access at cheaper
costs and larger bandwidth. Many local service providers integrate the free WiFi access
into their commercial business solutions. For example, the Canadian-wide coffee shop Tim
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Hortons work with Bell Canada to roll out the national free WiFi service to more than
2,000 Tim Hortons locations in September 2012. In addition, more commercial solutions
are developed by companies FatPort and Fon, encouraging distributed WiFi hotspots to
cooperatively share the Internet access to nearby users.
User-to-LSP
The user-and-LSP communications help the users better obtain the service information of
nearby LSPs. The communication techniques can be short-ranged wireless communica-
tions, such as WiFi and Bluetooth. Due to the easy-to-setup and low costs, many LSPs
have been equipped with wireless routers to offer the Internet access to its customers. In
other words, these LSPs are connected to its customers through WiFi. In addition, when
the LSPs are mobile, they can carry smartphones and send the service information to the
encountered users via Bluetooth.
User-to-User
When the users launch the autonomous mobile applications, the user-to-user communica-
tion helps the users share information in an efficient way. Bluetooth and NFC which are
both short-range communication techniques that are integrated into smartphones to im-
plement the user-to-user communication. NFC operates at slower speeds than Bluetooth,
but consumes far less power and doesn’t require pairing. NFC sets up more quickly than
standard Bluetooth, but has a lower transfer rate than Bluetooth low energy. With a
maximum working distance of less than 20 cm, NFC has a shorter range, which reduces
the likelihood of unwanted interception. It makes NFC particularly suitable for crowded
areas. In comparison, Bluetooth supports 1-100 m wireless communication range, more
suitable for the users at distances to share information.
1.1.3 MSN Applications
The boom of mobile applications is one of the important factors to the MSN development.
It is reported from WiKi that the Apple Company has greatly increased the number of
mobile applications from 800 in July 2008 to over 825,000 in April 2013. Generally, the
applications can be divided into four categories.
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Mobile Version of Online Social Applications
The first category is the mobile version of online social applications which enables users
to check social updates, share photos and watch online videos in a mobile environment.
Successful online social applications such as Facebook and Youtube have been extended to
a mobile version for smartphones.
Nowadays, hardware specifications of smartphones have been improved to the level of
personal computers, along with friendly interface improvements and usability enhance-
ments. In parallel to that, the deployment of 3G and LTE networks has considerably
improved the available mobile bandwidth, enabling the provisioning of content and ser-
vices powered by the ISPs. When the users launch the applications, they are able to
quickly download/upload data from/to the ISPs.
With the mobile version of online social applications, the users have the capability to
send the information out to the world in a fast and easy way, such as updating online status
or changing head photos in their online spaces. The pervasive use of the applications raise
a security issue, i.e., malicious attackers with the Internet access at any place is able to
keep tracking other users’ behavior. As such, when sharing any personal information, the
users need to be careful about whether the personal information disclosure is necessary or
not.
Location-based Applications
In addition to voice service available for any cellular telephone, smartphones distinguish
themselves by powerful computing resources and, most significantly, their capability to
understand their surrounding environments through many sensors that are built into them.
As a result, the second category, called location-based application, becomes one of the most
popular. It utilizes the information downloaded from the Internet to assist location-based
activities. Such applications are widely supported by either social network giants like
Facebook, or specialized service providers like Foursquare or Loopt. They work in the
following way: the GPS chips detect the location coordinates of the users who then report
the coordinates to the ISPs for downloading the information related to local services.
Foursquare is a typical location-based application that allows registered users to post
their location at a venue (”check-in”) and connect with friends. One can check into a
certain floor/area of a building, or indicate a specific activity while at a venue. Users can
choose to have their check-ins posted on their accounts on Twitter or Facebook.
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Figure 1.2: Mobile version of online social applications and location-based applications
In addition, when the ISPs collect users’ locations and categorize users’ interests, they
can not only provide location-based services but also coordinate users with similar interests
and close locations to encourage more local social activities. They can further reveal the
social relations under users’ agreements to help them establish mutual trust and improve
the communication security and efficiency. For example, the Google Latitude service en-
ables users to visualize the locations of nearby friends on a map and launch social activities
such as chatting or collaborative information filtering.
In general, the location-based application including Foursquare, collects and utilizes
the locations which are most privacy-sensitive to the users. Inappropriate disclosure of
locations to potential attacks may put the users’ lives in danger or cause property loss.
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Autonomous Mobile Applications
The third category is named autonomous mobile applications where the users are able to
connect to neighboring users and LSPs through short-ranged wireless communications such
as WiFi, Bluetooth, and NFC. For example, the nearby information search application [3]
helps a user consult her nearby friends, who in turn will ask their friends, and so on, until
the information is found. The users are not required to have the Internet connection.
Besides, navigating for information via neighboring users could be better than the Internet
search because the information from neighborhood is often more personalized, localized,
and quickly updated. In addition, It is very likely that the information from other local
users provide more trustable details for better service selections [4].
Carpool and ride sharing are promising solutions to the problems of urban growth and
heavy traffic with more cars [5]. The increasing use of vehicle sharing and public transport
is a simple, more effective way to reduce emissions as compared with the approach of
producing slightly more energy efficient vehicles at a high cost. Carpooling also has a strong
impact on the mode of commuting at the workplace level by only offering information,
incentives and a partner matching program. Financial incentives such as reduced parking
costs or fuel subsidies can drive that share higher [6]. However, in practise, users may not
be willing to publish their privacy-sensitive destinations making the carpool information
very limited. In the autonomous mobile applications, the direct communications between
two smartphones can help users share the destinations in real-time and establish the trust
relations in a distributed manner such that the chance to obtain a ride sharing largely
increases.
Smartphones with mobile healthcare systems assist the seniors who have the same
symptom to exchange their experiences, give mutual support and inspiration to each other
[7]. The chat between two seniors can be initialized with the first step to check if they
have similar experience and want to share information with each other. The autonomous
mobile applications can also significantly contribute to the current medical systems.
Body Area Applications
The last category is named body area application. Recent advances in microcircuits and
medical sensing have made it possible to deploy battery-powered miniaturized sensors on, in
or around the human body for long-term healthcare monitoring and falling detection [8–10].
These body sensors report their sensory data to a smartphone via wireless communication
channels. Then, under user’s control, the smartphone can transmit the data to a remote
healthcare agency via the Internet or trigger an alarm when some abnormal conditions
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are detected. The body sensors and the sink together constitute a small-scale wireless
sensor network, called wireless body area network (WBAN). The WBAN is particularly
suitable for monitoring people having chronic diseases or working and living under extreme
conditions, and help these people to know their health conditions in real-time. With the
WBAN and the smartphone, the body area applications can be further extended to an
emergency situation, i.e., after the body area application detects the emergency and trigger
the alarm, the autonomous mobile application helps users send an emergency call to nearby
people and find emergency medical care as quickly as possible [11].
1.2 MSN Characteristics
The MSN has its unique characteristics different from other traditional networks. The fol-
lowing Table 1.1 enumerates the typical characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET)
[12–14], sensor networks (SenN) [15–17], delay tolerant networks (DTN) [18–21], vehicular
ad hoc networks (VANET) [21–25], and mobile social network (MSN) [3, 4, 7, 26–32]. ©
means the network is not limited to one specific definition in that aspect. It is summarized
that the key component of the MSN is human who have a full control of their smartphones.
As such, the network topology relies on the human mobility. Many research works have
adopted either synthetic mobility model [33, 34] or trace-based mobility model [35–38] to
evaluate the performance of their protocols. Besides, human social preferences and the se-
curity and privacy concerns impact the communication behavior of users. In the following,
we will discuss the MSN characteristics in details.
Table 1.1: Comparison of network characteristics
MANET SenN DTN VANET MSN
Node © Sensors © Vehicles Human
Node Mobility Random Static © On-Road Human mobility
Node Connectivity © Good Poor © ©
Network Infrastructure No Sink No RSU No
Typical Research Issue Routing Coverage Routing Application Application
Security © Sensitive © © Highly-sensitive
1.2.1 Multiple Communication Domains
The MSN has multiple communication domains where users could have various applications
in each domain. In this thesis, we consider single-user communication domain, two-user
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communication domain, user-chain communication domain, and user-star communication
domain where we have study the applications for these domains.
   
 
 
Figure 1.3: Communication domains in the MSN
Single-user communication domain: As shown in Fig. 1.3(a), a user is equipped with
a smartphone and multiple body sensors which cooperatively communicate to support
body-related applications, such as healthcare monitoring and falling detection.
Two-user communication domain: As shown in Fig. 1.3(b), any two users run a two-
user communication protocol in order to obtain the personal information from the oppo-
nents, e.g., they want to know who the opponent is and what interests the opponent has.
In the MSN, the typical application can be profile matching.
User-chain communication domain: As shown in Fig. 1.3(c), multiple users are con-
nected in a chain structure to cooperatively forward the data from the start user of the
chain to the end user of the chain. Due to the human mobility, the construction of chains
depends on every user’s selection of next-hop user. In the MSN, the typical applications
can be data forwarding and information searching.
User-star communication domain: As shown in Fig. 1.3(d), multiple users are con-
nected in a star topology where the central user receives and sends the data from and
to multiple users nearby. In the MSN, the typical application can be trustworthy service
evaluation, i.e., the central user could be a vendor who needs to receive the service reviews
from the nearby users and disseminate its service information.
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1.2.2 Social Behavior
User social behavior is of great importance to the design of communication protocols of the
MSN. In the following, we review some interesting perspectives from the social theories.
Social works [39–41] indicate that in a fully autonomous system users behave inde-
pendently based on the rational calculation of expediency. The decision on how to act in
social interactions is viewed as either primarily economic and motivated by self-interest, or
non-economic and motivated by collective interest and moral obligation. Different norms
govern users’ behavior in economic and non-economic spheres of activity, and appropriate
behavior varies according to the context and the nature of the goods being exchanged.
These norms are not just learned, but are incorporated by social users into their person-
alities. In reality, if users violate a deeply internalized norm, they would feel guilty to
certain extent regardless of whether or not anyone else knew of their actions, and would
likely “punish” themselves in some manner. The incentive from self-interest is known as
social selfishness, while the incentive from collective interest or moral obligation is known
as social morality.
Social study [42] also indicates that individuals who experience feeling of guilt (com-
pared to individuals who feel no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the
first round of play, display higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play.
Experimental results demonstrate that non-cooperative individuals who experience a cer-
tain level of guilt in a social bargaining game may use this feeling state as “information”
about the future costs of pursuing a non-cooperative strategy. Their findings that the guilt
manipulation interacted with social motives (e.g., guilt tended to have its intense effect on
non-cooperative individuals) also suggest that these results do not occur merely because
of pre-existing individual differences in the tendency to cooperate or defect. Instead, it
would appear that guilt actually provokes non-cooperative individuals to depart from their
“typical” strategy of non-cooperative behavior.
The MSN users are often considered as rational and selfish entities which aim to max-
imize their own utility [20, 43]. Especially when privacy enhancing technique is adopted,
non-cooperative behavior is hardly overcome because users act anonymously. According to
the social theories, users will always choose the behavior considering both selfishness and
morality. In the design of data forwarding protocols, selfishness and morality need to be
considered interactively. In Chapter 4, a game theoretic approach [29] will be adopted to
calculate the user utility of communications.
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1.2.3 Social Graph
Social graph theory plays an important role in the cooperative communications of the
MSN. Because user mobility is highly dynamic and unpredictable, the traditional data
forwarding and dissemination protocols do not work efficiently in the MSN. Many research
works [44, 45] indicate that the social relations and behaviors among the MSN users are
built in a long-term fashion, which could be used to improve the communication efficiency.
Specifically, from social graph theory, social community and centrality can be directly
applied. For example, users in reality are often grouped based on their common interests.
Sociologists found that these users are more likely to interact with the same-community
members [46, 47]. Thus, many research works [48–50] consider that users may encounter
with another in the same community at a high probability and propose to utilize this social
characteristic to better select the relays for data forwarding. Other research works [51–53]
aim to identify communities from the contacts in real traces [35, 36]. Besides, centrality
is another important metric in the social graph to evaluate the capability of connecting
other users. To build data forwarding protocols based on this feature also improves the
delivery delay [54]. In the design of anonymity enhancing techniques (Chapter 3), the
social community concept will be applied.
1.2.4 Security and Privacy
Trust Problem
Trust is the fundamental of mobile applications. The mobile applications can be only
adopted by the users if the users have trust on the ISPs, the LSPs, and other users. While
the users enjoy the conveniences brought by the mobile applications that are maintained
by the ISPs, they realize that more and more personal information is revealed to the ISPs
and start questioning how the ISPs keep the collected personal information, e.g., will the
ISPs disclose the information for other purposes without proper consent. Some research
works [55, 56] suggest that the users only disclose fuzzy identity and location information
to the ISPs for privacy preservation.
Social community is a platform to build social relations among people who, for exam-
ple, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections. In the MSN, social
community implies the trust relationships, and help the users and the LSPs build the trust
relationships in a distributed way. When two users know that they belong to the same
social community (university and company) or have some common interests (sports or
tastes), they have a feeling that each other is more reliable and the shared opinions are
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more trustful. Some research works [28,31,57] develop privacy-preserving profile matching
protocols to help two users obtain the common interests. Besides, social ties representing
the relationships between two users are the foundation for effective collaboration. In the
MSN, the strength of social ties can be used to facilitate effective data forwarding [20,29]
and service recommendation [58].
Private Information leakage
Private information, such as identities, pseudonyms, locations, and profiles, may be re-
vealed in most mobile applications to some extent. The small amount of private informa-
tion of a user has not been particularly correlated because the user is not the interest. In
fact, the social networking plus mobile applications can be easily used to trace a user’s
behavior, if the user does not intentionally protect himself.
Research efforts [27, 59, 60] have been put on identification and privacy concerns in
social networking sites. Gross and Acquisti [59] argued that users are putting themselves
at risk both oﬄine (e.g., stalking) and online (e.g., identity theft) based on a behavior
analysis of more than 4,000 students who have joined a popular social networking site.
Stutzman [60] presented a quantitative analysis of identity information disclosure in social
network communities and subjective opinions from students regarding identity protection
and information disclosure. When the social networking platforms are extended into the
mobile environment, users require more extensive privacy-preservation because they are
unfamiliar with the neighbors in close vicinity who may eavesdrop, store, and correlate
their personal information at different time periods and locations. Once the personal in-
formation is correlated to the location information, the behavior of users will be completely
disclosed to the public. Chen and Rahman [27] surveyed various mobile Social Networking
Applications (SNAs), such as, neighborhood exploring applications, mobile-specific SNAs,
and content-sharing applications, all of which provide no feedback or control mechanisms
to users and may cause inappropriate location and identity information disclosure. Some
research works [20] suggest to use past social contact history to facilitate the packet for-
warding in the future, while not considering that the social contacts are privacy-sensitive
and could be never shared by the users. Besides, the private information leakage in the
profile matching protocols [7, 21,26–29,31,57,61,62] also attracts great research efforts.
Malicious Behavior
Most mobile applications are ineffective at the presence of the users’ malicious behavior.
For example, in the cooperative packet forwarding, if the users always expect others’ help
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but refuse to help others, the cooperative packet forwarding may never succeed; in the
trustworthy service evaluation (TSE) system, if the LSPs and the users can arbitrarily add
positive reviews and delete negative reviews, the users cannot receive authentic and useful
reviews and stop running the applications. Some research works [20, 29] consider social
selfishness and social morality into the calculation of utility, and explore novel packet
forwarding protocols. Some research work [58] studies the review attacks and the sybil
attacks and propose corresponding defensive mechanisms in the distributed TSE system.
Forgery attacks are very typical attacks in a distributed environment. Since users
know little about others, the forgery attacks can easily happen. As a defense mechanism,
cryptographic signature scheme [63] can be used to resist such attacks. For example,
group signature [64,65] can prevent non-group members from forging a signature of group
members. However, in the profile matching protocol [26, 28, 31, 57], forgery attacks on the
profile matching are hardly resisted. In other words, users are able to arbitrarily choose
forged profiles while other users cannot detect such behavior. Research works [28,31] have
to consider the honest-but-curious model where users honestly follow the protocol but act
curiously to guess others’ profiles. The work [26] requires users to make commitments
about their profiles at the beginning such that they cannot change the profiles later on.
However, in these works, users are always able to forge profiles without being detected.
In [57], signatures of every transactions are recorded by users, and thus the forgery attacks
can be caught with the help from an oﬄine trusted authority. However, this consumes
extra communication and computation overhead.
Sybil attacks are notorious attacks in a distributed system and very hard to prevent,
particularly when privacy is required. Such attacks subvert the system by creating a large
number of pseudonymous entities, using them to gain a disproportionately large influence
[66–69]. Research efforts on resisting sybil attacks have two directions. One is to study the
characteristics of sybil behavior and distinguish the sybil accounts before the attacks [69].
The other one is to detect sybil attacks by using cryptographic mechanisms [58].
1.3 Research Motivations and Contribution
The research in this thesis focuses on developing a suite of protocols to deal with the
challenging security and privacy-preserving issues in mobile social networks. Specifically,
the research motivation and contribution are summarized as follows:
• First, we study the profile matching application. Profile matching, as the initial step
of user-to-user communication, enables users to find and socialize with others who
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have similar interests or backgrounds. It normally requires two users to exchange
their profile details so that each of them is able to check if two profiles have any
similarities. However, users may have growing privacy concerns in sharing the con-
stant and personalized profiles with the nearby strangers who may eavesdrop, store,
and correlate their profiles at different time periods and locations. Once the profiles
are identified or correlated to the location information, the behavior of users will be
completely disclosed to the public. As such, the privacy-preserving profile matching
(PPM) has been proposed: it enables two users to compare their profiles and obtain
the comparison results without disclosing the profiles to each other. Many research
efforts on the privacy preserving profile matching [7, 26, 28, 31, 61] have been carried
out. The common goal of these works is to enable the handshake between two en-
countered users if both users satisfy each other’s requirement while eliminating the
unnecessary information disclosure. In this thesis, we review some related protocols
and study the user anonymity issues. We find the existing works neglect the user
anonymity requirement, and the defined privacy levels can hardly be related to the
user-specific anonymity requirement. Instead, we address the profile matching from
another novel perspective, i.e., user anonymity. We develop an anonymity-enhancing
technique for users to be self-aware of the anonymity risk level and take appropriate
actions to maintain the k-anonymity level where k is a parameter defined by each
individual user. We also propose a fully anonymous profile matching protocol which
enables users to share messages and does not disclose profile information at all [57].
• Second, by taking the human social behavior, we study the data forwarding strategy
in the opportunistic MSN. The opportunistic MSN does not have the stable user-to-
user connections due to the user mobility. Therefore, similar to the DTN, the data
forwarding relies on the opportunistic contacts among cooperative users. Different
from the DTN, the design of data forwarding strategies in the MSN must additionally
consider human factors, i.e., cooperative incentive and privacy preservation. In the
MSN, the incentive to act cooperatively from a user’s aspect includes multiple factors.
Users could be cooperative because of direct friendships. In this case, it is inevitable
to disclose the personal information to the encountered users which could possibly
violate privacy. If users do not share personal information to other peers for privacy
preservation, it seems that no one would act cooperatively because they obtain no
any benefits from the cooperation. Therefore, the cooperation could be severely
interrupted or even disabled when privacy preservation is applied. Many research
works [70–73] studied the cooperation incentives in the data forwarding and data
dissemination protocols of the MSN. In this thesis, we will study the cooperation
incentive of users from traditional social theory. We will present a morality-driven
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privacy-preserving data forwarding (PDF) protocol [29]. We will consider multiple
factors in the forwarding utility, such as forwarding capability, forwarding costs, and
morality factor. Based on the game theoretic analysis, users always maximize their
own utility and decide to forward their packets with certain probability. We are able
to show that the cooperation and privacy preservation, two conflicting goals, can be
achieved in the PDF among a group of users with social morality.
• Third, users in the MSN are often lack of trust toward others. How to establish trust
in the distributed MSN is very challenging but useful. Trustworthy service evalua-
tion (TSE) systems enable service providers or any third trusted authority to receive
user feedback, known as service reviews or simply reviews, such as compliments and
complaints about their services or products. By using the TSE, the service providers
learn the service experiences of the customers and are able to improve their service
strategy in time. In addition, the collected reviews can be made available to the
public, which enhances service advertising and assists the users in making wise ser-
vice selections. The TSE is often maintained by a third trusted authority that is
trusted to host authentic reviews. Popular TSE can be found in web-based social
networks such as Facebook, online stores like eBay, and third-party geo-social appli-
cations such as FourSquare. A trusted third party provides a platform for millions
of people to interact with their friends and obtain their recommendations. These
solutions are important marketing tools for service providers who target the global
market. To move the TSE into the MSN context is not easy due to the lack of third
trusted authorities. In the MSN, service providers (restaurants and grocery stores)
offer location-based services to local users and aim to attract the users by employing
various advertising approaches, for example, sending e-flyers to the nearby passen-
gers via wireless communications. Unlike the global counterparts, the interests of
the local service providers are in serving the users in close geographic vicinity be-
cause most users choose services based on the comparison of the service quality and
the distance advantage. Some works propose to collect the service reviews in a dis-
tributed manner and integrate the service reviews into the current location based
applications. However, it is still centralized control and the review management can
be complicated and cause information delay. We propose a distributed system where
the local service providers maintain the TSE by themselves. We study the potential
malicious attacks conducted by both the service providers and the users. Note that,
it is very challenging to restrict the malicious behavior from the service providers and
the users in an untrusted distributed environment. We introduce the possible review
attacks and the Sybil attacks [58]. We also devise effective defensive mechanisms to
resist these attacks.
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• Fourth, users in the MSN expect their information to be quickly transmitted to the
online service providers. Such information can be their health conditions. Recent
WBANs provide multiple in, on or around body sensors which continuously trans-
mit the monitored body signals to user smartphones. We study the routing problem
in WBANs. We propose a distributed Prediction-based Secure and Reliable routing
framework (PSR). It can be integrated with a specific routing protocol to improve the
latter’s reliability and prevent data injection attacks during data communication. In
the PSR, using past link quality measurements, each node predicts the quality of ev-
ery incidental link, and thus any change in the neighbor set as well, for the immediate
future. When there are multiple possible next hops for packet forwarding (according
to the routing protocol used), the PSR selects the one with the highest predicted link
quality among them. Specially-tailored lightweight source and data authentication
methods are employed by nodes to secure data communication. Further, each node
adaptively enables or disables source authentication according to predicted neighbor
set change and prediction accuracy so as to quickly filter false source authentication
requests. We demonstrate that the PSR significantly increases routing reliability
and effectively resists data injection attacks through in-depth security analysis and
extensive simulation study.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews some basic
techniques including multiple pseudonym technique, k-anonymity, prediction algorithm,
and cryptographic techniques. Chapter 3 presents a family of profile matching protocols
where user anonymity can be improved. Chapter 4 presents a morality-based data forward-
ing strategy with location privacy preservation. Chapter 5 presents a distributed, secure,
and efficient trustworthy service evaluation system in the MSN where users are able to
exchange their service reviews about the service providers. Chapter 6 presents a body-
gesture-based routing protocol over human body with security enhancement and efficiency
improvement. Finally, conclusions and future research work are described in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Basic Techniques
In this section, we will review some basic techniques that will be used in later chapters.
2.1 Multiple Pseudonym Technique
A pseudonym is a name that a person assumes for a particular purpose, which differs from
his or her original or true name. Pseudonyms have no literal meanings, and they can
be used to hide an individual’s real identity. In a network environment, pseudonyms have
been widely adopted to preserve user’s identity privacy [25,74]. An oﬄine trusted authority
(TA) is considered to initialize pseudonyms for users prior to the network deployment. The
TA will assign multiple pseudonyms for each individual user. These pseudonyms cannot be
linked by anyone but the TA. Each user changes their pseudonyms in the communications
when needed such that their behavior cannot be linked by the different pseudonyms. When
users consume all the pseudonyms, they can contact with the TA to fill up with new
pseudonyms.
To avoid the forgery attacks of pseudonyms, the TA assigns an additional secret to users
according to their pseudonyms. Only with the secret, a user can prove that the pseudonym
is legally held. The identity-based signature can be a solution. The TA generates a private
key for each pseudonym, and assigns the private key to the user. The user can always sign
on any message with the private key, and the generated signature can be verified with the
pseudonym. In this way, the forgery attacks of pseudonyms can be prevented.
However, with pseudonyms, users may launch malicious attacks, such as sybil attacks.
To prevent the abuse of pseudonyms, the TA needs to set a trapdoor when generating
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the pseudonyms such that it can trace user behavior. Generally, there are two ways to
implement traceable pseudonyms:
• Mapping function: The TA generates k pseudonyms {pidi,1, · · · , pidi,k} for user ui.
For each pseudonym pidi,j, the TA also generates a corresponding pseudonym secret
key pski,j and sends the key to ui in a secure channel. Then, ui is able to use pidi,j
in the communication protocols. He can generate a signature using pski,j to make
others confirm that ui is the legal holder of pidi,j. In the meantime, the TA maintains
a map from these pseudonyms to the real identity idi of ui. When needed, others
can always report the signature to the TA who is able to track ui’s behavior.
• Group signature: The TA generates k pairs of pseudonym and pseudonym secret
key (pidi,j, pski,j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Different from the previous method, the TA
generates the pseudonym secret keys by using the key generation algorithms from
group signatures [64,65]. In this way, user ui has to generate the group signature in
the communication protocols. Although the group signature does not reveal user’s
real identity, the TA with a master key can always perform the trace algorithm to
retrieve the real identity of the user from the group signature.
2.2 K Anonymity
The k-anonymity [75] is a classic concept for evaluating anonymity. Full anonymity [76,77]
of communication protocols implies that an adversary looking at the communication pat-
terns should not learn anything about the origin or destination of a particular message.
The k-anonymity is a weaker anonymity requirement, implying that the adversary is able
to learn something about the origin or destination of a particular message, but cannot
narrow down its search to a set of less than k users. In other words, the k-anonymity
guarantees that in a network with N honest users, the adversary is not able to guess the
sender or recipient of a particular message with probability non-negligibly greater than
1/k, where k ≤ N is not necessarily related to N . In practise, the parameter k can be
defined by the system or individual users. When users define k, users could have different
anonymity requirements and choose the appropriate strategies in the communication pro-
tocols. Using multiple pseudonym technique is a solution. When users frequently change
the pseudonyms, their transactions cannot be linked at all but the number of consumed
pseudonyms becomes huge. In this case, the design goal of communication protocols is to
develop multiple adaptive strategies for users such that their defined anonymity require-
ments can be satisfied with minimum consumed pseudonyms.
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2.3 Prediction Method - Autoregression
The autoregressive (AR) model is a tool for understanding and predicting a time series of
data [78]. It can be used to estimate the current term zk of the series by a linear weighted
sum of previous p terms (i.e., observations) in the series. The model order p is generally
less than the length of the series. Formally, AR(p) is defined as
zk = c+
p∑
i=1
φozk−i + k, (2.1)
where c is a constant standing for the mean of the series, φi autoregression coefficients,
and k the zero-mean Gaussian white noise error term. For simplicity, c is often omitted.
The derivation of AR(p) involves determining the coefficients φi for i ∈ [1 · · · p] that give
a good prediction. The model can be updated continuously as new samples arrive so as
to ensure accuracy, or it may be recomputed when the prediction error, i.e., the difference
between the predicted value and the true measurement, is very large. In [79], a simplified
AR model is presented and used for neighborhood prediction. This model can be updated
through trivial calculus, greatly reducing the requirement on the computational power of
the nodes that implement it.
2.4 Cryptographic Techniques
2.4.1 Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive and has been widely adopted in
many positive applications in cryptography [80, 81]. Let G be a cyclic additive group
and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same prime order q. We assume that the
discrete logarithm problems in both G and GT are hard. A bilinear pairing is a mapping
e : G×G→ GT which satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For any P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q, we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G and Q ∈ G such that e(P,Q) 6= 1GT .
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈
G.
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From reference [80], we note that such a bilinear pairing may be realized using the
modified Weil pairing associated with supersingular elliptic curve.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Generator) A bilinear parameter generator Genbili is a probabil-
ity algorithm that takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a 5-tuple (q, P,G,GT , e),
where q is a κ-bit prime number, (G,+) and (GT ,×) are two groups with the same order
q, P ∈ G is a generator, and e : G×G→ GT is an admissible bilinear map.
In the following, we briefly introduce the complexity assumptions including Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem, Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, and Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem) The Computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P, aP, bP ∈ G for un-
known a, b ∈ Z∗q, compute abP ∈ G.
Definition 3 (CDH assumption) We say that an algorithm A has advantages (κ) in
solving the CDH problem for G:
AdvG,A(κ) = Pr[A(q,G, e, P, aP, bP ) = P ab] ≥  (2.2)
We say that G satisfies the CDH assumption if for any randomized polynomial time (in κ)
algorithm A we have that AdvG,A(κ) is a negligible function. When G satisfies the CDH
assumption we say that CDH is hard in group G.
Definition 4 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem) The Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G for unknown a, b, c ∈
Z∗q, decide whether c
?
= ab. The DDH problem in G is easy, since we can check whether
e(aP, bP )
?
= e(P, cP ) and use the results to decide c
?
= ab.
Definition 5 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem) The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G for unknown a, b, c ∈
Z∗q, compute e(P, P )abc ∈ GT .
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Definition 6 (BDH assumption) We say that an algorithm A has advantages (κ) in
solving the BDH problem for Genbili if for sufficiently large k:
AdvGenbili,A(κ) = Pr[A(q,G,GT , e, P, aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P )abc] ≥ (κ) (2.3)
We say that Genbili satisfies the BDH assumption if for any randomized polynomial time (in
κ) algorithm A we have that AdvGenbili,A(κ) is a negligible function. When Genbili satisfies
the BDH assumption we say that BDH is hard in groups generated by Genbili.
Definition 7 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem) The Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P, aP, bP, cP, T
for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and T ∈ GT , decide whether T ?= e(P, P )abc.
Definition 8 (DBDH assumption) We say that an algorithm A has advantages (κ)
in solving the DBDH problem for Genbili if for sufficiently large k, A distinguishes the two
tuples (P, aP, bP, cP ) and (P, aP, bP, abP ) with advantage (κ), i.e.,
|Pr[A(q,G,GT , e, P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc) = 1]
− Pr[A(q,G,GT , e, P, aP, bP, cP, T ) = 1]| ≥ (κ)
(2.4)
We say that Genbili satisfies the DBDH assumption if for any randomized polynomial time
(in κ) algorithm A, it distinguishes the two tuples with a negligible probability. When
Genbili satisfies the DBDH assumption we say that DBDH is hard in groups generated by
Genbili.
2.4.2 Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
In the previous definition, groups G and GT have the same prime order q. In literature
[64, 65], there have been many cryptographic scheme design using the bilinear groups of
composite order. Generally, these works can provide additional anonymity protection and
trace capability. We briefly review its definition as follows.
Let two finite cyclic groups G and GT having the same order n, in which the respective
group operation is efficiently computable and denoted multiplicatively [64, 65]. Assume
that there exists an efficiently computable function e : G×G→ GT , called a bilinear map
or pairing, with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For any u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
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2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order n in GT . In other words, e(g, g)
is a generator of GT , whereas g generates G.
Note that, the operation in G is denoted as multiplication, which is just for easy presen-
tation. The bilinear groups of composite order differ from the previous ones by changing
a prime order p to a composite order n = pq where p 6= q are two large primes. The
factorization problem of n is assumed to be computationally-infeasible. The complexity
assumptions in the bilinear groups of prime order also hold in the bilinear groups of com-
posite order. In addition, we introduce the SubGroup Decision (SGD) Problem as follows:
Definition 9 (SubGroup Decision (SGD) Problem) The SubGroup Decision (SGD)
problem in G is defined as follows: Given (e,G,GT , n, h) where the element h is randomly
drawn from either G or subgroup Gq, decide whether h ∈ Gq or h ∈ G.
Definition 10 (SGD assumption) We say that an algorithm A has advantages (κ) in
solving the SGD problem for G and Gq if for sufficiently large k, A correctly guess either
h ∈ Gq or h ∈ G with advantage (κ), i.e.,
|Pr[A(h ∈ Gq) = 1]− Pr[A(q ∈ G) = 1]| ≥ (κ) (2.5)
We say that G and Gq satisfy the SGD assumption if for any randomized polynomial time
(in κ) algorithm A, it correctly guesses either h ∈ Gq or h ∈ G with a negligible probability.
When Genbili satisfies the SGD assumption we say that SGD is hard in groups G and Gq.
2.4.3 Identity Based Aggregate Signature
The identity based aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme [82] consists of five algorithms,
Setup, Private key generation, Individual Signing, Aggregation, and Verification.
• Setup: The Private Key Generator (PKG) uses a bilinear generator Genbili from the
previous section to generate a 5-tuple (q, P,G,GT , e). The PKG also picks a random s ∈ Zq
and sets Q = sP . It chooses a cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
• Private key generation: The user ui with identity IDi receives from the PKG the
private key sPi,j for j ∈ {0, 1}, where Pi,j = H1(IDi, j) ∈ G.
• Individual signing: The first signer chooses a string w that it has never used before.
Each subsequent signer checks that it has not used the string w chosen by the first signer.
To sign mi, the signer with identity IDi:
22
1. computes Pw = H2(w) ∈ G;
2. computes ci = H3(mi, IDi, w) ∈ Zq;
3. generates random ri ∈ Zq;
4. computes its signature (w, S ′i, T
′
i ), where S
′
i = riPw + sPi,0 + cisPi,1 and T
′
i = riP .
• Aggregation: Anyone can aggregate a collection of individual signatures that use
the same string w. For example, individual signatures (w, S ′i, T
′
i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n can be
aggregated into (w, Sn, Tn), where Sn =
∑n
i=1 S
′
i and Tn =
∑n
i=1 T
′
i .
• Verification: Let (w, Sn, Tn) be the identity-based aggregate signature where n is the
number of signers. The verifier checks that:
e(Sn, P ) = e(Tn, Pw)e(Q,
n∑
i=1
Pi,0 +
n∑
i=1
ciPi,1), (2.6)
where Pi,j = H1(IDi, j), Pw = H2(w) and ci = H3(mi, IDi, w).
2.4.4 Shamir Secret Sharing
The goal of a secret sharing scheme [83] is to divide a secret s into n pieces s1, s2, · · · , sn
in such as way that:
• knowledge of any k or more si pieces makes s easily computable;
• knowledge of any k − 1 or fewer si pieces leaves s completely undetermined (in the
sense that all its possible values are equally likely).
Such a scheme is called a (k, n) threshold scheme.
The following scheme [83] is an example of a (k, n) secret sharing. Denote G as a group.
Suppose that a user has a secret s ∈ G.
• Secret shares generation: To generate n si, the user chooses a polynomial with a
degree k, i.e., f(x) = xk + ak−1xk−1 + · · · a1x + a0(= s) where a0, · · · , ak−1 are
randomly chosen from G. Then, the user generates si = f(i) for i = 1, · · · , n.
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• Secret recovery: To recover the secret s, a lagrange interpolation is used to calculate
s from n pieces s1, · · · , sn following the equation.
s = f(0) =
n∑
i=1
αi · si, where αi =
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
−j
i− j . (2.7)
2.4.5 Homomorphic Encryption
There are several existing homomorphic encryption schemes that support different oper-
ations such as addition and multiplication on ciphertexts, e.g. [84, 85]. By using these
schemes, a user is able to process the encrypted plaintext without knowing the secret
keys. Due to this property, homomorphic encryption schemes are widely used in data ag-
gregation and computation specifically for privacy-sensitive content [86]. We review the
homomorphic encryption scheme [85].
Suppose user ui has a public/private key pair (pki, ski) from the fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) scheme. The Encryption Enc, Decryption Dec, Addition Add, and
Multiplication Mul functions must be satisfied.
• Correctness: Dec(ski, Enc(pki,m)) = m;
• Addition of plaintexts: Dec(ski, Add(Enc(pki,m1), Enc(pki,m2))) = m1 +m2;
• Multiplication of plaintexts: Dec(ski,Mul(Enc(pki,m1), Enc(pki,m2))) = m1 ·m2.
The following scheme is an example of the FHE scheme. A trusted authority runs a
generator Genhomo which outputs 〈p, q, R,Rq, Rp, χ〉 as system public parameters:
• p < q are two primes s.t. q ≡ 1 mod 4 and p l;
• Rings R = Z[x]/〈x2 + 1〉, Rq = R/qR = Zq[x]/〈x2 + 1〉;
• Message space Rp = Zp[x]/〈x2 + 1〉;
• A discrete Gaussian error distribution χ = DZn,σ with standard deviation σ.
Suppose user ui has a public/private key pair (pki, ski) such that pki = {ai, bi}, with
ai = −(bis + pe), bi ∈ Rq and s, e ← χ, and ski = s. Let bi,1 and bi,2 be two messages
encrypted by ui.
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• Encryption Epki(bi,1): ci,1 = (c0, c1) = (aiut + pgt + bi,1, biut + pft), where ut, ft, gt are
samples from χ.
• Decryption Dski(ci,1): If denoting ci,1 = (c0, · · · , cα1), bi,1 = (
∑α1
k=0 cks
k) mod p.
Consider the two ciphertexts ci,1 = E(bi,1) = (c0, · · · , cα1) and ci,2 = E(bi,2) = (c′0, · · · , c′α2).
• Addition: Let α = max(α1, α2). If α1 < α, let cα1+1 = · · · = cα = 0; If α2 < α, let
c′α2+1 = · · · = c′α = 0. Thus, we have E(bi,1 + bi,2) = (c0 ± c′0, · · · , cα ± c′α).
• Multiplication: Let v be a symbolic variable and compute (∑α1k=0 ckvk)·(∑α2k=0 c′kvk) =
cˆα1+α2v
α1+α2 + · · ·+ cˆ1v + cˆ0. Thus, we have E(bi,1 × bi,2) = (cˆ0, · · · , cˆα1+α2).
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Chapter 3
Profile Matching Protocol with
Anonymity Enhancing Techniques
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a popular research topic, called privacy-preserving profile
matching (PPM). The PPM can be very useful in an application scenario where two users
both want to know something about each other but they do not want to disclose too much
personal information. The PPM occurs quite frequently in our daily life. For example, in a
restaurant or a sports stadium, people like finding their friends and chatting with friendly
neighbors. To initialize the communication, they may expect to know if others have similar
preferences or share the similar opinions. In a mobile healthcare system, patients may be
willing to share personal symptoms with others. However, they expect the listeners to have
similar experiences such that they could receive comforts and suggestions. Based on the
above application scenarios, we can see that the common design goal of the PPM is to help
two users exchange personal information while preserving their privacy. It could serve as
the initial communication step of many mobile social networking applications.
We will introduce a family of the PPM protocols. Specifically, these protocols rely
on the homomorphic encryption to protect the content of user profiles from disclosure.
They provide increasing levels of user anonymity (from conditional to full). Furthermore,
we will study the social community concept and adopt the prediction method and the
multiple-pseudonym technique to improve the user anonymity protection in the protocol.
The extensive trace-based simulation results show that the protocol with the anonymity
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enhancing technique achieves significantly higher anonymity strength with slightly larger
number of used pseudonyms than the protocol without the technique.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we present the
network model and the design goal. Then, we introduce three protocols in Section 3.3. We
introduce the anonymity enhancing techniques in Section 3.4 and provide the simulation-
based performance evaluations of the protocols and techniques in Section 3.5. Lastly, we
review the related work and draw our summary respectively in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7.
3.2 Network Model and Design Goal
3.2.1 Network Model
We consider an MSN composed of a set V = {u1, · · · , uN} of mobile users with the network
size |V| = N . Users have equal wireless communication range, and the communication is bi-
directional. Each user obtains multiple pseudonyms from a TA and uses these pseudonyms
instead of their real identities to preserve their privacy (Section 2.1).
Profile: Each user has a profile spanning w attributes W = {a1, · · · , aw}. These w
attributes represents every aspect of a user. Each profile is a w-dimension vector, and
each dimension has an integer value between 1 and l. The profile of user ui is denoted by
pi = (vi,1, · · · , vi,w) where vi,h ∈ Z and 1 ≤ vi,h ≤ l for 1 ≤ h ≤ w.
Matching operation: A matching operation between two profiles pi = (vi,1, · · · , vi,w)
and pj = (vj,1, · · · , vj,w) can be
• Inner product fdot(pi, pj) = fdot(pi, pj) =
∑w
t=1 vi,t · vj,t.
• Manhattan distance fman(pi, pj, α) = fman(pi, pj) = (
∑w
t=1 |vi,t − vj,t|α)
1
α .
• Max distance fmax(pi, pj) = max{|vi,1 − vj,1|, · · · , |vi,w − vj,w|}.
• Comparison-based
fcmp(pi, pj, x) =

−1,vi,x < vj,x
0,vi,x = vj,x
1,vi,x > vj,x
(3.1)
• Predicate-based
fcmp(pi, pj,Π) =
{
1,(pi, pj) ∈ Π
−1,(pi, pj) /∈ Π (3.2)
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Note, Π = “t¯ of {(vi,x, opt, vj,x)|ax ∈ A} are satisfied” is a predicate where A ⊆ W
and the comparison operator opt is either > or < and t¯ ≤ |A|. fcmp(pi, pj,Π) = 1 if
(pi, pj) satisfies at least t¯ equations; fcmp(pi, pj,Π) = −1 otherwise.
3.2.2 Design Goals
The objective of a privacy-preserving profile matching protocol is to enable two users to
compare their profiles while not disclosing the profiles to each other. The matching oper-
ations in previous section can be easily done if (pi, pj) can be obtained by any single user.
However, users will not disclose their profiles pi and pj to others, and no trusted authority
exists. This makes the implementation of the matching operations very difficult. Recent
secure multi-party computation (MPC) is developed to enable users to jointly compute a
function over their inputs, while at the same time keeping these inputs private. The two-
party computation can be used for profile matching. In addition, many recent works [26,31]
realize that the explicit matching result may reveal the uniqueness of profiles, and extend
their protocols to show fuzzy matching results instead of explicit results, i.e., users are able
to know if the matching result is larger or smaller than a pre-defined threshold. In the
following, we review three kinds of matching results.
• Explicit matching result: the matching result f∗() is directly disclosed to users ui
and/or uj.
• Fuzzy matching result: the relationship between the matching result f∗() and a
predefined threshold T (i.e., if f∗() > T ) is disclosed to users ui and/or uj.
• Implicit matching result: a message Fi(f∗()) is implicitly disclosed to users uj where
Fi() is a secret mapping function defined by ui and ui is unaware of f∗().
Note that, the amount of disclosed information is reduced from explicit, fuzzy to implicit
matching results. In practise, users expect to know how much profile information disclosed
in each profile matching protocol. They do not want to over-disclose the profile information.
Especially, when the disclosed information can be linked in multiple runs, the behavior of
an individual user will be more easily to track. We consider that users apply the multiple
pseudonym technique (Section 2.1). Then, the problem will be how to minimally change
the pseudonyms such that the leaked information cannot be used to identify the user.
In our protocols, instead of minimizing the disclosed information in each protocol run,
we focus on how to protect user anonymity in the multiple protocol runs. To address this
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point, we define the anonymity level for the profile matching protocols as the probability of
correctly guessing the profile of the user from the published profile samples. Note that, if a
user does not change the pseudonym, its anonymity continuingly decreases as the protocol
runs because the disclosed information will help narrow down the possibilities of the profile.
If a user changes the pseudonym, its anonymity is changed to the highest level because the
previous disclosed information will not be linked to the new pseudonym. In literature, user
privacy level and user anonymity level are both metrics for evaluating the protocols. The
user privacy level is often related to the disclosed information in one protocol run, while the
user anonymity level is a user-specific property that is defined in multiple protocol runs.
From our perspective, the user anonymity level is more practical for users to be adapted.
Considering a user ui has a profile pi from the profile sets (p1, · · · , pν) where any two
profiles are different. Denote the profile matching protocol as P(ui, pidi, uj, pidj) where ui
and uj run the protocol with their pseudonyms pidi and pidj. Pi(ui, pidi, uj, pidj) returns
the transactions that ui obtains from the protocol run, while Pj(ui, pidi, uj, pidj) returns
those of uj. An attacker A knows all profile samples and has many pseudonyms denoted
by (pida1 , · · · , pidax). In the following, we define three types of user anonymity levels for
profile matching protocols, i.e., non-anonymity, conditional anonymity, and full anonymity.
Definition 11 (Non-Anonymity) A profile matching protocol provides non-anonymity
if Pr[A(∑xz=1PA(A, pidaz , ui, pidi)) = pi] = 1.
Definition 12 (Conditional Anonymity) A profile matching protocol achieves condi-
tional anonymity if Pr[A(∑xz=1PA(A, pidaz , ui, pidi)) = pi] > 1ν .
Definition 13 (Full Anonymity) A profile matching protocol achieves full anonymity if
Pr[A(∑xz=1PA(A, pidaz , ui, pidi)) = pi] = 1ν .
In most recent works [26,31], the explicit and fuzzy matching results could be possibly
used to track user behavior. Thus, these works provide non-anonymity and conditional
anonymity. In comparison, the implicit matching results do not reveal the profile infor-
mation and the corresponding protocols achieve full anonymity. In the following, we in-
troduce three comparison-based profile matching protocols: an explicit Comparison-based
Profile Matching protocol (eCPM), an implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching pro-
tocol (iCPM), and an implicit Predicate-based Profile Matching protocol (iPPM) [57].
The eCPM achieves conditional anonymity while the eCPM and the iCPM achieve full
anonymity.
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3.3 PPM Solutions
We first use an example to describe the profile matching with the comparison operation.
Consider two CIA agents have two different priority levels in the CIA system, A with a
low priority lA and B with a high priority lB. They know each other as a CIA agent.
However, they do not want to reveal their priority levels to each other. B wants to share
some messages to A. The messages are not related to user profile, and they are divided into
multiple categories, e.g., the messages related to different regions (New York or Beijing) in
different years (2011 or 2012). B shares one message of a specified category T at a time.
The category T is chosen by A, but the choice is unknown to B. For each category, B
prepares two self-defined messages, e.g., a message m1 for the CIA agent at a lower level
and another message m2 for the agent at a higher level. Because lA < lB, A eventually
obtains m1. In the meantime, B does not know which message A receives. The above
profile matching offers both A and B the highest anonymity since neither the comparison
result between lA and lB is disclosed to A or B nor the category T of A’s interest is
disclosed to B. In the following, we refer to A as the initiator ui, B as the responder uj,
the attribute used in the comparison (i.e., priority level) as ax, and the category T of A’s
interest as Ty. The attribute values of ui and uj on the attribute ax are denoted by vi,x and
vj,x, respectively. We first formally describe two scenarios from the above examples: (a)
Attribute value vi,x and attribute value vj,x will not be disclosed to uj and ui, respectively.
The initiator obtains the comparison result at the end of the protocol. (b) vi,x and vj,x will
not be disclosed to uj and ui, respectively. In addition, category Ty will not be disclosed
to uj, and the comparison result will not be disclosed to any of ui and uj. The initiator
obtains either s1,y or s0,y depending on the comparison result between vi,x and vj,x.
Initiator 
ui
Responder 
uj
Initiator 
ui
Responder 
uj
vi,x = 0.8 vj,x= 0.5
E(s1,y)
vi,x = 0.8 vj,x= 0.5
vi,x > vj,x
vi,x = vj,x
vi,x < vj,x
vi,x > vj,x
(a) Scenario-1 (b) Scenario-2
vi,x > vj,x
vi,x < vj,x
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s1,1,  …,  s1,y, …,   s1,λ
s0,1,  …,  s0,y, …,   s0,λ
y-th dimension
Figure 3.1: Scenarios in privacy-preserving profile matching
Scenario-1: The initiator wants to know the comparison result, i.e., whether it has a
value larger, equal, or smaller than the responder on a specified attribute. For example, as
shown in Fig. 3.1 (a), the initiator ui expects to know if vi,x > vj,x, vi,x = vj,x, or vi,x < vj,x.
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Scenario-2: The initiator expects that the responder shares one message related to the
category of its interest, which is however kept unknown to the responder. In the meantime,
the responder wants to share with the initiator one message which is determined by the
comparison result of their attribute values. For example, as shown in Fig. 3.1 (b), both
ui and uj know that ax is used in the comparison and the categories of messages are
T1, · · · , Tλ. The initiator ui first generates a (0, 1)-vector where the y-th dimension value
is 1 and other dimension values are 0. Then, ui encrypts the vector with its own public key
and sends the ciphertexts (E(0), · · · , E(1), · · · , E(0)) to the responder uj. The ciphertexts
imply ui’s interested category Ty, but uj is unable to know Ty since E(0) and E(1) are
non-distinguishable without a decryption key. ui also provides its attribute value vi,x in
an encrypted form so that uj is unable to obtain vi,x. On the other hand, uj prepares λ
pairs of messages, each pair (s1,h, s0,h) relating to one category Th(1 ≤ h ≤ λ). uj executes
a calculation over the ciphertexts and sends the result to ui. Finally, ui obtains E(s1,y) if
vi,x > vj,x or E(s0,y) if vi,x < vj,x, and obtains s1,y or s0,y by the decryption.
3.3.1 Approach 1: Explicit Comparison-based Approach
In this section, we present the explicit Comparison-based Profile Matching protocol, i.e.,
eCPM. This protocol allows two users to compare their attribute values on a specified
attribute without disclosing the values to each other. But, the protocol reveals the com-
parison result to the initiator, and therefore offers conditional anonymity.
Bootstrapping: The protocol has a fundamental bootstrapping phase, where the TA
generates all system parameters, user pseudonyms, and keying materials. Specifically, the
TA runs G to generate 〈p, q, R,Rq, Rp, χ〉 for initiating the homomorphic encryption (see
Section 2.4.5). The TA generates a pair of public and private keys (pkTA, skTA) for itself.
The public key pkTA is open to all users; the private key skTA is a secret which will be
used to issue certificates for user pseudonyms and keying materials, as shown below.
The TA generates disjoint sets of pseudonyms (pidi) and disjoint sets of homomorphic
public keys (pki) for users (ui). For every pidi and pki of ui, the TA generates the corre-
sponding secret keys pski and ski. In correspondence to each pseudonym pidi, it assigns a
certificate certpidi to ui, which can be used to confirm the validity of pidi. Generally, the
TA uses skTA to generate a signature on pidi and pki. The TA outputs certpidi as a tuple
(pki, SignskTA(pidi, pki)). The homomorphic secret key ski is delivered to ui together with
pski; pki is tied to pidi and varies as the change of pseudonyms.
Protocol Steps: Consider user ui with a neighboring user uj. Denote by pidi the current
pseudonym of ui and by pidj that of uj. Recall that ax is an attribute, vi,x and vj,x the
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values of ui and uj on ax, and l the largest attribute value. Suppose that ui as an initiator
starts profile matching on ax with a responder uj. Let pski and pskj be the secret keys
corresponding to pidi and pidj, respectively. The protocol is executed as follows.
Step 1. ui calculates di = Epki(vi,x), and sends the following 5-tuple to uj.
(pidi, certpidi , ax, di, Signpski(ax, di))
Step 2. After receiving the 5-tuple, uj opens the certificate certpidi and obtains the
homomorphic public key pki and a signature. It checks certpidi to verify that (pki, pidi) are
generated by the TA, and it checks the signature to validate (ax, di). If any check is failed,
uj stops; otherwise, uj proceeds as follows. It uses pki to encrypt its own attribute value vj,x,
i.e., dj = Epki(vj,x); it chooses a random value ϕ ∈ Zp such that 1 ≤ ϕ < bp/(2l)c and m|ϕ
for any integer m ∈ [1, l− 1] (ϕ can be chosen dependent on uj’s anonymity requirement).
By the homomorphic property, it calculates Epki(vi,x − vj,x) and d′j = Epki(ϕ(vi,x − vj,x));
it finally sends a 5-tuple (pidj, certpidj , ax, d
′
j, Signpskj(ax, d
′
j)) to ui.
Step 3. After receiving the 5-tuple, ui opens the certificate certpidj and checks the
signature to make sure the validity of pidj and (ax, d
′
j). If the check is successful, ui uses
ski to decrypt d
′
j and obtains the comparison result c = ϕ(vi,x − vj,x). ui knows vi,x > vj,x
if 0 < c ≤ p−1
2
, vi,x = vj,x if c = 0, or vi,x < vj,x otherwise.
Effectiveness Discussion: The effectiveness of the eCPM is guaranteed by the following
theorems.
Theorem 1 (Correctness) In the eCPM, the initiator ui is able to obtain the correct
comparison result with the responder uj on a specified attribute ax.
Proof 1 Recall p l and 1 ≤ ϕ < bp/(2l)c. As 1 ≤ vi,x, vj,x ≤ l, we have −l < vi,x−vj,x <
l. If vi,x > vj,x, we have 0 < ϕ(vi,x − vj,x) < bp/(2l)c × l ≤ p/2. Because p is a prime and
ϕ(vi,x− vj,x) is an integer, we have 0 < ϕ(vi,x− vj,x) ≤ (p− 1)/2. In case of vi,x < vj,x, we
may similarly derive (p+ 1)/2 ≤ ϕ(vi,x − vj,x) < p. Thus, by comparing ϕ(vi,x − vj,x) with
0, (p− 1)/2 and (p+ 1)/2, ui is able to know whether vi,x > vj,x, vi,x = vj,x, or vi,x < vj,x.
Theorem 2 (Anonymity) The eCPM does not disclose the attribute values of partici-
pating users.
Proof 2 The initiator ui who starts the protocol for attribute ax encrypts its attribute value
vi,x using its homomorphic public key pki. Thus, the responder uj is unable to know any
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information about vi,x. On the other side, the responder uj does not transmit its attribute
value vj,x, but returns ϕ(vi,x−vj,x) to ui, where ϕ is a random factor added for anonymity.
Since m|ϕ for 1 ≤ m ≤ l−1, we have m|(ϕ(vi,x−vj,x)). Thus, (vi,x−vj,x) can be any value
between −(l − 1) and l − 1 from ui’s view, and the exact value of vj,x is thus protected.
Theorem 3 (Non-forgeability) The eCPM discourages profile forgery attack at the cost
of involving the TA for signature verification and data decryption.
Proof 3 Consider two users ui and uj running the eCPM with each other on attribute ax.
Their public keys pki and pkj used for homomorphic encryption are generated by the TA,
and the TA has full knowledge of the corresponding private keys ski and skj. In addition,
their attribute values are generated by the TA and recorded in the TA’s local repository,
and the TA can retrieve any attribute value of users (e.g. vi,x or vj,x) anytime when
necessary. After the two users finish the protocol, ui will have Signpskj(d
′
j), and uj will have
Signpski(di). If ui(uj) uses the forged profile in the protocol, uj(ui) can cooperate with the
TA to trace such malicious attack. Specifically, uj(ui) can send Signpski(di) (Signpskj(d
′
j))
to the TA. the TA will be able to check if the signatures are valid and the encrypted values
are consistent with vi,x and vj,x. Thus, any profile forgery attack can be detected with the
help from the TA, and such attacks will be discouraged.
3.3.2 Approach 2: Implicit Comparison-based Approach
In this section, we introduce the implicit Comparison-based Profile Matching (iCPM) by
adopting the oblivious transfer cryptographic technique [87]. We consider users have dis-
tinct values for any given attribute. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the iCPM consists of three main
steps. In the first step, ui chooses an interested category Ty by setting y-th element to 1
and other elements to 0 in a λ-length vector Vi. ui then encrypt the vector by using the
homomorphic encryption and sends the encrypted vector to uj. Thus, uj is unable to know
Ty but still can process on the ciphertext. In the second step, uj computes the ciphertexts
with input of self-defined messages (s1,h, s0,h) for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ, two encrypted vectors (mi, di),
and its own attribute value vj,x. In the last step, ui decrypts the ciphertext and obtain s1,y
if vi,x > vj,x or s0,y if vi,x < vj,x.
Protocol Steps: In the iCPM, the responder uj prepares λ pairs of messages (s0,h, s1,h)
for category Th (1 ≤ h ≤ λ) where s0,h, s1,h ∈ Zp and s0,h, s1,h ≤ (p−1)/2. These messages
are not related to uj’s profile. The initiator ui first decides which category Ty it wants to
receive messages related to. But ui does not disclose Ty to uj. Then, the responder uj
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shares either s0,y or s1,y to ui without knowing which one will be received by ui. When the
protocol finishes, ui receives one of s0,y and s1,y with no clue about the comparison result.
We elaborate the protocol steps below.
Initiator ui Responder uj
Vi = (0, … , 1, …, 0)
mi=Epki(Vi)
di = (Epki(bi,x,1), 
…, Epki(bi,x,θ))
mi, di
bj,x,1, …, bj,x,θ
mi, di
For 1≤h≤λ, (s1,h, s0,h) Epki(μ) = (Epki(μ1), …, Epki(μθ))
Decrypt dj and obtain
s1,y, if vi,x > vj,x
s0,y, if vi,x < vj,x
1
3
2
dj
Figure 3.2: The iCPM flow
Step 1. ui generates a vector Vi = (v1, · · · , vλ), where vy = 1 and vh = 0 for
1 ≤ h ≤ λ and h 6= y. This vector implies that ui is interested in the category Ty. ui sets
mi = Epki(Vi) = (Epki(v1), · · · , Epki(vλ)). It converts vi,x to binary bits 〈bi,x,1, · · · , bi,x,θ〉,
where θ = dlog le, and sets di = (Epki(bi,x,1), · · · , Epki(bi,x,θ)). It sends uj a 6-tuple
(pidi, certpidi , ax, di,mi, Signpski(ax, di,mi)).
Step 2. After receiving the 6-tuple, uj checks if (pidi, certpidi) are generated by the TA
and the signature is generated by ui. If both checks are successful, it knows that (ax, di,mi)
is valid. uj proceeds as follows:
1. Convert vj,x to binary bits 〈bj,x,1, · · · , bj,x,θ〉 and compute Epki(bj,x,t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ θ.
2. Compute e′t = Epki(bi,x,t)− Epki(bj,x,t) = Epki(ζ ′t).
3. Compute e′′t = (Epki(bi,x,t)− Epki(bj,x,t))2 = Epki(ζ ′′t ).
4. Set γ0 = 0, and compute Epki(γt) as 2Epki(γt−1) + e
′′
t , which implies γt = 2γt−1 + ζ
′′
t .
5. Select a random rt ∈ Rp in the form of ax + b where a, b ∈ Zp, a 6= 0, and compute
Epki(δt) as Epki(ζ
′
t)+Epki(rt)× (Epki(γt)−Epki(1)), which implies δt = ζ ′t + rt(γt−1).
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6. Select a random rp ∈ Zp (rp 6= 0), and compute Epki(µt) as
λ∑
h=1
((s1,h + s0,h)Epki(1) + s1,hEpki(δt)− s0,hEpki(δt))
× (rp((Epki(vh))2 − Epki(vh)) + Epki(vh))
+ rp(
λ∑
h=1
Epki(vh)− Epki(1)).
(3.3)
which implies µt =
∑λ
h=1(s1,h(1+δt)+s0,h(1−δt))((v2h−vh)rp+vh)+(
∑λ
h=1 vh−1)rp.
Then, uj compiles Epki(µ) = (Epki(µ1), · · · , Epki(µθ)), and makes a random permutation
to obtain dj = P(Epki(µ)). It finally sends a 5-tuple (pidj, certpidj , ax, dj, Signpskj(ax, dj))
to ui.
Step 3. ui checks the validity of the received 5-tuple. Then, it decrypts every ciphertext
Epki(µt) in dj as follows: for Epki(µt) = (c0, · · · , cα), obtain µt by µt = (
∑α
h=0 chs
h) mod p.
If vi,x > vj,x, ui is able to find a plaintext µt ∈ Zp and µt = 2s1,y ≤ p − 1 and computes
s1,y; if vi,x < vj,x, ui is able to find µt = 2s0,y and computes s0,y.
Effectiveness Discussion: The correctness of the iCPM can be verified as follows. If
vi,x > vj,x, then there must exist a position, say the t
∗-th position, in the binary expressions
of vi,x and vj,x such that bi,x,t∗ = 1, bj,x,t∗ = 0 and bi,x,t′ = bj,x,t′ for all t
′ < t∗. Since
γt = 2γt−1 +ζ ′′t , we have γt′ = 0, γt∗ = 1, and δt∗ = 1. For t
′′ > t∗, we have γt′′ ≥ 2, and δt is
a random value due to rt′′ . Since s0,y and s1,y are elements of Zp and rt is in the form of ax+b
(a, b ∈ Zp, a 6= 0), ui can always determine the effective plaintext from others. The effective
plaintext will be µt =
∑λ
h=1(s1,h(1+ δt∗)+s0,h(1− δt∗))((v2h−vh)rp+vh)+(
∑λ
h=1 vh−1)rp.
If the vector Vi from ui does not satisfy
∑λ
h=1 vh = 1 or vh ∈ {0, 1}, ui cannot remove
the random factor rp; if Vi satisfies the conditions, only s1,y and s0,y will be involved in
the computation. Because δt∗ = 1, ui can obtain µt = 2s1,y ≤ p − 1 and recovers s1,y. If
vi,x < vj,x, we similarly have µt = 2s0,y and ui can obtain s0,y.
The confidentiality of user profiles is guaranteed by the homomorphic encryption. The
comparison result δt is always in the encrypted format, and δt is not directly disclosed to ui.
The revealed information is either s1,y or s0,y which is unrelated to user profiles. Therefore,
the protocol transactions do not help in guessing the profiles, and the full anonymity is
provided. In the meantime, vector Vi is always in an encrypted format so that uj is unable
to know the interested category Ty of ui. In addition, uj ensures that only one of s1,y and
s0,y will be revealed to ui. The non-forgeability property is similar to that of the eCPM.
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ui will not lie as it makes signature Signpski(ax, di) and gives it to uj. The profile forgery
attack will be detected if uj reports the signature to the TA. Moreover, uj has no need to
lie as it can achieve the same objective by simply modifying the contents of s1,y and s0,y.
3.3.3 Approach 3: Implicit Predicate-based Approach
Both the eCPM and the iCPM perform profile matching on a single attribute. For a match-
ing involving multiple attributes, they have to be executed multiple times, each time on
one attribute. In this section, we extend the iCPM to the multi-attribute cases, without
jeopardizing its anonymity property, and obtain an implicit Predicate-based Profile Match-
ing protocol, i.e., iPPM. This protocol relies on a predicate which is a logical expression
made of multiple comparisons spanning distinct attributes and thus supports sophisticated
matching criteria within a single protocol run (similar to [88]).
As shown in Fig. 3.3, the iPPM is composed of three main steps. In the first step, differ-
ent from the iCPM, ui sends to uj n encrypted vectors of its attribute values corresponding
to the attributes in A where A (|A| = n ≤ w) is the attribute set of the predicate Π. In the
second step, uj sets 2λ polynomial functions fsat,h(x), funsat,h(x) for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ. uj then
generates 2λn secret shares from fsat,h(x), funsat,h(x) by choosing 1 ≤ h ≤ λ, 1 ≤ x ≤ n,
and arranges them in a certain structure according to the predicate Π. For every 2λ secret
shares with the same index h, similar to the step 2 of the iCPM, uj generates θ ciphertexts.
uj obtains nθ ciphertexts at the end of the second step. In the third step, ui decrypts these
nθ ciphertexts and finds n secret shares of s1,y and s0,y. uj finally can obtain s1,y or s0,y
from the secret shares.
Initiator ui Responder uj
Vi = (0, … , 1, …, 0)
mi=Epki(Vi)
di = (Epki(bi,x,1), …, Epki(bi,x,θ)
…, …, )
mi, di
bj,x,1, …, bj,x,θ
mi, di
For 1≤h≤λ, (s1,h,x, s0,h,x)djDecrypt dj and obtain
n secret shares of s1,y and s0,y 3
2
1 Set functions fsat and funsat
For ax, 
Set predicate π
dj
generate s1,h,x and s0,h,x for 1≤h≤λ, 
Figure 3.3: The iPPM flow
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The iPPM is obtained by combining the iCPM with a secret sharing scheme [83] to
support a predicate matching. The initiator ui sends its attribute values corresponding
to the attributes in A to the responder uj. Without loss of generality, we assume A =
{a1, · · · , an}. Then, uj defines a predicate Π = “t¯ of {(vi,x, opt, vj,x)|ax ∈ A}”, where the
comparison operator opt is either > or < and t¯ ≤ n. The predicate contains n number
of requirements (i.e., comparisons), each for a distinct ax. The responder uj determines λ
pairs of messages (s0,h, s1,h) for attributes ah (1 ≤ h ≤ λ). The initiator ui receives s1,h if
at least t¯ of the n requirements are satisfied, or s0,h otherwise. Similar to the iCPM, Ty is
determined by ui but unknown to uj. The threshold gate 1 ≤ t¯ ≤ n is chosen by uj. When
n = 1, the iPPM reduces to the iCPM. The protocol steps are given below.
Step 1. ui generates a vector Vi = (v1, · · · , vλ), where vy = 1 and vh = 0 for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ
and z 6= y, and sets mi = Epki(Vi) = (Epki(v1), · · · , Epki(vλ)). In addition, ui selects the
attribute set A (|A| = n), and sends uj a 6-tuple:
(pidi, certpidi , A, di,mi, Signpski(A, di,mi)),
where di contains nθ (θ = dlog le) ciphertexts as the homomorphic encryption results of
each bit of vi,x for ax ∈ A.
Step 2. uj checks the validity of the received 6-tuple (similar to the Step 2 of the
iCPM). It creates a predicate Π and chooses the threshold gate t¯. Using the secret shar-
ing scheme [83], uj creates 2λ polynomials: fsat,h(v) = ρt¯−1,hvt¯−1 + · · · + ρ1,hv + s1,h and
funsat,h(v) = ρ
′
n−t¯,hv
n−t¯+· · ·+ρ′1,hv+s0,h for 1 ≤ h ≤ λ, where ρt¯−1,h, · · · , ρ1,h, ρ′n−t¯,h, · · · , ρ′1,h
are random numbers from Z∗p. For each attribute ax ∈ A, it calculates the secret shares of
s1,h,x and s0,h,x as follows (s1,h,x, s0,h,x ≤ (p− 1)/2 are required):
s0,h,x = 0||funsat,h(x),
s1,h,x = 1||fsat,h(x), if “vi,x > vj,x” ∈ Π;
s0,h,x = 1||fsat,h(x),
s1,h,x = 0||funsat,h(x), if “vi,x < vj,x” ∈ Π.
(3.4)
Note that uj adds a prefix 0 or 1 to each secret share such that ui is able to differentiate
the two sets of shared secrets, one for s1,h, the other for s0,h. uj runs the Step 2 of the iCPM
n times, each time for a distinct attribute ax ∈ A and with (s1,h,x, s0,h,x) for (1 ≤ h ≤ λ)
being input as s1,h and s0,h, respectively. uj then obtains dj including nθ ciphertexts.
Finally, it sends a 6-tuple (pidj, certpidj , t¯, A, dj, Signpskj(dj)) to ui.
Step 3. ui checks the validity of the received 6-tuple. ui can obtain n secret shares,
and each of these shares is either for s0,y or s1,y. It then classifies the n shares into two
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groups by looking at the starting bit (either ‘0’ or ‘1’). Thus, if Π is satisfied, ui can obtain
at least t¯ secret shares of s1,y and be able to recover s1,y; otherwise, it must obtain at least
n− t¯+ 1 secret shares of s0,y and can recover s0,y.
The correctness of the iPPM is as follows. At Step 2, the responder uj executes the Step
2 of the iCPM n times, each time it effectively delivers only one secret share of either s0,y
or s1,y to ui. When ui receives either t¯ shares of s1,y or n− t¯+1 shares of s0,y, it can recover
either s1,y or s0,y. The interpolation function corresponding to the secret sharing scheme
always guarantees the correctness. The anonymity and non-forgeability of the iPPM are
achieved similar to those of the iCPM and the eCPM, respectively.
Efficiency Discussion: Let |R| be the size of one ring element in Rq. In the eCPM,
the initiator and the responder both need to send ciphertexts in size of 2|R|, and the
communication overhead is thus subject only to the system parameter |R|.
In order to achieve full anonymity, the iCPM constructs ciphertext in a sequence of
operations. From Section 2.4.5, we know |Enc(b)| = 2|R|. Thus, the communication
overhead of the initiator is 2(θ + λ)|R| with θ = dlog le. It can be seen that the initiator’s
communication overhead increases with system parameters (θ, λ). According to Section
2.4.5 an addition operation of homomorphic encryption does not increase the ciphertext
size, while a multiplication with inputs of two ciphertexts of lengths a|R| and b|R| outputs
a (a + b − 1)|R|-length ciphertext. Thus, in the iCPM, the communication overhead of
the responder increases to 6θ|R|. It is concluded that the communication overhead of the
eCPM and the iCPM is constantly dependent on system parameters (θ, λ).
The iPPM extends the iCPM by building complex predicates. From the protocol de-
scription, we observe that if a predicate includes n ≥ 1 comparisons, the communication
overhead of the iPPM would be approximately n times of that in the iCPM.
3.4 Anonymity Enhancing Techniques
3.4.1 Anonymity Measurement
Suppose that user ui is currently using pseudonym pidi to execute profile matching with
others. We consider an adversary aiming to break the k-anonymity of ui. We have the
following definition:
Definition 14 The k-anonymity risk level of a user is defined as the inverse of the min-
imum number of distinct protocol runs (MNDPR) that are required to break the user’s
k-anonymity.
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From this definition, the k-anonymity risk level reflects the difficulty that the adversary
can break a user’s k-anonymity. In the iCPM and the iPPM, the profile matching initiator
does not reveal its attribute values to the responder, and the responder has no clue about
the comparison result and only reveals the self-defined messages which are not related to
the profile. In this case, a user’s k-anonymity risk level can be minimum, i.e., no matter
how many protocol runs are executed, its k-anonymity risk level is always the lowest.
Therefore, the iCPM and the iPPM both provide full anonymity (put users at minimum
anonymity risk).
target
comparedcompared
K L
I uncompared values J uncompared values
K+L+1 anonymity set
Figure 3.4: Identifying the target from others
For the eCPM, it exposes the comparison results to users and thus obviously puts users
at risk of the disclosure of attribute values. Because every eCPM run is executed for a
particular attribute (which is specified by the initiator), any user ui has a k-anonymity risk
level on its each individual attribute. When “=” case happens, users have higher anonymity
level because they will be indistinguishable from other users with the same attribute values.
In the following, we consider the worst case where users have distinctive attribute values
on a single attribute. For a given attribute ax, we assume a1,x > a2,x > · · · > aN,x, where
vi,x is the value of ui on ax. In order to break ui’s k-anonymity on ax, the adversary has
to make comparisons ‘aα,x > vi,x’ and ‘vi,x > aβ,x’ for β−α− 1 < k so that the anonymity
set of vi,x has a size smaller than k. Let I and J respectively be the numbers of larger and
smaller values on ax among all the users that have not been compared to vi,x. Let K ≤ I
and L ≤ J respectively be the number of such un-compared values in the k-anonymity set
of vi,x. The relations among I, J,K, and L are shown in Fig. 3.4. Assuming the contact is
uniformly random, we define a recursive function f as shown in Eqn. (3.5).
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f(I, J,K, L) =

0, if K + L < k − 1 or I < K or J < L;
I −K
I + J
(f(I − 1, J,K, L) + 1) + J − L
I + J
(f(I, J − 1, K, L) + 1)+∑K
z=1(f(I − 1, J,K − z, L) + 1)
I + J
+
∑L
z=1(f(I, J − 1, K, L− z) + 1)
I + J
, otherwise
(3.5)
The above function f(I, J,K, L) returns the MNDPR with respect to a user’s k-
anonymity on ax in the eCPM. Thus, the user’s anonymity risk level in this case is defined
as L = 1/f(I, J,K, L). Since we assumed a1,x, · · · aN,x are sorted in a descending order,
the index i actually reflects the rank of vi,x among the attribute values. Fig. 3.5 plots
the MNDPR f(I, J,K, L) and the k-anonymity risk level L in terms of 78 users’ attribute
values where k = 5, 10, · · · , 25. It can be seen that a user with a median attribute value
will have a lower k-anonymity risk level than those with larger or smaller values. This is
reasonable because the user with a median attribute value is less distinctive from other
users.
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Figure 3.5: Numerical results on user anonymity risk level
3.4.2 Anonymity Enhancement
We have derived the maximum number of distinct eCPM runs (MNDPR) before a user’s
k-anonymity is broken. This number is obtained under an assumption of uniformly random
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contact. However, in reality, users as social entities are likely to gather with others who
have similar attribute values. This situation increases user anonymity risk level quickly
when profile matching is executed frequently, and the k-anonymity can be broken within
a much smaller number of the eCPM runs as a result. Recall that multi-pseudonym
techniques are used to protect user identity and location privacy. Similar to previous
work [25,74], here we consider that pseudonyms themselves are unlinkable. In the eCPM,
if a user does not change the pseudonym, the comparison result will be easily linked to
break the k-anonymity. If a user changes pseudonym for each protocol run, information
revealed by the protocol cannot be directly linked, and the user obtains highest anonymity.
Nevertheless, it is desirable that the user changes pseudonym only when necessary, since
pseudonyms are limited resources and have associated cost [25, 74] (e.g., communication
cost for obtaining them from the TA and computation cost for generating them on the
TA). Thus, user anonymity is tightly related with pseudonym change frequency.
Our goal is to improve the anonymity strength of the eCPM by combining it with a
pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy which enables users to take necessary pseudonym
change action before their k-anonymity is broken. The new verso of the eCPM is referred to
as eCPM+. Before presenting the pre-adaptive strategy, we first introduce a post-adaptive
pseudonym change strategy, where users measure their anonymity risk levels periodically
and change their pseudonym after their anonymity risk levels becomes larger than a pre-
defined threshold value.
The post-adaptive strategy assumes that a user uj as responder runs the protocol on an
attribute ax with an initiator ui (recognized by seeing the same pseudonym) only once, and
refuses to participate any subsequent protocol running on the same ax with ui. However,
if ui has changed its pseudonym since the last protocol running with uj, then uj will
consider ui as a new partner and participate the protocol. Time is divided into slots of
equal duration. The neighborhood status of ui on attribute ax in a time slot is characterized
by a pair of values NSi,x = (ni,x,s, ni,x,l), respectively implying the number of new partners
(identified in the time slot) with attribute values smaller than vi,x and the number of those
with attribute values larger than vi,x. It varies over time due to user mobility and can be
modeled as a time series data.
The centre of this strategy is the continuous measurement of user anonymity risk level
based on neighborhood status. In the iCPM, attribute values are protected, and users
obtain the matching results. For every attribute ax, user ui maintains the numbers Ni,x,s
and Ni,x,l of discovered values that are smaller and larger than its own value vi,x since the
last change of pseudonyms. These two numbers are respectively the sum of individual ni,x,s
and the sum of ni,x,l corresponding to the past several time slots. Recall that vi,x is ranked
the i-th largest among all N users in the network. Let I = i− 1 and J = N − i. ui is not
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able to compute the accurate MNDPR because it does not have the information of the last
two arguments of function f() (see Eqn. 3.5). The anonymity risk level of ui on ax may
be estimated as L = 1/f ′(Ni,x,s, Ni,x,l), where f ′(Ni,x,s, Ni,x,l) approximates the MNDPR
of ui regarding ax and is given as
∑
1≤α≤I−Ni,x,s
1≤β≤J−Ni,x,l
Pr[(α, β)] · f(I −Ni,x,s, J −Ni,x,l, α, β). For
simplicity, we assume that the Ni,x,s values are randomly distributed among the I−α users
(0 ≤ α ≤ I − Ni,x,s) with larger values on ax than ui and the Ni,x,l values are randomly
distributed among the J − β smaller-value users (0 ≤ β ≤ J −Ni,x,l). Thus, for Ni,x,s ≥ 1
and Ni,x,l ≥ 1, we have f ′(Ni,x,s, Ni,x,l) as
∑
0≤α≤I−Ni,x,s
0≤β≤J−Ni,x,l
(I−α−1Ni,x,s−1)(
J−β−1
Ni,x,l−1)
(INi,x,s)(
J
Ni,x,l
)
f(I −Ni,x,s, J −Ni,x,l, α, β). (3.6)
For Ni,x,s = 0 and Ni,x,l ≥ 1, f ′(Ni,x,s, Ni,x,l) is
∑
0≤β≤J−Ni,x,l
(J−β−1Ni,x,l−1)
(JNi,x,l)
· f(I, J −Ni,x,l, I, β). (3.7)
For Ni,x,s ≥ 1 and Ni,x,l = 0, f ′(Ni,x,s, Ni,x,l) is
∑
0≤α≤I−Ni,x,s
(I−α−1Ni,x,s−1)
(INi,x,s)
· f(I −Ni,x,s, J, α, J). (3.8)
In the above computation, ui needs to know N and its value rank i. The information
can be obtained from the TA when ui registers to the TA. If users are allowed to freely
leave and enter the network, they will need to de-register/re-register themselves with the
TA when leaving/joining the network. In this case, (N, t) are changing, and the TA has
to be involved in the network operation in order to maintain latest network status and
update users with the latest information.
The post-adaptive strategy also relies on pseudonym lifetime for making pseudonym
change decisions. Suppose that user ui is currently using pseudonym pidi. The longer
pidi has been used, the more private information of ui is leaked in case its anonymity has
been broken. Hence, when ui’s anonymity risk level Li has stayed unchanged for a certain
duration, called the lifetime of pidi and denoted by τ(pidi), ui changes its pseudonym for
damage control. However, τ(pidi) should not be given as a constant value, but subject to
Li. The higher Li is, the more possible the anonymity of ui is broken, and therefore the
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smaller τ(pidi) is. We define τ(pidi) = ξ
MNDPRi
Li , where MNDPRi is obtained by Eqn. 3.5
and ξ > 1 is the pseudonym lifetime factor.
For the pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy, each user ui initializes an ARMA
model for its neighborhood status on every attribute when entering the network. Since it
has w attributes, the number of ARMA models to be initialized is w. At the end of each
time slot, it measures its current neighborhood status on each attribute and updates the
corresponding ARMA models. It takes the post-adaptive strategy for each attribute to
determine whether to change its pseudonym. In case pseudonym change is not suggested,
it proceeds to predict the neighborhood status on all the attributes in the following time
slot using the ARMA models. If one of the predicted neighborhood status leads to an
unacceptable anonymity risk level, it changes its pseudonym; otherwise, it does not. The
pre-adaptive strategy strengths the post-adaptive strategy by one-step ahead prediction
based decision making and generally enhances user anonymity.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
The eCPM+ addresses accumulative anonymity risk in multiple protocol runs and tunes
itself automatically to maintain desired anonymity strength. Some previous works [28,31]
are concerned only with the anonymity risk brought by each individual protocol run, and
some works [26] reduce anonymity risk by manually adjusting certain threshold values.
Though they provide the conditional anonymity as the eCPM, they are not comparable
to the eCPM and the eCPM+ because the anonymity protection of users is considered
in terms of consecutive protocol runs. Therefore, in this section we evaluate the eCPM+
(which uses a pre-adaptive pseudonym change strategy) in comparison with two other
eCPM variants, respectively employing a constant pseudonym change interval z (CONST-
z) and a post-adaptive pseudonym change strategy (Post).
3.5.1 Simulation Setup
Our simulation study is based on the real trace [35] collected from 78 users attending a
conference during a four-day period. A contact means that two users come close to each
other and their attached Bluetooth devices detect each other. The users’ Bluetooth devices
run a discovery program every 120 seconds on average and logged about 128, 979 contacts.
Each contact is characterized by two users, a start-time, and a duration. In CONST-z,
we set the pseudonym change interval z from 1 to 40 (time slots); in the post-adaptive
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and pre-adaptive strategies, we set pseudonym lifetime factor ξ = 30. In the pre-adaptive
strategy, we use ARMA order (10, 5).
We use the contact data to generate user profiles. According to social community
observations [89], users within the same social community often have common interests
and are likely interconnected through strong social ties [20]. The stronger tie two users
have, the more likely they contact frequently. Let fi,j denote the number of contacts of
users ui and uj. We build a complete graph of users and weight each edge (ui, uj) by fi,j.
By removing the edges with a weight smaller then 100, we obtain a graph G containing
78 vertices and 2863 edges. We find all maximal cliques in G using the Bron-Kerbosch
algorithm [90]. A clique is a complete subgraph. A maximal clique is a clique that cannot
be extended by including one more adjacent vertex. We obtain the 7550 maximal cliques
C1, · · · , C7550 that all contain ≥ 15 users.
Without loss of generality, we assume that these cliques are sorted in the descending
order of the weight sum of their edges (the weight sum of C1 is the largest). We then
construct communities in the following way. Scan the sequence of cliques from C1 to
C7550. For a scanned clique Ci, find a clique Cj that has been previously scanned and
identified as core clique and contains ≥ 80% vertices of Ci. If there are multiple such
cliques, take the one with largest weight sum as Cj. If Cj is found, assign Ci with the same
attribute as Cj; otherwise, generate a new attribute, assign it to Ci, and mark Ci as a core
clique. After the attribute generation and assignment, merge the cliques with the same
attribute into a community. A community contains multiple users, and a user may belong
to multiple communities. From the above settings, we generate 349 attributes and thus
obtain 349 communities. We however concentrate on the first generated 100 attributes
and their corresponding communities for simplicity. On average, each of these considered
communities contains 28 users, and each user belongs to 38 communities.
Afterwards, we assign values to each user in G for these 100 attributes. For an attribute
ax, we find the corresponding community Cx and do the following. For each user in Cx,
we compute the weight sum of its incidental edges in Cx; for each vertex outside Cx, we
compute the weight sum of its incident edges to the vertices in Cx; then, we sort all the
users in the decreasing order of their weight sums and assigned their values on ax with
(78, 77, · · · , 1). This assignment method is reasonable because a large weight sum indicates
a large interest in communicating with users in Cx and thus a strong background in the
aspect represented by ax.
Our simulation spans 10, 000 time slots, each lasting 30 seconds, and focuses on a
randomly selected attribute. Users can change their pseudonym at the beginning of each
time slot. The pseudonym is corrupted in terms of k-anonymity (on the selected attribute)
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if there are less than k − 1 other users in the network that will obtain the same matching
results in the same protocol settings. A user experiences an anonymity break (on the
selected attribute) if it is using a corrupted pseudonym.
3.5.2 Simulation Results
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Figure 3.6: Anonymity break period under the constant strategy
Figure 3.6 shows the anonymity break period experienced by each user with the constant
strategy being used. It can be seen that when z = 1, each user experiences the shortest
anonymity break period at the cost of 10, 000 pseudonyms per user. Anonymity break
is still possible in this extreme case because users may have multiple contacts within a
single time slot while they are still using the same pseudonym. If a user has a more
restrictive anonymity requirement (e.g., from 10-anonymity to 30-anonymity) or uses a
larger pseudonym change interval (from 1 time slot to 20 time-slots), it will have more
corrupted pseudonyms and thus suffer a longer period of anonymity break.
The neighborhood status of a user on a given attribute is characterized by the number
of neighbors with larger values and the number of neighbors with smaller values. We
investigate the regularity of neighborhood status of individual users over time and justify
the effectiveness of pre-adaptive strategy. To do so, we randomly choose two users, ranked
respectively the 7th and the 32nd. Figure 3.7 shows their neighborhood status. The 7th
user’s neighborhood status exhibits regular change, i.e., the number of neighbors with
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Figure 3.7: Neighborhood status over time
larger values stays stable, and that of neighbors with smaller values decrease linearly over
time. For the 32nd user, the number of users with larger values and the number of users
with smaller values both decrease.
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Figure 3.8: Anonymity risk level over time (th = 0.15)
We choose the 32nd user, who in general has lower anonymity risk level than the 7th
user, and show its 10-anonymity risk level in two consecutive time periods (2000, 3200)
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and (8200, 9400) with the post-adaptive strategy in Fig 3.8. The anonymity risk level
threshold is th = 0.15. In the figure, the drop from a high risk level to a low risk level
indicates a pseudonym change. Recall that a user changes its pseudonym not only when the
anonymity risk level is beyond threshold th but also when its current pseudonym expires.
This is reflected by the anonymity risk level drop happened below the threshold line in
the figure. From Fig. 3.7, we can see that the pseudonym change frequency is high when
the user encounters a large number of neighbors. This is reasonable as a large number of
profile matching runs are executed in this case, and the user’s anonymity risk level grows
quickly. When the level is beyond a pre-defined threshold, the user changes its pseudonym.
Figure 3.9 shows the performance of the constant, the post-adaptive and the pre-
adaptive strategies respectively for 5-anonymity and 10-anonymity, in relation with thresh-
old th. The results are obtained with respect to the 32nd user. For the constant strategy,
multiple lines are plotted, respectively corresponding to z = {1, 2, 4, 10, 20, 40}. As z goes
up, the user consumes a decreasingly number of pseudonyms and has an increasingly break
ratio (the ratio of the number of time slots that the k-anonymity of the 32nd user is broken
to 10,000). It can be seen that the number of pseudonyms consumed by the post-adaptive
and pre-adaptive strategies are much smaller than those of the constant strategy. For
example, in the case of 5-anonymity and th = 0.0763, the post-adaptive strategy spends
369 pseudonyms and results in a 514 time slot anonymity break period. The constant
strategy consumes 500(> 369) pseudonyms and has a 0.0540(> 0.0514) break ratio. The
post-adaptive strategy outperforms the constant strategy in anonymity protection by using
fewer pseudonyms to achieve smaller break ratio. Similar phenomena are observed for other
th values and 10-anonymity scenario as well. In particular, we find that as expected, the
pre-adaptive strategy leads to yet better anonymity performance than the post-adaptive
one. Fig. 3.9 shows that in case of 5-anonymity and th = 0.0763, the pre-adaptive strategy
consumes 449(> 369) pseudonyms and results in a 0.0445(< 0.0514) break ratio. The pre-
adaptive strategy consumes slightly more pseudonyms, but achieves significantly shorter
anonymity break period.
3.6 Related Work
In general, the profile matching can be categorized based on the formats of profiles and the
types of matching operations. A well-known profile matching is the FNP scheme [62], where
a client and a server compute their intersection set such that the client gets the result while
the server learns nothing. Later, Kissner et al. [91] implemented profile matching with more
operations including set intersection, union, cardinality and over-threshold operations. On
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Figure 3.9: Pseudonyms and break ratio (the 32nd user)
48
the other hand, Ye et al. [92] further extended the FNP scheme to a distributed private
matching scheme and Dachman-Soled et al. [93] aimed at reducing the protocol complexity.
All the above solutions to the set intersection rely on homomorphic encryption operation.
In the meantime, other works [94, 95] employed an oblivious pseudo random function to
build their profile matching protocols, where communication and computational efficiency
is improved. Li et al. [28] implemented profile matching according to three increasing pri-
vacy levels: i) revealing the common attribute set of the two users; ii) revealing the size
of the common attribute set; and iii) revealing the size rank of the common attribute sets
between a user and its neighbors. They considered an honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary
model, which assumes that users try to learn more information than allowed by inferring
from the profile matching results, but honestly following the protocol. They applied se-
cure multiparty computation, the Shamir secret sharing scheme, and the homomorphic
encryption scheme to achieve the confidentiality of user profiles.
In another category of profile matching [26,31,96], profiles can be represented as vectors,
and matching operation can be inner product or distance. Such profile matching is a
special instance of the secure two-party computation, which was initially introduced by
Yao [97] and later generalized to the secure multi-party computation by Goldreich et al. [98].
Specifically, we introduce two recent works in this category. Dong et al. [26] considered
user profile consisting of attribute values and measured the proximity of two user profiles
using dot product fdot(u, v). An existing dot product protocol [99] is improved to enable
verifiable secure computation. The improved protocol only reveals whether the dot product
is above or below a given threshold. The threshold value is selected by the user who
initiates the profile matching. They pointed out the potential anonymity risk of their
protocols; an adversary may adaptively adjust the threshold value to quickly narrow down
the value range of the victim profile. Thus, it is required that the threshold value must be
larger than a pre-defined lower bound (a system parameter) to guarantee user anonymity.
The same problem exists in other works [28, 31]. Furthermore, Dong et al. [26] required
users to make a commitment about their profiles to ensure the profile consistency, but
profile forgery attack may still take place during the commitment phase. In the same
category, Zhang et al. [31] set the matching operation fdis(u, v) of two d-dimension user
profiles u and v as the calculation of the following distances: i) Manhattan distance, i.e.,
fdis(u, v) = lα(u, v) = (
∑d
1 |vi − ui|α)
1
α ; or ii) Max distance, i.e., fdis(u, v) = lmax(u, v) =
max{|v1 − u1|, · · · , |vd − ud|}. The distance is compared with a pre-defined threshold τ to
determine whether u and v match. Then, three increasing privacy levels are defined as:
i) one of u and v learns fdis(u, v), and the other only learns fdis; ii) one of them learns
fdis(u, v), and the other learns nothing; and iii) one of them learns whether fdis(u, v) < τ ,
and the other learns nothing.
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3.7 Summary
We have investigated the privacy-preserving profile matching problem, and introduced
three comparison-based profile matching protocols, the explicit comparison-based pro-
file matching protocol (eCPM), the implicit comparison-based profile matching proto-
col (iCPM), and the implicit predicate-based profile matching protocol (iPPM). We have
shown that the eCPM achieves conditional anonymity and both the iCPM and the iPPM
achieves full anonymity. We have further introduced an enhanced version of the eCPM,
i.e., eCPM+, by exploiting the prediction method and the pre-adaptive pseudonym change.
The effectiveness of the eCPM+ is validated through extensive simulations using real-trace
data.
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Chapter 4
Cooperative Data Forwarding
Strategy with Privacy Preservation
4.1 Introduction
In the MSN, users rely on the opportunistic contacts for cooperative data forwarding.
Unlike conventional wireless relay networks assuming end-device to be insensate, users
have specific social features, e.g., privacy concerns and selfishness, and they will choose a
data forwarding strategy under the impacts of these features. For example, when privacy
preservation of users is applied, users become unrecognizable to each other and the social
ties and interactions are no longer traceable. In this case, there is no obvious incentives
for users to be cooperative on data forwarding. Thus, due to the selfish behavior, the
cooperative data forwarding could be severely interrupted or even disabled.
In this chapter, we address the privacy preservation problem and the data forwarding
problem in the MSN. Our goal is to resolve the two problems in one framework by proposing
a privacy preserving social-based cooperative data forwarding protocol. We exploit the
social morality for cooperative data forwarding design. The morality of human beings is a
common social phenomenon which provides the rules for people to act upon and grounds
the moral imperatives. It is the fundament of a cooperative and mutually beneficial social
life in the real-world society. Specifically, we will address the problem according to three
steps.
First, we identify the conflicting nature between privacy preservation and cooperative
data forwarding in the MSN. We leverage social morality to model the user cooperation
and accordingly promote the communication efficiency.
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Second, we introduce a three-step protocol suite to attain the privacy-preserving data
forwarding. In step one, we introduce a privacy-preserving route-based authentication
scheme. It enables users to expose the mobility information to each other for cooperation,
yet with location privacy preserving. In step two, based on the mobility of users, we
evaluate the forwarding capability of individual users on a given packet. In step three, a
game-theoretic approach taking account of both the morality and forwarding capability
is designed to adaptively determine the optimal data forwarding strategy for individual
users.
Third, we evaluate the performance of the protocols through extensive trace-based
simulations. The simulation results validate the efficiency of the data forwarding protocols
and the location privacy preservation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we present the
network model and design goal. Then, we introduce the three-step protocol suite in Section
4.3. We evaluate the protocol in a trace-based simulation environment in Section 4.4.
Lastly, we review the related work and draw our summary respectively in Section 4.5 and
Section 4.6.
4.2 Models and Design Goal
4.2.1 Network Model and Social Behavior Model
We consider an MSN composed of a set V = {u1, · · · , uN} of mobile users with the network
size |V| = N . Users have equal communication range, denoted by Rt. The communication
between any two users ui and uj, is bidirectional, i.e., ui can communicate to user uj if and
only if user uj can also communicate to ui. Users follow the same behavior model: they
are selfish, tending to maximize their individual utilities during data forwarding, and do
not perform irrational attacks. A trusted authority is available at the initialization phase
for generating pseudonyms and secret keys for MSN users, but it will not be involved in
the data forwarding (Section 2.1). Users continuously change their pseudonyms to preserve
their identity and location privacy. The pseudonym change breaks any relation previously
established between two users and as a result they can no longer recognize each other.
User Location Privacy: We assume that there exists a set A = {a1, · · · , al} of social
hotspots in the network. They are located in regions such as supermarkets, restaurants,
office buildings and residential blocks with high population density as shown in Fig. 1.1.
Different users have different sets of favored hotspots that they frequently visit. The
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hotspots that a user visited in the past indicate the personal preference of the user and thus
may relate to the user’s future locations [100]. In addition, the hotspots can be categorized
into sensitive hotspots, e.g., office buildings, residential blocks, and non-sensitive hotspots,
e.g., supermarkets, restaurants. Sensitive hotspots are tightly related to users’ personal
lives. The access to sensitive hotspots needs to be protected according to users’ privacy
needs. In this work, users are able to anonymize their sensitive hotspots, and thus the
hotspots can be used to assist data forwarding with the location privacy preservation.
User-to-Spot Data Forwarding: We introduce a user-to-spot data forwarding proto-
col to achieve privacy preservation and user cooperative data forwarding. Specifically,
each hotspot is equipped with a non-compromised and communicable storage device which
buffers the packets for receivers to fetch. A data sender/forwarder leaves packets at se-
lected hotspots, and receivers can fetch the packets upon their later access to the same
hotspots. Compared with the contact-based data forwarding protocols where users swap
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of effective data forwarding
data upon their contacts, the user-to-spot data forwarding protocol would have more suc-
cessful deliveries in special cases as shown in Fig. 4.1. In this figure, relay user uj has no
contact with receiver ui but they enter the common hotspots during different time periods.
By making use of this property, the user-to-spot data forwarding protocol enables uj to
deliver the packet to ui. This user-to-spot data forwarding protocol is practical due to the
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following facts:
• Social users often have specific preferences on common social hotspots, such as su-
permarkets, office buildings, etc. They are likely to choose part of these hotspots and
visit them frequently.
• In the MSN, data sender often has certain social relationship with receiver. The
sender is likely to be partially aware of the social behaviors and frequently-visited
hotspots of the receiver.
• Hotspot buffers are low-cost and can be pervasively available data storage resources
[101]. They are not interconnected and will not be involved in cooperative data
forwarding. They act as static receivers to temporarily store user data and allow
authorized wireless access of the data when users come into their wireless communi-
cation range.
In this work, the identity of the receiver is implicitly contained (thus protected) in the
packet, and the receiver can fetch the packet from the hotspot buffer after a simple au-
thentication operation, e.g., using the scheme in [102].
Observing the unique social features in the MSN, we exploit the morality factor of the
MSN by mimicking the morality-centric human society. We emphasize that the morality
factor should be counted into the calculation of users’ utility. To this end, we instantiate
two forms of social morality, i.e., guilt and high-mindedness, in the context of MSN-based
data forwarding where cooperation is highly desirable: users feel guilty when they defect
(i.e., refuse to forward a packet), and they feel high-minded when choosing to cooperate
(i.e., help to forward a packet). Guilt creates a feeling of indebtedness, which directs them
to cooperate, while high-mindedness alleviates the guilty feeling of users.
A self-regulated morality factor g, internalized for each user that quantitatively depicts
the internal moral force, is based on two elements:
• Morality state x: The morality state reflects the behavior history of a user. It in-
creases by one level for a single cooperation behavior and decreases by one level due
to a single defection conduct.
• Sociality strength st: The sociality strength st is related to a user’s personal expe-
rience, such as education and habitation. It is stabilized and less independent with
short-term behavior changes. If the sociality strength of a user is significant, the
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user feels a correspondingly significant increment of guilt towards a single defection
behavior and a correspondingly significant increment of high-mindedness towards a
single cooperation behavior.
Each ui has a sociality strength denoted by sti, and a varying morality state xi. Follow-
ing social theory [41,42], we depict the morality state xi by a Markov chain model with the
state space and non-null transitions shown in Fig. 4.2. Let Pi(j, j+1) and Pi(j, j−1) denote
the transition probabilities from the uj-th state to the (j + 1)-th and the (j− 1)-th states,
respectively. The state j = 0 is the initial neutral state (neither guilty nor high-minded).
The states with a positive index are high-minded states, and those with a negative index
are guilty states. Being in a high-minded state implies frequent cooperation behavior in
the past; being in a guilty state indicates overwhelming defection conduct in the past. The
morality factor gi of ui is evaluated by a function f(xi, sti) that increases as xi decreases
or sti increases. Later, in Section 4.4 when we present our performance evaluation, we will
define a specific f().
-k -1 1 k… ... … ...… ... … ...
cooperate
defect
0
cooperate cooperate cooperate
defect defect defect
Figure 4.2: Markov chain model for morality state
4.2.2 Design Goal
We address a fundamental tradeoff between the privacy preservation and the data forward-
ing efficiency in the MSN. Specifically, with the multiple pseudonym technique applied for
privacy preservation, an unpleasant accompanying side-effect is that users are unable to
identify their social friends because of the anonymity of users. This directly impedes the
cooperative data forwarding as social ties among users are interrupted. Since users are
anonymous, the malicious behaviors (e.g., selfish and free-riding) can no longer be tracked
and punished on time using traditional mechanisms.
This may discourage user cooperations and deteriorate the data forwarding efficiency.
Therefore, privacy preservation protects and hides the identities of users to the public,
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which, however, hinders the social-based cooperative data forwarding. Our goal is to
resolve the two conflicting goals in one framework by proposing a privacy preserving social-
based cooperative data forwarding protocol. We exploit the social morality for cooperative
data forwarding design. Specifically, the morality of human beings is a common social
phenomenon in real-world which provides the rules for people to act upon and grounds the
moral imperatives.
4.3 PDF Solutions
4.3.1 Overview of the Protocol
With the user-to-spot data forwarding protocol deployed, in the following sections, we
concentrate on how to forward packets to the hotspots for effective and efficient data
forwarding with privacy preservation. This delivery is enabled in three steps:
1. Privacy-preserving route-based authentication,
2. Proximity measurement,
3. Morality-driven data forwarding.
In the first step, the privacy-preserving route-based authentication enables two en-
countered users to exchange partial route information. The route information can be
constructed in a privacy-preserving structure determined by users themselves. The use of
an authentication scheme is to resist user manipulation attacks, i.e., users have to honestly
tell about their hotspots. In the second step, each user measures a proximity score between
the destination and the route information provided by the relay user. The proximity score
reflects the forwarding capability of a relay node with respect to a specific destination.
The larger a proximity score is, the more effective a relay’s forwarding is. In addition, the
proximity score also affects the morality factor of the relay node. The rationale is that
a user would feel more guilty if he/she demonstrates more capability to deliver a packet
(with a large proximity score), and yet, drops the packet. In the third step, the morality
factor is incorporated into the utility calculation of a data forwarding game in which users
act selfishly and preserve their privacy. We elaborate these three steps in the subsequent
sections. Note that, we do not consider irrational attacks here. Users tend to be rational
and selfish to maximize their own utility.
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4.3.2 Step1: Privacy-Preserving Route-Based Authentication
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a8
Figure 4.3: Geographical view of ui’s route
We first show how to construct a privacy-preserving routing tree which describes the
route of ui between hotspots. At an initial stage, the TA associates ui to a subset of hotspots
Ai = {ay|y = (2, 3, 6, 7)} ⊆ A, which represents the hotspots frequently visited by ui. We
consider that ui is located at hotspot a1 and moving towards a8, as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Suppose that ui moves along the route a1 → a2 → a3 → a6 → a7 → a8. Users neighboring
ui have already known ui’s current location a1. But ui has no intention to reveal a8 to
them for privacy reason. In addition, it is unwilling to authenticate the entire hotspot
set {ay|y = (2, 3, 6, 7)}, which contains privacy-sensitive hotspots {a3, a6, a7}. Then ui
creates a tree for its mobility route Ti as “a2 AND (a3 OR a4) AND (2 of (a5, a6, a7))”
and only authenticates this tree to others. The authentication reveals the following fuzzy
information instead of the precise route: ui will visit a2, one of (a3, a4), and at least two
hotspots from (a5, a6, a7).
We present the routing tree structure T as shown in Fig. 4.4, where each non-leaf
node represents a threshold gate and each leaf node represents a hotspot in Au. We use
AT = {az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ} ⊆ Au to denote the hotspot set corresponding to all leaf nodes in
T . Note that, if we assign 0 or 1 to the hotspots (az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ) of leaf nodes in T , T
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Figure 4.4: Tree structure of ui’s route
will be transformed into a Boolean function F (az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ). For example, in Fig. 4.4,
F (a1, a2, · · · , a7) = a2(a3 + a4)(a5a6 + a5a7 + a6a7). We say that a hotspot set Ai satisfies
both T and function F (az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ) if and only if F (az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ) = 1, where for
each ay, y ∈ {z1, z2, · · · , zτ},
ay =
{
1, if ay ∈ Ai,
0, if ay /∈ Ai. (4.1)
The routing tree preserves user privacy by making sensitive hotspots anonymous, and
at the same time it provides certain information of the mobility route that can be used
to evaluate the user’s forwarding capability. We are now ready to present our privacy-
preserving route-based authentication scheme which supports a single threshold gate (max-
imum threshold value d) for a routing tree. A multiple-threshold tree can be semantically
converted to multiple single-threshold trees. The authentication scheme is built on the
bilinear pairing technique [64,65].
Initialization: Let G and GT be two finite cyclic groups of the same composite order
n, where n = pq is a product of two large primes p and q (Section 2.4.2). Suppose G and
GT are equipped with a pairing, i.e., a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear
map e : G × G → GT such that i) ∀g, h ∈ G, ∀a, b ∈ Zn, e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab; and ii)
∃g ∈ G, e(g, g) has order n in GT .
TA chooses a redundant hotspot set Ar = {al+1, al+d−1}, two generators (g, u) of G,
a generator h of Gq (Gq is a subgroup of G with order q), a secure cryptographic hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n, and random number δ ∈ Z∗n. For all 1 ≤ y ≤ l + d − 1, TA
chooses random numbers ty ∈ Z∗n and computes Ty = gty . TA also computes ∆ = e(g, u)δ.
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With these settings, TA keeps the master key (δ, (ty)1≤y≤l+d−1) secretly, and publishes the
public parameter pub = (n, g, u, h,G,GT , e,H,∆, Ty(1 ≤ y ≤ l + d− 1),A ∪Ar).
User Registration: TA chooses a unique random number t ∈ Z∗n and a random
polynomial q(x) = κd−1xd−1+κd−2xd−2+· · ·+κ1x+δ, and generates Ei = 〈kd, (dy)ay∈Ai∪Ar〉,
where kd = t and dy = u
q(y)
t+ty . It informs the registering ui about the secret key Ei.
Let users ui and uj denote the signer and verifier respectively. Denote ui’s routing tree
(with a single threshold) by Ti. Let k be the threshold value of the root of Ti and Θi a
hotspot set corresponding to Ti’s leaf nodes. Φi ⊆ Ai ∩Θi is a hotspot set of size k.
Signing by ui: ui first chooses a subset Ar′ ⊆ Ar (|Ar′ | = d − k). Let Ar′ be
{al+1, · · · , al+d−k}. Then, for each hotspot ay ∈ Ψ = Φi ∪ Ar′ , ui computes the Lagrange
coefficient ωy =
∑
w|aw∈Ψ,w 6=y
0−w
y−w . It randomly selects rt, rp, ry ∈ Z∗n for ay ∈ Θi ∪Ar′ and
computes Sy for ay ∈ Θi ∪ Ar′ as
Sy =
{
dωyy · hry , if ay ∈ Ψ
hry , if ay ∈ Θi \ Φi
(4.2)
It outputs the signature
σi = 〈Ti, St, Sp, (Sy)ay∈Θi∪Ar′ , pi1, pi2〉, (4.3)
where St = g
kd · hrt , Sp = g
1
kd+H(pidi) · hrp ,
pi1 = S
rt
p (g
H(pidi)gkd)rp , (4.4)
and pi2 =
∏
ay∈Ψ
(dωyy )
rt
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
(StTy)
ry . (4.5)
Verification by uj: uj receives σi and checks
e(Stg
H(pidi), Sp)
?
= e(g, g) · e(h, pi1)∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
e(Sy, StTy)
?
= ∆ · e(h, pi2), (4.6)
If the above equations hold, uj confirms that ui has pseudonym pidi and a hotspot set
satisfying Ti. The correctness of the verification is from the following mathematical ma-
nipulation:
e(Stg
H(pidi), Sp) = e(g
thrt · gH(pidi), g 1t+H(pidi)hrp)
=e(g, g) · e(h, (g 1t+H(pidi)hrp)rt · (gtgH(pidi))rp)
=e(g, g) · e(h, Srtp (gH(pidi)gt)rp) = e(g, g) · e(h, pi1)
(4.7)
59
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
e(Sy, StTy)
=
∏
ay∈Ψ
e(dωyy , StTy) ·
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
e(hry , StTy)
=
∏
ay∈Ψ
e(u
ωyq(y)
kd+ty , gkdhrtgty) ·
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
e(hry , StTy)
=e(g, u)δ
∏
ay∈Ψ
e(u
rtωyq(y)
kd+ty , h) ·
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
e(hry , StTy)
=∆ · e(h,
∏
ay∈Ψ
(dωyy )
rt
∏
ay∈Θi∪Ar′
(StTy)
ry) = ∆ · e(h, pi2)
(4.8)
Privacy discussion: For user privacy preservation, the route-based authentication
scheme mixes the hotspot ay ∈ Ψ that ui has with the hotspot ay /∈ Ψ that ui does not
have from the equation (4.2) by multiplying a subgroup element h. This achieves full-
anonymity, i.e., any other user cannot trace the hotspots which are used to generate the
signature, because the element h cannot be distinguished from either Gp or Gq without
p or q known as a priori. The theoretical proof can be found in [64, 65]. Consider that
an adversarial user may use the authenticated route information to identify the signer’s
trace. Without precaution, such misbehavior may violate location privacy. An effective
defense mechanism against this privacy violation is to let each user change the routing tree
structures of their route information as frequently as the change of their pseudonyms, and
also include redundant hotspots into their routing tree. As a result, different users may
generate the same routing tree, and the signature cannot be used to link the past/future
locations and behaviors of any specific user.
4.3.3 Step2: Proximity Measurement
In this section, we develop a novel proximity measurement for implementing the user-to-
spot data forwarding protocol. Consider a packet originated from uj and destined to Dj,
which is a hotspot that its intended receiver frequently visits. When uj meets a ui, it
computes a forwarding score ej,i. This score implies ui’s forwarding capability of bringing
the packet to Dj. It is subject to multiple factors such as the time-to-live period of the
packet, the probability that ui drops the packet due to limited storage buffer, how close
that ui can be to Dj, when the closest distance will occur, and so on. However, the more
factors used, the more personal information revealed, and the less privacy preserved.
60
To avoid any additional privacy leakage, we define that ej,i = ψ(rj,i), where rj,i is the
smallest distance between Dj and the hotspots that ui will visit and ψ() is a monotonically
decreasing function of rj,i. The smaller rj,i, the more closely ui can deliver the packet to
Dj, the larger ej,i by this definition. A particular case is shown in Fig. 4.5. Even if user
h appears to move away from Dj, its forwarding, when used, will still be effective since it
is going to encounter ui who will visit Dj afterwards. Given that no global knowledge is
available and any user can be an effective forwarder, ψ() always returns a positive value.
jh
Destination
i
h
i
contact
contact
Figure 4.5: A user moving towards opposite direction of the destination can still provide
effective forwarding
Algorithm 1 Smallest radius calculation by uj
1: Input: Ti and Dj .
2: Transform Ti to Fi(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ).
3: Calculate F˜i(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ) = Fi(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ).
4: Calculate Ds = {dz1 , dz2 , · · · , dzi}, where dy is the distance between Dj and ay for y ∈ {z1, z2, · · · , zτ}.
5: Sort Ds in an ascending order {dz∗1 , dz∗2 , · · · , dz∗τ } corresponding to spots {az∗1 , az∗2 , · · · , az∗i }.
6: Initialize A˜ = {az∗1 }, µ = 1.
7: while (A˜ does not satisfy F˜i(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ )) do
8: µ = µ+ 1,
9: A˜ = A˜ ∪ {az∗µ}.
10: end while
11: Let r∗j,i = dz∗µ and ADj ,r∗j,i = A˜.
12: Output r∗j,i.
Since ui only exposes partial information Ti of its mobility route to uj during route-
based authentication, uj cannot compute rj,i accurately. We devise an approximation
algorithm for uj to obtain an approximate value r
∗
j,i with the inputs Ti and Dj. In this
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Figure 4.6: An example of the smallest radius calculation
algorithm, we first transform Ti to a Boolean function Fi(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ). We denote a
self-dual function of Fi as F˜i(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ) = Fi(az1 , az2 , · · · , azτ ). Let ADj ,r denote a
set of hotspots located in a circular area centered at the destination Dj with radius r.
For a ui neighboring uj, we can find the smallest radius r
∗
j,i such that ADj ,r∗j,i satisfies
function F˜i(az1 , az2 , · · · , azi). The algorithm finally outputs an approximate value r∗j,i. The
algorithmic detail is given in Algorithm 1. uj will then use this value r
∗
j,i to calculate the
forwarding score of ui.
We use an example to illustrate how proximity score is computed, in accordance with
the scenario given in Fig. 4.6. ui encounters uj. ui generates a routing tree Ti and
the corresponding Boolean function Fi(a2, a3, · · · , a7) =“a2 AND (a3 OR a4) AND (2
of (a5, a6, a7))”. uj has two packets with destinations D1 and D2, respectively. We have
F˜i(a2, a3, · · · , a7) =“a2 OR (a3 AND a4) OR (2 of (a5, a6, a7))”. According to the Algorithm
1, with Ti and D1 as inputs, A˜ is initialized to {a3} since a3 is the hotspot closest to D1.
Then, {a4} will be added into A˜ since {a3} does not satisfy F˜i(a2, a3, · · · , a7) and a4 is the
second closest to D1. A˜ = {a3, a4} now satisfies F˜i(a2, a3, · · · , a7). The algorithm finally
outputs the distance r′j,i between a4 and D1. Similarly, with Ti and D2 as inputs, the
algorithm outputs the distance r′′j,i between a5 and D2, where A˜ = {a5, a7} satisfying Ti.
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4.3.4 Step3: Morality-Driven Data Forwarding
After finishing the first two steps, users can perform morality-driven data forwarding. Note
that the mobile social users are autonomous and intelligent individuals. It is reasonable
to assume that they are rational and their behaviors are driven by personal profit and
morality. On one hand, they tend to act defection in order to reduce their forwarding
costs. On the other hand, they offer cooperation from time to time so as to counteract the
guilty feelings brought by the past selfish deeds. During MSN-based data forwarding, social
users implement the best strategy to balance cost and payoff. In this section, we apply
game theory to model individual user behavior and obtain the optimal data forwarding
strategy.
Consider a scenario where users move along independently and randomly determined
mobility routes. Upon the contact with another user, a user would either cooperate or
defect for data forwarding. We assume that, for two users that both have packets to
send, cooperation is reciprocal. Due to the random mobility and privacy preservation,
users’ future contacts are unpredictable. A user thus derives the optimal data forwarding
strategy based on its self-related information, including its own mobility route, destination
of its own packet, and morality factor, as well as the opponent information, including the
morality factor, mobility route and packet destination of the encountered user.
From a user’s perspective, among a series of cooperations with different encountered
opponents, due to the privacy preservation, the opponent information of current contact is
always independent from that of previous contacts, and thus the decision on cooperation
or defection depends only on the self-related information and the opponent information of
the current contact. We thus model the interplay upon each contact, namely cooperation
game, as a nonzero sum two-player game.
Basic/Extended Cooperation Games
We first define a basic cooperation game, called B-game (B stands for Basic), as a 3-
tuple (N ,S,P), where N is a pair of users, S is a set of strategies and P is a set of
payoff functions. According to Section 2.1, users continuously change their pseudonyms
to preserve their privacy. Pseudonym change breaks any relation previously established
between two users and as a result they no longer recognize each other. Therefore, B-game
is a non-repeated game which can be described as follows:
• Players: Two users ui and uj belong to the universal user set V . uj can also be
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Table 4.1: User payoff matrix in PDF
(a) Payoff matrix of B-game
i \ j Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) (b− c, b− c) (−c, b)
Defect (D) (b,−c) (0, 0)
(b) Payoff matrix of E-game
i \ j C D
C (b− c, b− c) (−c, b− gj)
D (b− gi,−c) (−gi,−gj)
(c) Payoff matrix of S-game
i \ j C D
C (ei,jb− c, ej,ib− c) (−c, ej,ib− ei,jgj)
D (ei,jb− ej,igi,−c) (−gi,−gj)
denoted as −i. The two users are within the transmission range of each other, and
they decide to cooperate or defect, aiming at maximizing their individual payoff.
• Strategy: Upon the forwarding request of the opponent user, each user has two
strategies: Cooperate (C) and Defect (D). Denote ui’s strategy by si. Then si = C
means that ui forwards uj’s packet, and si = D that ui drops uj’s packet.
• Payoffs: The cost c of forwarding on one packet is a value, the same for both users.
If ui’s data is forwarded by uj, the profit acquired by ui is b, which is also a constant.
We set b ≥ c > 0 since the profit acquired from each forwarding should be at least
equal to the incurred cost. The user payoffs under different strategies are shown in
Table 4.1(a).
From the payoff matrix in Table 4.1(a), it is observed that the B-game is a typical
prisoner-dilemma game, where the only Nash Equilibrium (NE) is (D,D) for non-repeated
version. In other words, no matter what the opponent’s strategy is, the best strategy for
a user is to defect. This is because that b > b− c, 0 > −c.
Next, we introduce an E-game (E stands for Extended), where the payoff matrix is
shown in Table 4.1(b). This game considers users ui and uj’s behaviors affected by morality
factors gi and gj. The morality factors are introduced as the costs of defection behaviors
into the payoff functions. The best strategy of the E-game for ui is: cooperate if gi > c;
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defect if gi ≤ c. Based on the Markov chain model given in Section 4.2.1, there exists
a morality state x∗ < 0 such that f(sti, x∗ + 1) < c < f(sti, x∗). After a finite series of
defections, ui will reach state x
∗, and then alternatively chooses to cooperate.
Social Cooperation Game
In the following, we extend the E-game to a complex S-game (S stands for Social), which
is also denoted by a 3-tuple (N ,S,P). S-game further incorporates the forwarding scores
ei,j and ej,i into the payoff function.
• Players: Two users ui and uj with different sociality strength sti, stj and current
morality factors gi, gj.
• Strategy: The strategy is the same as that of the B-game. ui’s strategy is denoted
by si.
• Payoffs: The payoff of ui is evaluated by
psi =

ei,jb− c, if si = C, sj = C,
−c, if si = C, sj = D,
ei,jb− ej,igi, if si = D, sj = C,
−gi, if si = D, sj = D.
(4.9)
In payoff formula (4.9), the forwarding scores ei,j and ej,i are used to measure ui’s profit
and morality factor. If uj forwards ui’s data, the profit that ui acquires is ei,jb instead of
b. If ui drops uj’s data, depending on uj’s strategy, ui acquires different morality factors,
ej,igi or gi. Note that, when users ui and uj both drop each other’s packets, the morality
factor on ui’s payoff is independent of the forwarding score ej,i. This is because users ui
and uj treat each other equally and do not further consider their forwarding capability.
S-game with complete information
We first analyze the S-game in the case that two players have complete information includ-
ing the sociality strength and morality state of each other. Each player can calculate the
morality factor by ψ() as defined in Section 4.2.1 and determine the payoff before deciding
whether to cooperate or defect, according to Table 4.1(c). We use Theorem 4 to identify
the NE strategies of the S-game.
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Theorem 4 When the two players have complete information of each other in the S-game,
there are multiple pure-strategy NE in different cases and one mixed-strategy NE (xi, xj),
where xi =
c−g−θ
eθ,−θg−θ−g−θ is the probability that user nθ chooses to cooperate, as shown in
Fig. 4.7(b).
Proof 4 For θ = i or j, we have the following three cases to consider.
• gθ < ce−θ,θ : We have eθ,−θb − e−θ,θgθ > eθ,−θb − c and −gθ > − ce−θ,θ ≥ −c due to
e−θ,θ ≥ 1. As a result, when g−θ < c, (sθ = D, s−θ = D) is a NE; and when g−θ > c,
(sθ = D, s−θ = C) is a NE.
• gθ > c: We have −gθ < −c and eθ,−θb− e−θ,θgθ < eθ,−θb− c due to e−θ,θ ≥ 1. As a result,
when g−θ > ceθ,−θ , (sθ = C, s−θ = C) is a NE; when g−θ <
c
eθ,−θ
, (sθ = C, s−θ = D) is a
NE.
• c
e−θ,θ
< gθ < c: Let xθ denote the forwarding probability of user nθ. For s−θ = C or
s−θ = D, we separately calculate the payoff for n−θ as follows:
ps−θ|C = xθ × (e−θ,θb− c) + (1− xθ)× (−c) (4.10)
ps−θ|D = xθ × (e−θ,θb− eθ,−θg−θ) + (1− xθ)× (−g−θ) (4.11)
If xθ is the best strategy of nθ, we have p
s
−θ|C = ps−θ|D which gives xθ = c−g−θeθ,−θg−θ−g−θ .
S-game with incomplete information
We consider the case that the two players have incomplete information of each other.
Specifically, ui obtains sociality strength sti, morality state gi, forwarding scores ei,j and
ej,i, but it does not obtain the sociality strength stj and morality factor gj of uj. As a
supplementary information, we assume that ui obtains the probability distribution % of the
morality factor of all users. Based on this, ui can estimate the morality factor gj of uj.
Then, ui follows the following steps according to the best strategy shown in Fig. 4.7(b):
• If 0 ≤ gi < cej,i , then ui chooses to defect regardless of uj’s strategy.
• If c ≤ gi, then ui chooses to cooperate regardless of uj’s strategy.
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(a) The best strategy of E-game
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Mixed-
strategy
(C,D)(D,D)
0
(b) The best strategy of S-game
Figure 4.7: The best strategy for different games
• If c
ej,i
≤ gi < c, then there exists a pure-strategy NE (D,D) for gj < cei,j , a pure-
strategy NE (C,C) for gj > c, and a mixed-strategy NE for
c
ei,j
< gj < c. For
the pure strategy NE, we calculate the defection probability Pr1 and cooperation
probability Pr2:
Pr1 = Pr(0 ≤ gj < c
ei,j
) =
∫ c
ei,j
0
%(α)dα,
Pr2 = Pr(c ≤ gj) =
∫ +∞
c
%(α)dα.
In addition, ui makes a mixed-strategy NE with probability Pr3, which is given by
Pr3 = Pr(
c
ej,i
≤ gi < c) =
∫ c
c
ej,i
%(α)dα. (4.12)
For the mixed-strategy NE with probability Pr3, Theorem 4 indicates the best strat-
egy of ui is to forward the data with probability
c−gj
ei,jgj−gj if gj is known by ui. In this
case, the probability that ui chooses to cooperate is
Pr4 =
∫ c
c
ej,i
(
c− α
ei,jα− α)%(α)dα. (4.13)
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Overall, ui decides to cooperate with probability PrF = Pr2 + Pr4 and to defect with
probability PrD = 1− PrF .
4.3.5 Summary of Data Forwarding Strategy
Notice that the S-game with incomplete information emulates the MSN environments in
reality, where the opponent’s morality factor cannot be directly obtained. We use the
optimal strategy of this game in our protocol for users to make the optimal data forwarding
strategies. As we defined in Section 4.2.1, user morality factor would vary with both
sociality strength and morality state. However, revealing such information violates user
privacy since other adversarial users can utilize the information to track user behavior.
In this case, we do not require an accurate calculation of morality factor in the S-game.
Instead, we examine the strategy by using a probability distribution function % of morality
factor. This function % can be either observed by a trusted authority or reported by
individual users. Further analysis is presented in Section 4.3.4.
A user who has packets to forward starts the data forwarding protocol with a randomly
selected neighbor. Consider two neighboring users ui and uj that are running the protocol,
i.e., they are both able to provide cooperative data forwarding to each other and any
forwarding/defection decision in the two-user game will impact their social morality. Let
Si = {pi1 , pi2 , · · · , piα} and Sj = {pj1 , pj2 , · · · , pjβ} be the packet sets held by ui and uj,
respectively. We summarize the protocol as follows. ui first randomly selects a packet
px (destined to Di) from its local repository. It then calculates the digest of the packet
di = H(px), where H is the cryptographic hash function. Lastly, it sends di to uj. In the
meantime, uj executes a similar procedure locally and sends ui the digest dj of a packet
of py (destined to Dj). According to di (dj), if uj (resp., ui) finds that it already has px
(resp., py), it will inform ui (resp., uj) to re-select px (resp., py). Through exhaustive packet
re-selection, if they cannot find any exclusively owned packet, the protocol will terminate.
Otherwise, they proceed to exchange (px,Di) and (py,Dj), together with their own routing
trees Ti and Tj. Then, they validate each other’s routing trees (see Section 4.3.2). After
that, they evaluate each other’s forwarding scores (see Section 4.3.3), and finally make the
forwarding strategy for each other (see Section 4.3.4).
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4.4 Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 Simulation Settings
User Mobility, Hotspots, and Packet Generation
We generate user mobility model according to the real-world trace of pedestrian runners
provided in [79]. In the real trace set, N = 100 mobile users are randomly deployed in a
1000 × 1000 m2 square region with the velocity randomly distributed with a mean value
of 1 m/s. The communication range Rt of users is set to 50 m. The log contains the user
locations in successive T = 900 time slots.
We divide the network field into 10 × 10 grids, where each grid is a square with side
length 100 m. We create a circle of radius Rt around each grid point, and there are
totally 121 circles. The areas enclosed by these circles are called spots and denoted by
(a1, a2, · · · , a121) as shown in Fig. 4.8; no any two spots overlap.
1000 m
1000 m
100 m
Figure 4.8: Hotspots
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We aggregate user route information to determine the most popular spots as follows.
Let dm,n denote the number of users in hotspot am at time slot n, where integersm ∈ [1, 121]
and n ∈ [1, 900]. We sort the spots in an descending order according to dm =
∑T
n=1 dm,n,
and choose the top-ten spots as hotspots (i.e., l = 10). At the middle of each hotspot, we
place a wireless storage device which has a communication range equal to Rt. Once a user
enters a hotspot, it can access the storage device of the hotspot via wireless communication.
For each simulation run, there are totally 1000 packets generated for transmissions, 100
packets per each user, with uniformly selected hotspots as the packet destinations. In each
time slot, a ui randomly selects a neighboring uj to play a two-player cooperation game.
In the cooperation game, we consider the communication cost of data forwarding to be
much greater than the computational cost of the associated authentication. As such, the
authentication scheme imposes negligible influence on user behavior. Upon each contact,
users uniformly select one available packet from their buffers to transmit. In order to focus
on the impact of cooperation on the data forwarding effectiveness, we consider packets
do not expire during the simulations and hotspot buffers and user device buffers are not
limited in size.
Sociality Strength and Morality Function
The sociality strength sti of ui (1 ≤ i ≤ 100) is selected from the range of [0, 1]. The
greater sti is, the more intense social morality impact on ui’s cooperation. In this section,
we adopt different models of sociality strength represented by three beta distributions
β(2, 5), β(2, 2), β(5, 2) shown in Fig.4.9(a), respectively, to evaluate the performance of the
protocol in the cases of low, medium and high users’ sociality strength, respectively.
The morality function f is used to calculate the morality factor of each ui using the
user’s sociality strength sti and current morality state x. From Section 4.2.1, we define
three morality functions: linear function f1, natural logarithm function fe and common
logarithm function f10. They output 0 if x ≥ 0, and otherwise,
f1(sti, x) = k · sti · (−x)
fe(sti, x) = k · ln(1 + sti · (−x))
f10(sti, x) = k · log10(1 + sti · (−x))
(4.14)
where k is a tunable coefficient in the range of (0,+∞). For simplicity, we fix k = 1 in our
simulation.
The three morality functions represent three different levels of morality force affecting
user cooperation behavior, respectively. They always output a non-negative value. The
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Figure 4.9: Preliminary results
common logarithm function f10 generates a smaller morality factor, compared with the
other two functions. If it is adopted, we can expect to see more defection behaviors.
Routing Tree and Forwarding Capability
Recall that a user’s routing tree preserves user privacy by making the sensitive hotspots
anonymous, and in the meantime provides partial information of user mobility route in
order to facilitate cooperative data forwarding. With 10 hotspots in simulations, each ui
may have at most 10 hotspots and at least 0 hotspot in Ai. We generate a simplified
routing tree structure T in the following way: if |Ai| = 0, the tree cannot be created; if
0 < |Ai| < 5, we set the threshold as |Ai|, and the leaf nodes as all the hotspots of Ai and
other 5− |Ai| ones from Au \ Ai; if |Ai| ≥ 5, we set the threshold as 4, and the leaf nodes
as four randomly selected hotspots from Ai and another different hotspot. In short, for
every user, the tree structure can be written as “t of 5”, where 1 ≤ t ≤ 4.
In Section 4.3.3, a function ψ is used to compute the forwarding capability of a given ui
for a packet with a specific destination. We set the lower bound of ψ as 1. In the network
grid, r∗i,j can be 1000×
√
2 = 1415 meters at most and 0 at least. Intuitively, if r∗i,j = 1415,
the forwarding capability ei,j reaches the minimum value; and if r
∗
i,j = 0, ei,j reaches the
maximum value. We define ψ(r∗i,j) = e
k′−k′r∗i,j/1415 and set k′ = 3 as an example to illustrate
the effect of forwarding capability.
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(e) E-game with f10
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Figure 4.10: Delivery ratio in E-game and S-game with complete information
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4.4.2 Simulation Results
The performance metrics used in the simulation are: i) the delivery ratio, which is the
fraction of packets that are correctly delivered to the hotspots as their destinations; and
ii) the average morality state, which reflects the intention of users to cooperate over time.
The delivery ratio examines the overall cooperation of users in the MSN, while the average
morality state denotes the long-term cooperation strategies for a single user. For each
simulation, we conduct 50 simulation runs and report the average results.
B-game
We first examine the B-game, where users always choose defection as the best strategy
as discussed in Section 4.3.4. Fig. 4.9(b) shows three delivery ratios in the following
three cases: a) users do not cooperate (i.e., B-game); b) users stochastically cooperate to
forward packet with the probability of 10%; and c) users fully cooperate. It can be seen
that at time slot 900, the full-cooperation strategy achieves 99% delivery ratio while the
non-cooperation strategy achieves only 30%. Furthermore, Fig. 4.9(b) indicates that the
probabilistic cooperation strategy provides a significant improvement to the delivery ratio
up to 74%. However, without effective incentive and appropriate exploration of their social
feature, users will not take cooperation due to the selfishness. Successful delivery happens
only when the data senders arrive at their selected hotspots. This inevitably results in a
low delivery ratio in the B-game.
E-game and S-game
The E-game extends the B-game by embedding the morality factor into the payoff function
as shown in Table 4.1(b), while the S-game further considers the forwarding capability into
the payoff of the E-game. Fig. 4.10 shows the delivery ratio of both the E-game and the S-
game with complete information, with red lines representing the performance of forwarding
cost c = 0.5, blue lines representing that of c = 1.5, and black lines depicting those of full-
cooperation and non-cooperation as the best and worst case. It is clearly observed that the
strategies with c = 0.5 can achieve higher delivery ratio than the strategies with c = 1.5.
The rationale is that a large forwarding cost c = 1.5 hinders the cooperation performed by
users who have limited resources and thus limits guilty incentive. In particular, when f10
is adopted, the cooperation condition in case of c = 1.5 approaches to the worst case. This
is because that the guilty function f10 returns the smallest morality factor resulting in the
least incentive to cooperate, compared to the function fe and f1. Fig. 4.10 shows that the
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Figure 4.11: Average morality states of all users in E-game and S-game with complete
information, c = 0.8, and common logarithm
strategies with the sociality strength β(5, 2) perform much better than those with β(2, 2)
and β(2, 5) in terms of delivery ratio. This is because that, compared to cases β(2, 2) and
β(2, 5), users will be initialized with larger sociality strength in case β(5, 2) as shown in
Fig. 4.9(a), and as discussed in Section 4.2.1, more users feel intense guilt towards their
defection and choose to cooperate, which leads to a better performance.
Fig. 4.10 shows the performance comparisons between the E-game and the S-game
under the same parameters. It can be seen that the delivery ratio can be further improved
by enabling privacy-preserving route-based authentication. But since the route information
is limited due to the privacy preservation, the improvements are not significant, e.g., when
choosing β(2, 5) and c = 1.5, the delivery ratio increases from 0.309 as shown in Fig. 4.10(e)
to 0.327 as shown in Fig. 4.10(f). To further investigate the impact of the route information
on the data forwarding cooperation, we randomly select 100 users in the network and
examine their average morality states. Fig. 4.11 shows the average morality state of each
selected user in terms of the user sociality strength in three settings of social strength
β(2, 5), β(2, 2), and β(5, 2), respectively. The blue circle represents a user which adopts
the best strategy from the S-game, and the red star represents a user which adopts the
best strategy from the E-game. It can be seen that with the same sociality strength, the
users represented by the red star have smaller morality states than users represented by the
blue circle. This is to say, the incentive to defect in the cooperation game can be further
reduced by enabling privacy-preserving route-based authentication.
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Figure 4.12: S-game with incomplete information
S-game with Incomplete Information
For the S-game with incomplete information, the morality factor cannot be obtained di-
rectly in our morality model due to the lack of sociality strength and morality state in-
formation about the opponent user. As such, the morality factor will be estimated by a
probability distribution function %. In our simulation, we use exponential distribution with
parameter λ = {1, 2, 10, 20} to generate the morality factors for all users. The probability
distribution function % is shown in Fig. 4.12(a).
Fig. 4.12(a) shows that most users in case of λ = 1 may have relatively large morality
factor. As we make sti ∼ β(2, 5), most users would have the weak sociality strength. Thus,
the large morality factors of users indicate that they have already adopted a large amount
of defections. Accordingly, they would have intense guilty feeling so that their following
behaviors are probably cooperative. Besides that, it can be seen that when λ = 20 most
users with the weak sociality strength have smaller morality factors, and without enough
guilt as cooperation incentives their future behaviors would likely be defections. The
performance results from Fig. 4.12(b) validate the above analysis, where the delivery ratio
largely decreases if λ changes from 1 to 20. By investigating the strategy, it can be seen
that when λ = 20, from ui’s perspective, the opponent uj has a morality factor gj <
c
ei,j
with a large probability. In this case, ui chooses to cooperate if gi ≥ c and defect if gi < c.
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The best strategy of the S-game with incomplete information is thus almost equal to that
of the E-game; both games indicate users to cooperate or defect mostly based on user
self morality factors. However, the S-game with incomplete information outperforms the
E-game since it has an additional mixed-strategy space shown in Fig. 4.7(b) to encourage
user cooperation.
4.5 Related Work
Data forwarding protocols have been extensively investigated in delay-tolerant networks.
Due to the sparse and dynamic nature of delay-tolerant networks, user-to-user data for-
warding often relies on the mobility and random contacts of users. For example, Lindgren
et al. [103] evaluated the forwarding capability of a user by the historic contact informa-
tion. Under the similar framework, [20,48,100,104,105] used social metrics calculated from
the contact information to evaluate the forwarding capability of a user. Hui et al. [105]
demonstrated that community and centrality social metrics can be effectively used in data
forwarding protocol. Li et al. [20] introduced the social-selfish effect into user behavior, i.e.,
a user gives preference to packets received from other users with stronger social relations.
Yuan et al. [100] proposed a data forwarding protocol enabling two users to share their
historical mobility information. Based on the opponent’s past mobility information, a user
is able to predict the future location that the opponent will visit.
Though significantly improving the data forwarding effectiveness, most contact-based
data forwarding protocols require a contact calculation phase in which each user must
have a unique identity and reveal it to others. In this phase, user behaviors are very
easy to be linked together and user’s identity privacy and location privacy are completely
compromised. In the contact-based data forwarding protocol, a sender must exchange the
contact and unique identity with a relay user. In [20, 48, 103], to improve the forwarding
effectiveness, a sender can evaluate the forwarding capability of a relay user based on both
the relay user’s contact probability and forwarding willingness. However, the required
contact probability and unique identity information are privacy-sensitive to the relay user
and not available in a privacy-preserving environment. The conventional contact-based
data forwarding protocols do not provide effective privacy preservation and can hardly be
accepted by the privacy-aware mobile users. We aim to solve the privacy preservation and
security issues of cooperative data forwarding in the MSN.
Recently a rich body of literature [106–111] addressed the cooperation stimulation is-
sue from a game-theoretic perspective. Yu and Liu [106] proposed a game-based approach
to stimulate cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks, where two participating users set a
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threshold on the number of forwarded packets in each forwarding round and they alterna-
tively forward each other’s packets. The setting of the threshold can stimulate cooperation
and also limit the possible damage caused by the opponent’s defection. If the opponent de-
fects, a user immediately terminates the interaction and his maximum damage is bounded
by the threshold setting in the previous round. Li and Shen [111] proposed an integrated
system over an individual reputation system and a price-based system which demonstrates
a superiority in terms of the effectiveness of cooperation incentives and selfish node de-
tection. However, their works do not address user privacy and are not applicable in the
privacy-sensitive the MSN.
The studies in the MSN mainly focus on exploring the human factors and behaviors
for communications in a distributed and autonomous environment. Privacy preservation
as a fundamental user requirement is however neglected in previous research. Recent
proposals [112] indicated that one or a few snapshots of a user’s location over time might
assist an adversary to identify the user’s trace, and an effective attack was presented to
identify victims with high probability. As a defense technique, the multiple-pseudonym
technique providing both identity and location privacy is widely applied in literatures [74,
113,114]. Freudiger et al. [74] developed a user-centric location privacy model to measure
the evolution of location privacy over time, and they derive the equilibrium strategies
on changing pseudonyms for each user from the game-theoretic perspective. With the
multiple-pseudonym technique applied, conventional cooperation stimulation mechanisms
without privacy preservation [72, 106, 115, 116] are no longer applicable in the considered
environment.
4.6 Summary
We have studied two fundamental problems in the MSN, i.e., privacy preservation and co-
operative data forwarding. We have indicated the difficulties to solve both problems at the
same time. This is because that concealing and protecting user information may prohibit
tracking the social behavior of users, which impedes the cooperative data forwarding and
effective incentive mechanism. We have attained the two conflicting design goals in one
framework. Specifically, we have introduced a novel user-to-spot data forwarding protocol
where each packet is destined to a hotspot associated with the receiver and then retrieved
by the receiver upon its access to the hotspot. With this protocol, not only can receiver lo-
cation privacy be preserved, but the packet delivery ratio is also enhanced. Game-theoretic
approaches have been adopted to derive the best data forwarding strategy for users, with
respect to user morality factor and forwarding capability. Through extensive trace-based
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simulations, we have demonstrated the data forwarding effectiveness of the protocol in
terms of packet delivery ratio. Particularly, the embedded privacy-preserving route-based
authentication scheme makes important contribution to the protocol performance.
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Chapter 5
Recommendation-based Trustworthy
Service Evaluation
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce another research topic, called trustworthy service evaluation
(TSE). We envision the MSN as business streets as shown in Fig. 5.1 where local service
providers (vendors) are densely distributed. Users in the MSN not only want to talk to
other users, but also expect to well communicate with the nearby vendors. In the meantime,
the vendors will try possible advertising methods to attract the potential customers.
The TSE is a distributed system involving both users and vendors. The intuition of
designing the TSE is from the successful business solutions, as shown in Fig. 5.2. When
we visit the business stores, especially restaurants, we often see some photos on the walls
showing the famous people had a very pleasure time with the restaurant owners. This is
a simple but very effective recommendation mechanism; people believe they would have
the same experience as the famous people had. The behavior of the famous people with
positive reputation would largely impact the customers’ choices. In the TSE, we aim to
change the format of the recommendations, i.e., convert the photos to non-forgeable digital
review comments. The review comments can be collected and disseminated not only inside
of the stores but also over the streets. However, the efficiency, security and privacy issues
would be more challenging.
We introduce a basic trustworthy service evaluation (bTSE) system and an extended
Sybil-resisted TSE (SrTSE) system for the MSN. In both systems, no third trusted author-
ities are involved, and the vendor locally maintains reviews left by the users. The vendor
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Figure 5.1: Mobile social networks with vendors
Figure 5.2: Restaurants with the reviews from famous people
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initializes a number of tokens, which are then circulated among the users to synchronize
their review submission behaviors. After being serviced by a vendor, a user generates and
submits a non-forgeable review to the vendor. The user cannot proceed with the review
submission until it receives a token from the vendor. If the review submission succeeds, the
user will forward the token to a nearby user who is wishing to submit a review to the same
vendor; otherwise, the user will forward both the token and its own review to the receiver,
expecting that receiver-user will cooperate and submit their reviews together. During to-
ken circulation, a hierarchical signature technique [64,65] is adopted to specify and record
each forwarding step in the token, and a modified aggregate signature technique [82] is
employed to reduce token size. Both signature techniques are also used during cooperative
review submission for reducing communication overhead and improving review integrity.
Specifically, we identify three unique review attacks, i.e., review linkability attack, review
rejection attack, and review modification attack in the bTSE. We also introduce two typ-
ical sybil attacks which cause huge damage to the bTSE. Under the sybil attacks, the
bTSE system cannot work as expected because a single user can abuse the pseudonyms to
generate multiple unlinkable false reviews in a short time. To resist such attacks, in the
SrTSE, the pseudonyms are embedded with a trapdoor; if any user leaves multiple false
reviews toward a vendor in a pre-defined time slot, its real identity will be revealed to
the public. Through the security analysis and numerical results, we show that both the
bTSE and the extended SrTSE are secure against the possible attacks. We further evaluate
the performance of the bTSE in comparison with a non-cooperative system that does not
engage cooperative review submission. Simulation results indicate that the bTSE achieves
significantly (up to 100%) higher submission rates in the presence of the review rejection
attacks, and (up to 75%) lower submission delays in general than the non-cooperative
system, at the cost of reasonable cooperation overhead.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we present the
system model and design goal. Then, we introduce the TSE systems in Section 5.3 where
the above challenges can be resolved. We provide the security analysis and the simulation-
based performance evaluation in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5, respectively. We also review
the related works in Section 5.6. Lastly, we draw our summary in Section 5.7.
81
5.2 System Model and Design Goal
5.2.1 System Model
As mentioned in previous chapter, an MSN may contain multiple vendors offering different
or similar services to users. Without loss of generality we consider a singe-vendor MSN.
There is no central trusted authority in the network. The vendor is assumed to offer a single
service. The vendor is equipped with a wireless communication device that has a large
storage space. Each user has a handheld device such as cell phone; the transmission range
of the device is the same for all users, and smaller than the vendor’s transmission range.
There are two types of communication in the network: vendor-to-user communication and
user-to-vendor communication. The former may take place directly if users are in the
vendor’s transmission range, or indirectly through other users’ message relay otherwise.
It aims to disseminate up-to-date service information including service description and
reviews to users. The later enables users to submit reviews to the vendor. Similar to
vendor-to-user communication, it occurs directly if the vendor is in the transmission range
of users, or indirectly otherwise.
We consider an MSN composed of a set V = {u1, · · · , uN} of mobile users with the
network size |V| = N . Users have equal communication range, denoted by Rt. From a social
perspective [117], users spontaneously form different social groups based on their common
interests, termed as “attributes”. Suppose that there are p social groups {g1, · · · , gp}.
Let Au be the universal attribute set. Denote a social group gh’s attribute set by Ah
(Ah ⊆ Au) for 1 ≤ h ≤ p. Every user uj belongs to at least one social group. It inherits
the attributes of the social groups that it belongs to. Thus, the attribute set of uj is
Pj =
⋃
h∈HAh, where uj is a member of gh. The vendor (precisely, its service) is also
tagged by an attribute set V ⊆ Au. It periodically disseminates its up-to-date service
information including service description and reviews to users. The integrity and non-
forgeability of such service information will be achieved by using a public/private key pair
of the vendor.
Each group gh relies on a group authority ch for membership management. ch has
a public/private key pair (pkh, skh), and publishes the public key to all users. A multi-
authority identity based signature scheme [82] is used to implement group membership.
Note that ch is not a part of the network, and the management of group membership is
performed oﬄine. Every user uj has a private unique identity idj. When it joins gh, ch
verifies the validity of uj’s identity idj and assigns uj a number of randomly generated
verifiable pseudonyms pidj,h,1, pidj,h,2, · · · . It also allocates uj a number of secret keys
pskj,h,∗, each corresponding to pidj,h,∗. Thus, uj has a set of pseudonyms pidj,∗,∗ allocated
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by the group authorities of the social groups that it belongs to. It interacts with the vendor
and other users using these pseudonyms alternatively, instead of its unique identity idj,
for privacy preservation. Reviews are associated with pseudonyms, which in turn belong
to social groups, such that the vendor and other users are able to check the authenticity
of the reviews and the group authorities are able to trace the reviews generated by their
group members.
5.2.2 Design Goal
Due to the lack of centralized control, the MSN is vulnerable to various security threats. It
is worthy noting that with third trusted authorities in the network, the security problems
can be easily solved. We consider that the group authorities are trusted but not a part
of the network. The vendor and compromised users can manipulate reviews for malicious
competition. In the following, we describe several malicious attacks that aim particularly
at the TSE. They are called review attacks and sybil attacks, where the review attacks
includes review linkability, rejection and modification attacks and the sybil attacks have
two categories. Without protection, they may take place easily, paralyzing the entire
system.
Review attack 1: Review linkability attack is executed by malicious users. who claim
to be members of a specific group, but disables the group authority to trace the review
back to its unique identity, thus breaking review linkability.
Review attack 2: Review rejection attack is launched by the vendor when a user
submits a negative review to it. In the attack, the vendor drops the review silently without
responding to the submission request from the user. The vendor may intend to perform
review rejection attacks so as to hide public opinions and mislead users.
Review attack 3: Review modification attack is performed by the vendor toward
locally recorded review collections. The vendor inserts forged complimentary reviews,
or modifies/deletes negative reviews in a review collection. Such attacks aim at false
advertising by breaking review integrity and influencing user behavior.
In addition, we consider attacks where legitimate users generate false reviews. As
reviews are subjective in nature, it is difficult to determine whether the content of an
authentic review is false or not. However, the TSE must prevent the sybil attacks which
subvert the system by creating a large number of pseudonymous entities, using them to
gain a disproportionately large influence. Since the TSE assigns multiple pseudonyms to
a registered user, the sybil attacks can easily happen in the TSE as follows:
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Sybil attack 1: Such an attack is launched by malicious users: Registered users leave
multiple reviews toward a vendor in a time slot where reviews are false and negative to the
service.
Sybil attack 2: Such an attack is launched by malicious vendors with colluded users:
A malicious vendor asks registered users to leave multiple reviews toward itself in a time
slot where reviews are positive to the service.
The above two sybil attacks produce inaccurate information, which is unfair to either
vendors or users, and disrupt the effectiveness of the TSE. In previous requirement, to
prevent review linkability attacks, reviews are needed to be linked to real identities by
the group authorities. However, the group authorities are not part of the network, and
the detection of the sybil attacks by the group authorities is inefficient and probably with
huge delay. To this end, we introduce another security mechanism to effectively resist the
sybil attacks by restricting each user to generate only one review toward a vendor in a
pre-defined time slot. If any user generates two or more than two reviews with different
pseudonyms toward a vendor in a time slot, its real identity will be exposed to the public
and such malicious behavior will be caught. The above two sybil attacks can thus be
resisted.
Note that, restricting the number of reviews per each user in one time slot effectively
limits the sybil attacks. However, any user can still generate false reviews using multiple
pseudonyms for different time slots, and the reviews cannot be linked immediately. Since
users are grouped based on their interests and reviews are linked to the social groups, false
reviews will damage group reputation in a long run. Group reputation can therefore be
taken as a weighting factor for the reviews generated by the group members. To further
mitigate the effect by the false reviews, users may also make their service selection decisions
based on reviews from familiar groups with high reputation rather than strange groups with
low reputation.
5.3 TSE Solutions
We present the bTSE based on the above defined models. In the bTSE, a user, after being
serviced by the vendor, submits a review to the vendor, which then records the review in
its local repository. The review consists of two parts: (α, σ), where α is the review content
and σ is the signature proving the authenticity of the content. Review submission may
need cooperations from other users when the vendor is not in the transmission range of the
user, or when direct submission fails due to communication failure. The logic is: the user
84
forwards its review to a nearby user who wants to submit a review to the same vendor and
expects that user to submit their reviews together. User cooperation increases submission
rate and reduces submission delay at the cost of additional transmission efforts. To have
a clear idea about the cost of user cooperation, we analyze the communication overhead
with or without user cooperation being engaged.
Without cooperation, users submit only their own reviews, and the total communication
overhead of l users (one review per user) is l ·f(|α|+ |σ|), where f(x) is the communication
cost on transmitting x bits. With cooperations, in an extreme case, user uki requires
user uki+1 to submit a review for it, uki+1 further requires uii+2 , and so on, and uki+l−1
finally submits the reviews of the l users altogether. The communication overhead is
(
∑l
j=1 j) · f(|α| + |σ|). If we further adopt the aggregate signature scheme [82], multiple
signatures σ can be aggregated into a single batch signature σ∗, where σ∗ has the same
size as σ, and the communication overhead can be reduced to (
∑l
j=1 j) · f(|α|) + l · f(|σ|).
During review submission, data confidentiality and access control are not necessary
because review information is open to the public, and data integrity, authenticity and non-
repudiation can be obtained by directly applying traditional cryptography techniques such
as hashing and digital signature on review content. As these techniques are very classic,
we do not detail them here. While the basic security features are easy to achieve, it is
challenging to resist the three review attacks and the two sybil attacks. To overcome this
challenge, we first introduce the bTSE which uses tokens to synchronize review submis-
sion and organize reviews into certain structures. The integrity of the review structure is
protected through hierarchical and aggregate signature techniques so that the review mod-
ification can be detected. User cooperation is further exploited to deal with the review
rejection. Below, we elaborate on review structure, token usage, and the review generation
and submission processes.
5.3.1 Step 1 of bTSE: Structured Reviews
In the bTSE, reviews are structured to reflect their adjacency (i.e. submission order)
through user cooperation. As such, vendors simply rejecting or modifying reviews will
break the integrity of the review structure, thus being detected by the public. Consider a
collection of n reviews received by a vendor v. We define four basic review structures (as
illustrated in Fig. 5.3) and indicate vendors’ review modification capabilities corresponding
to them.
In Fig. 5.3(a), reviews appear as discrete points, meaning that they are submitted
separately and independent of each other. This independence gives the vendor maximum
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(a) Discrete points (b) Tree (c) Chain (d) Ring
Figure 5.3: Basic review structures
capability of manipulating the n reviews, and its modification capability is therefore O(n).
A logarithm modification capability is shown in Fig. 5.3(b), where the reviews are presented
in a tree-like structure. In this scenario, v is able to delete any single review corresponding
to the leaf node, and the number of such reviews is O(log n). Figures 5.3(c) and 5.3(d)
exhibit a chain structure and a ring structure. They respectively lead to constant O(1)
and zero modification capabilities. Clearly, the strength of the modification capabilities
follows the order of O(n) > O(log n) > O(1) > 0.
1
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Figure 5.4: A hybrid review structure
In order to restrict the vendor’s review modification capability, reviews need to be
structured. Pure use of the strongest ring structure requires extensive cooperation efforts
from users, i.e., the first user that submitted a review must be aware of the pseudonyms of
the users who are going to submit reviews subsequently. Considering the decentralized na-
ture of the S-MSN, the assumption of having such pre-knowledge is unrealistic. Therefore,
in the bTSE, separately submitted individual reviews and collectively submitted review
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clusters are linked into a chain according to their submission order, and within each review
cluster, reviews are organized to form a ring. This hybrid structure, as shown in Fig. 5.4,
limits the modification capability of the vendor below O(1). Because this structure has a
chain as its skeleton, in the sequel we refer to it as “chain” for ease of our presentation.
5.3.2 Step 2 of bTSE: Synchronization Tokens
The chain structure requires reviews to be submitted sequentially. The bTSE uses a token
technique to synchronize review submission. The vendor spontaneously initializes a number
of tokens and issues them to distinct users, one per user. The tokens will then be circulated
among users according to their local decision on token forwarding. A user cannot submit
a review unless it currently holds one of the tokens. A token may be lost due to user
mobility or malicious dropping. The vendor considers a token lost if it has not received
any review submission associated to the token for a pre-defined maximum time duration
θexp. It replaces lost tokens with new ones so as to maintain a constant number of active
tokens and stable system performance.
Each token leads to an independent review chain. The vendor’s review modification
capability is proportional to the number of review chains. The more review chains, the less
trustworthy the reviews from users’ viewpoint. Thus, the vendor has the motivation to
keep the token number as small as possible. On the other hand, there should be sufficient
tokens in order to avoid token starvation problem, where some user never obtains a token to
leave its review. In the performance evaluation, we will study the impact of token number
on the system performance.
A user, when having a review to submit, transmits a token request message. After
receiving the request, a nearby user currently holding a token or the vendor (if having a
spare token) may send the token to the requesting user. The requesting user accepts the
first arrived valid token and replies with an ACK message. For other received tokens, it
replies with a RETURN message, indicating that it no longer needs a token. The token
request, ACK and RETURN messages are signed by senders using (pseudonym) secret keys
which are non-forgeable. Token forwarding happens toward one user at a time; successfully
forwarded tokens (replied with ACKs) are no longer passed to any other user. Transmission
retrials may be made up to a maximum number of times to tolerate communication failure.
The vendor maintains a token-pseudonym (TP) list. In this list, each token is linked
to a pseudonym that belongs to a user who most recently submitted a review using the
token. The list is updated whenever the vendor receives a new review, and is periodically
broadcasted to all users in the vendor’s transmission range. Once a token’s information
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is published, the vendor cannot simply remove the token from the TP list because any
modification to the list will cause inconsistency with previously published information and
be noticed by the public. A user having a token will forward the token, after using it, to a
randomly selected neighboring user who is wishing to submit a review. Below, we explain
token structure and how a token is forwarded among users.
Consider three users u1, u2 and u3, with u1 neighboring u2, and u2 neighboring u3.
They are respectively members of groups g1, g2, g3 and have obtained pseudonyms pid1,1,∗,
pid2,2,∗, and pid3,3,∗ from the corresponding group authorities. The vendor initializes a
token with an identifier tok. It generates a public/private key pair (pkt, skt) for tok and
publishes the public key pkt. Suppose that it intends to issue the token to u1. Then, the
token initially is a signature σ1 = Signskt(g1||pid1,1,∗||T ), where T is current time stamp.
We denote this initial version σ1 by tok1. It implies that u1 is the first user who can submit
a review and must submit the review using pseudonym pid1,1,∗. The pseudonym pid1,1,∗ is
exposed to the vendor by ui.
After submitting a review using tok1 and pid1,1,∗, u1 updates tok1 to tok2 and passes
tok2 to u2 as a response to u2’s token request. The updated version tok2 is (PF1, σ2 =
Signpsk1,1,∗(g2||pid2,2,∗||T1)), where PF1 = (g1, pid1,1,∗, σ1) is the token forwarding proof
of u1. Note that, (pkt, tok, pid1,1,∗) is currently included in the TP list. Suppose that
tok2 is the first token received by u2. u2 does the following: validate tok2 by checking the
authenticity of PF1 using signatures σ1 and σ2, check if the user with pid1,1,∗ is the one that
lastly forwards tok (by looking at the TP list), send an ACK to u1, submit its review using
tok2 and pid2,2,∗, and update tok2 to tok3 = (PF1, PF2, σ3 = Signpsk2,2,∗(g3||pid3,3,∗||T2))
where PF2 = (g2, pid2,2,∗, σ2), and send tok3 to u3.
The token forwarding process is repeated among users until tok expires or is brought
out of the network. tok is always in the form of ({PFx = (pidx,∗,∗, σx)}x∈X , σy) where ux has
forwarded the token and uy the receiver user. It includes the hierarchical signatures that
define the order of review submission and organizes submitted reviews in a chain structure.
Note that malicious token drop is handled by the vendor through token replacement, as
discussed previously.
Reducing token size by signature aggregation: We introduce an aggregate sig-
nature technique within multiple-authority settings, which is a variant of the scheme pre-
sented in [82]. This technique aggregates the signatures of different users from different
social groups, and the signatures can be on different messages. By this technique, the
signatures in a token can be aggregated, and the token size, thus the communication cost
can be reduced. The aggregate signature technique will also be used for review aggregation
in the next sub-section, and the associated Sign and V erify functions will be instantiated
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as explained below.
Let G and GT be two cyclic additive groups with the same prime order q, and e :
G×G→ GT be a bilinear pairing (Section 2.4.1). P is a generator of G. A group authority
ch picks a random sh ∈ Z/qZ and sets Qh = shP . It also chooses two cryptographic hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z/qZ.
Key generation: A user uj if registering to a group authority chj will receive a bunch of
pseudonym secret keys corresponding to randomly generated pseudonyms pidj,hj ,∗. Within
a social group, the pseudonyms are never repeatedly assigned to users. The pseudonym
secret keys pskj,hj ,∗ = (kj,0, kj,1), where kj,0 = shjPj,0 = shjH1(pidj,hj ,∗||0) and kj,1 =
shjPj,1 = shjH1(pidj,hj ,∗||1).
Signing: uj generates a string as str = “v”, where v represents the identity of the
vendor. Note that, all tokens are toward a specific vendor at a time period t. Therefore,
the string can be obtained by other similar users. The signature on mj will be σj =
Signpskj,hj ,∗(mj) = (str, Sj, Tj).
Sj = rjPs + kj,0 + βjkj,1 and Tj = rjP (5.1)
where Ps = H1(str), βj = H2(mj, pidj,hj ,∗, str) and rj is randomly chosen from Z/qZ.
Aggregation: Multiple signatures with the common str can be aggregated. Consider
σj = (str, Sj, Tj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n are the signatures with common string str. The aggregated
signature σagg = (str, Sagg, Tagg) can be obtained, where Sagg = Σ
n
j=1Sj and Tagg = Σ
n
j=1Tj.
Verification: Consider σagg = (str, Sagg, Tagg) is the aggregated signature for {(str, Sj, Tj)1≤j≤n}.
The function V erify(pid1,h1,∗|| · · · ||pidn,hn,∗,m1|| · · · ||mn, σagg) outputs 1 if the following
condition holds; 0 otherwise.
e(Sagg, P )
?
= e(Tagg, Ps)·
Σnj=1e(H1(pidj,hj ,∗||0) + βjH1(pidj,hj ,∗||1), Qhj)
(5.2)
where βj = H2(mj, pidj,hj ,∗, str). A user will only use pidj,hj ,∗ to generate a review on mj
for v only once to resist existential forgery attack [63].
5.3.3 Step 3 of bTSE: Review Generation and Submission
Review generation and submission involve multiple steps as shown in Fig. 5.5. Review
generation does not rely on tokens which gives users flexibility to generate review. Consider
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Figure 5.5: Review generation and submission
a user uj who just received a token tok from a nearby user uw with pseudonym pidw,∗,∗. It
checks if the received tok is valid. This validation step has two perspectives: i) to ensure
that tok is indeed originated from the vendor and has been properly forwarded in the
past; ii) to ensure that tok is sent by the user who lastly used it. The first goal can be
realized by using the public key pkt of the vendor and the forwarder information (including
secrets, pseudonyms, and time stamps) embedded in tok. The second one can be achieved
by checking if the association (tok, pidw,∗,∗) exists in the latest TP list provided by the
vendor.
During token forwarding, a token is supposed to be passed to only one user that is
wishing to submit a review to the same vendor. When multiple such users are present, a
random selection can be made. In case that the token is passed to multiple users, whether
accidentally (due to the failure in transmitting ACK message) or intentionally, the vendor
will only accept the first subsequently submitted review using the token. With the second
check on the TP list during token validation, the other users holding the token will find
that the token is no longer valid and then try to find a new token to submit their reviews.
After confirming that tok is valid, uj separates the attached review REVw from tok. It
checks the authenticity of REVw. It is able to do so because uw’s pseudonym pidw,∗,∗ is
included in tok. If REVw is invalid, uj will discard it. After the review authenticity check,
uj generates its own review revj. Denote the review content by αj. Suppose that uj will
use the pseudonym pidj,h,∗ from social group gh for the review generation, and set Tj to
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current time which is larger than all the time stamps embedded in tok. It computes
σj = Signpskj,h,∗(αj||v||Tj)
revj = 〈gh, pidj,h,∗, αj, v, Tj, σj〉.
(5.3)
The signature σj can be verified by checking V erify(pidj,h,∗, αj||v||Tj, σj) ?= 1 (see the
previous sub-section for the details of functions Sign and V erify). The receiver then
knows that revj is indeed generated by a user from gh at time Tj, not forged by the vendor
or a user from a different group. Having generated revj, uj aggregates it with REVw (by
the signature aggregation technique in Section 5.3.2) and submits the aggregated reviews
REVj (REVj = revj if REVw = null) together with tok to the vendor. The vendor checks
the validity of REVj and tok, and broadcast the updated TP list. Review aggregation is the
same process as signature aggregation during token forwarding presented in the previous
section. Review aggregation has two advantages: i) it effectively resists the review attacks;
ii) it largely reduces the communication overhead.
Note that uj is unable to forge a review of uw because it cannot obtain any pseudonym
secret key pskw,∗,∗, and uj is unable to replace the review with any other review received
from uw in the past because time stamp is used to prevent review replay. Direct replacement
can be easily detected and rejected by the vendor. Further, uj cannot forward the token
without submitting REVw and/or revj because the token records the forwarding history
and the vendor will detect the review missing when it later receives the token as part of a
review submission made by another user.
After submitting REVj and tok to the vendor, uj checks the updated TP list from
the vendor. An unsuccessful submission can be due to communication failure or review
rejection. To tolerate communication failure, a number of submission retrials can be made
before drawing a submission failure conclusion. Upon receiving the updated TP list, uj will
check which pseudonym tok is related to in the list. If tok is related to pidj,h,∗, meaning
that uj have successfully submitted REVj, uj will forward tok to a nearby user as described
in the previous section. If tok is still related to pidw,∗,∗, meaning that uj’s submission failed,
uj will resort for cooperative submission by sending tok and REVj together to a nearby
user that is requesting for a token. If tok is related to a different pseudonym, implying
that uw must have sent the token to multiple users and uj’s submission failed, uj will try
to find a new token from nearby users and submit REVj using it.
Comments: During service information dissemination, the vendor needs to broadcast
its entire review collection together with the latest versions of the tokens. After receiving
the service information, a user checks the authenticity of the reviews and compares the
pseudonyms associated with reviews to those embedded in tokens. Because the token
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contains its circulation history (implemented by hierarchical signatures and time stamps),
the user may arrange the reviews according to the circulation history. Any missed review
will be detected. If multiple reviews from the same user appear, it will use time stamp to
differentiate them.
5.3.4 SrTSE
In previous sub-sections, we have introduced a bTSE where review linkability, rejection
and modification attacks are considered. We further extend the bTSE to a Sybil-resisted
TSE, named SrTSE, which effectively prevents the sybil attacks. In the following, we first
describe the sybil attacks in the S-MSN, and then introduce our solutions to complete the
design of the SrTSE.
Sybil Attacks: In Section 5.2.2, we define two types of sybil attacks: the sybil attack
1 is launched by a group of registered users. They aim at telling other users the bad service
from a vendor while the service of the vendor is good. With the valid registration, these
malicious users are able to leave false reviews toward a specific vendor. Even realizing
the reviews are not in accord with the service, the vendor cannot simply delete or reject
the reviews. If the vendor does, users will detect such behavior and regard the vendor as
a dishonest vendor. Besides, the sybil attack 2 is launched by a vendor and a group of
registered users. They aim at raising the reputation of the service from a vendor while
the service of the vendor is not that good. The reviews generated by these malicious users
cannot be distinguished from other reviews by well-behaving users. In the bTSE, every
user receives multiple pseudonyms and the corresponding secret keys. For example, uj
has pidj,h,1, pidj,h,2, · · · in social group gh. Since these pseudonyms are random numbers
and cannot be linked by anyone except group authorities, uj can use pidj,h,1, pidj,h,2, · · ·
to generate multiple reviews toward a vendor for a short time period. In addition, uj can
form the false reviews in chain structure or ring structure. Therefore, from the perspective
of other users, they cannot tell if these reviews are from the same user or not.
Sybil-resisted TSE (SrTSE): In the SrTSE, we introduce a novel solution to prevent
the two sybil attacks. In the S-MSN, we consider that a user has no need to generate
multiple reviews toward a vendor in a short time period. The SrTSE allows a user to leave
only one review toward a vendor for a pre-defined time slot. If a user generates multiple
reviews with the same pseudonyms, the linkability of the reviews can be easily verified
by the public; if a user generates multiple reviews with different pseudonyms toward a
vendor in a time slot, its real identity will be exposed to the public. To achieve the above
properties, we modify the pseudonym generation and the signature scheme of the bTSE.
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Let G and GT be two cyclic additive groups with the same order q, and e : G×G→ GT
be a bilinear pairing [80]. P,Q are two generators of G. A group authority ch picks a
random sh ∈ Z/qZ and sets Qh = shP . It also chooses two cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z/qZ.
Consider a user uj registers to the social group gh in the SrTSE. Then, uj obtains the
following values:
• pidj,hj ,∗, a published random number.
• aj,∗ = ρH2(pidj,hj ,∗) + idj, where idj is the real identity of uj, and ρ is a coefficient
in Z/qZ.
• bj,∗ = (r∗P, shQ + r∗H1(aj,∗r∗P ||pidj,hj ,∗)), where r∗ is a random number. This is a
signature on aj,∗r∗P by the group authority ch.
For multiple random numbers pidj,hj ,∗, uj obtains multiple tuples (pidj,hj ,∗, aj,∗, bj,∗)
from ch. Then, uj regards pidj,hj ,∗ as the pseudonym and pskj,hj ,∗ = aj,∗ as the secret key.
In order to generate a signature on message mj, uj executes the following steps:
• uj calculates aj,∗H1(mj).
• uj generates a random number r¯ ∈ Z/qZ, and outputs a signature
σj = (pidj,hj ,∗, σj,1, σj,2, σj,3, σj,4), (5.4)
where σj,1 = aj,∗H1(mj),
σj,2 = aj,∗r∗P ,
σj,3 = r∗P ,
σj,4 = shQ+ r∗H1(aj,∗r∗P ||r∗P ||pidj,hj ,∗).
(5.5)
If an entity receives σj, it runs the following verification steps.
• Step 1:
e(σj,4, P ) = e(Q,Qh)e(H1(σj,2||σj,3||pidj,hj ,∗), σj,3) (5.6)
• Step 2:
e(σj,1, σj,3) = e(H1(mj), σj,2) (5.7)
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It can be seen that (σj,3, σj,4) is a signature generated by the group authority ch since
sh is the secret key only known to ch. From Step 1, the authenticity of σj,2 and pidj,hj ,∗ can
be guaranteed. In addition, from Step 2, if the equality holds, it is publicly verified that
uj knows the value aj,∗. In fact, we build our signature scheme based on identity-based
signature [118] and short signature [119].
Sybil Attack Detection: For each review, we require users to sign on mj = v||t
where v is the vendor’s name and t is the time slot. If users do not output the signature
on mj, its review will not be accepted by the public. We consider a sybil attack launched
by uj who generate two reviews with two different pseudonyms pidj,hj ,1 and pidj,hj ,2. If
both reviews are authentic, they must contain both aj,1H1(mj) and aj,2H1(mj) which can
be accessed by the public. Thus, the public is able to calculate Tr = idjH1(mj) from
aj,1 = ρH2(pidj,hj ,1) + idj (5.8)
and
aj,2 = ρH2(pidj,hj ,2) + idj, (5.9)
since
idj =
aj,1H2(pidj,hj ,2)− aj,2H2(pidj,hj ,1)
H2(pidj,hj ,2)−H2(pidj,hj ,1)
. (5.10)
To recover the real identity of the sybil attacker, any entity calculates Tr′ = idH1(mj) for
every possible id and tests if Tr′ ?= Tr. The entity outputs the recovered identity id, upon
satisfaction of the above equation.
Note that, similar to [64,65], the vendors or the users can pre-calculate values idH1(mj)
for every possible identity, and then, they just need to check the equality between Tr and
these values. Within a constant time, the real identity of the sybil attacker can be revealed.
Aggregate Signature in the SrTSE: The signature aggregation plays an important
role in the bTSE because it largely reduces the communication overhead. We will also
explore the possible aggregation scheme for the newly developed signatures in the SrTSE.
Observing the modified signature scheme, the pseudonyms and the corresponding secret
keys have to be equipped with a trapdoor such that other entity (not group authority)
is able to recover the real identity of the sybil attacker. Therefore, the aggregation on
signatures becomes more difficult. From the verification Step 1 and Step 2, we can see
that σj,1, σj,2 and σj,3 cannot be aggregated because σj,2 and σj,3 have to be individually
input in the hash function and σj,1 is paired with different σj,3 every time. But σj,4 from
different users can be aggregated in the form of
∏
j σj,4 because it is always paired with P .
The verification on the aggregate signature is shown below.
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e(
∏
j
σj,4, P ) = e(Q,Qh)
∏
j
e(H1(σj,2||pidj,hj ,∗), σj,3) (5.11)
In the SrTSE, we have modified the signatures of the review generation in order to
resist the sybil attacks. Such modification makes the aggregation less efficient. If we have
n signatures and each has 4 group elements in G, these signatures can be aggregated into
3k + 1 group elements. Though the size of aggregate signature decreases, it still linearly
depends on k. We regard the size of such aggregate signature as O(k). In comparison, the
bTSE offers an aggregated signature sized at O(1). Thus, we can still use the aggregate
signature scheme of the bTSE for the token generation to achieve higher efficiency.
5.3.5 Summary of bTSE & SrTSE
We have introduced two trustworthy service evaluation systems: one considers the review
attacks only and the other one considers both the review attacks and the sybil attacks.
In the following, we summarize the efficiency and security properties of these two sys-
tems. We also consider the non-cooperative system where pseudonyms are employed and
the reviews are individually submitted by users. Let “L att” denote “review linkability
attacks”, “R att” denote “review rejection attacks”, “M att” denote “review modification
attacks”, “S att” denote “sybil attacks”, “S token 1” denote “the size of signature on to-
kens”, “S review 1” denote “the size of signature on reviews”, “S token k” denote “the
size of k-aggregated signatures on tokens”, “S review k” denote “the size of k-aggregated
signatures on reviews”, “Y” denote “resist”, and “N” denote “not resist”.
Table 5.1: Security attacks in bTSE and SrTSE
L att R att M att S att
Non-Coop Y N N N
bTSE [4] Y Y Y N
SrTSE Y Y Y Y
Table 5.2: Communication overhead in bTSE and SrTSE
S token 1 S token k S review 1 S review k
bTSE [4] 2|G| 2|G| 2|G| 2|G|
SrTSE 2|G| 2|G| 4|G| (3k + 1)|G|
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From the above the security comparisons in Table 5.3.5, it can be seen that both
the bTSE and the SrTSE outperforms the non-cooperative system in terms of security.
Moreover, the bTSE resists “L att”, “R att”, and “M att” which are the possible attacks.
The SrTSE additionally resists the two sybil attacks from malicious users, and thus the
SrTSE is more reliable and trustworthy in the S-MSN.
In the above Table 5.3.5, we give the communication overhead of a token and a review
in both bTSE and SrTSE. We do not count the sizes of messages and the common strings
because their sizes are negligible compared to the signatures. From the Table 5.3.5, both
bTSE and SrTSE have very efficient review and token generation due to the signature
aggregation. To resist the sybil attacks, SrTSE employs a trapdoor in the pseudonym
which leads to a linearly-increasing size in review generation of the SrTSE.
5.4 Security Analysis
Security analysis focuses on the system’s resilience against review linkability attacks, review
rejection attacks, review modification attacks, and sybil attacks.
5.4.1 Resilience to Review Linkability Attacks
In a review linkability attack, a user submits unlinkable reviews. If reviews without linkabil-
ity enabled on the group authorities are allowed, malicious users may abuse their member-
ships and generate irresponsible reviews to undermine the system’s performance. Recall the
review generation process described in Section 5.3.3. A review revj is valid if and only if the
following verification function can be checked by the public: V erify(pidj,h,∗, αj||v||Tj, σj).
By the verification function, (gh, pidj,h,∗, αj||v||Tj) are related by a non-forgeable signature.
Anyone without the secret key skh or pskj,h,∗ is unable to forge a triple tuple in such re-
lation. Furthermore, when generating pidj,h,∗ and the corresponding pskj,h,∗ for user uj,
the group authority ch checks the unique identity idj of uj, and maintains an association
(pidj,h,∗, idj) all the time. Therefore, invalid reviews are recognizable by the public and the
group authorities, and the group authorities are able to link any valid review to the unique
identity of its generator. Review linkability attacks thus can be effectively prevented.
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5.4.2 Resilience to Review Rejection Attacks
In a review rejection attack, the vendor rejects unwelcome but authentic reviews from
users. Recall the review submission process in Section 5.3.3. A user uj tries to directly
submit its review revj using token tok to the vendor for several times. If all the trials fail,
whether due to communication failure or owing to a review rejection attack, it will pass
both tok and revj to a nearby user uk who also has a need in submitting its review revk to
the same vendor, and expect uk to submit revj and revk together. Then, uk validates the
received tok and revj, aggregates revj and revk to obtain REVk, and submits REVk as a
whole, together with tok, to the vendor. The vendor either accepts REVk (including the
previously rejected revj) or rejects it (including the new one revk). Now, the vendor has
a constraint on rejecting REVk because it has to consider whether revk is complimentary
or not. As reviews are aggregated, the vendor will have more and more constraints on
launching review rejection attacks. If it finally decides to accept the aggregated reviews
that are submitted as a whole piece, it will actually accept all the reviews that it previously
rejected. The review aggregation and indirect review submission techniques mitigate such
attacks.
5.4.3 Resilience to Review Modification Attacks
In a review modification attack, the vendor manipulates its locally recorded review col-
lection by inserting forged complimentary reviews and modifying or deleting existing un-
welcome authentic reviews. The integrity of the review content is guaranteed by the sig-
nature techniques (refer to Section 5.4.1). Reviews are generally linked in one or a few
review chains, depending on the number of the used tokens, if they are directly submit-
ted by users. The cooperation among users enables indirect review submission in case of
direct-submission failure. Indirect submission causes the reviews from different users to
be aggregated and formed in a ring structure. Figure 5.4 shows a single review chain as a
result of direct and indirect submissions. In this figure, dots represent individual reviews,
and without ambiguity they also refer to the users that submit the corresponding reviews.
Let the users whose reviews are aggregated in one signature form a cluster. In Fig. 5.4,
there are three clusters of users as indicated by the colorful dots. We index the users in
each cluster such that a smaller index indicates the user obtains the token earlier and the
largest index implies the user successfully and directly submitted the aggregated reviews to
the vendor. Thus, the users with the smallest index and the largest index are the interfaces
of the cluster. Outside these clusters, arrowed lines indicate the token forwarding direction.
We define a risky pair of users as two users that are interconnected by an arrowed line.
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The one from which the line starts is called start user, and the other is referred to as end
user. The following theorems indicate that review modification attack can be resisted.
Theorem 5 The vendor is able to insert reviews into a review chain if and only if it has
compromised a start user.
Proof 5 Suppose that the vendor has compromised a start user uj and obtained its all
keying materials. Let uv be the end user corresponding to uj. The token is in the form of
(· · · , PFj, PFv, · · · , σy). If the vendor wants to insert a false review via the pseudonym of
user um, it has to change the token to (· · · , PF ′j , PFm, PFv, · · · , σy), where
PF ′j = (pidj,hj ,∗, Signpskj,hj ,∗(ghm||pidm,hm,∗||Tj),
PFm = (pidm,hm,∗, Signpskm,hm,∗(ghv ||pidv,hv ,∗||Tm).
(5.12)
The validity of the modified token can be easily verified. Note that in this case, the vendor
has also compromised um because otherwise it would not have pskm,hm,∗ and not be able to
generate PFm or forge the review.
We consider the case that the vendor has successfully inserted a forged review. In order
for the forged review to be accepted by the public, the vendor must have inserted a fake
token forwarding proof in the token, which in turn implies that it must have compromised
a user who has used the token. Assume that the compromised user is not a start user.
In this case, it must be a user in a cluster (see Fig. 5.4) that does not have the largest
index. Because the user with largest index outputs a non-forgeable aggregated signature on
the legitimate reviews in the cluster, the forged review will be detected, contradicting to the
fact that the insertion is successful. This completes the proof.
Theorem 6 The vendor without compromising any user can only delete a sub-chain of a
review chain, starting with an end user and spanning all the users that receive the token
later than the end user.
Proof 6 A cluster of aggregated reviews are treated as a single piece because the vendor is
not able to separate them. They are either all kept or all deleted. By definition, an end user
is also a start user unless it is within a user cluster (corresponding to a cluster of aggregated
reviews). Thus, the vendor can only delete reviews from an end user. After deleting a review
or some aggregated reviews, the review chain becomes broken. The breakage is detectable
unless the subsequent reviews are also deleted. However, if the vendor compromises a
start user (and obtains the user’s keying materials), it will be able to delete an arbitrary
number of successive reviews including review clusters from the start user, and fix the chain
breakage, without being detected.
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5.4.4 Resilience to Sybil Attacks
To resist to the sybil attacks, we need to prove that the SrTSE satisfies the following two
properties.
• P1. If a user leaves two or more false reviews with different pseudonyms toward a
vendor in a time slot, its real identity can be derived by the vendor and other users.
• P2. If a user leaves only one review toward a vendor in a time slot, its real identity
can be protected.
We first consider the property P1 of the SrTSE. We consider a malicious user uj
generates two signatures on mj = v||t. From the signature, σj,1 can be obtained. If both
signatures are valid, the relation σj,1, σj,2 and σj,3 will be fixed by the eqn. (5.7). Since σj,2
and σj,3 are included in the message of σj,4, their authenticity can be verified. Therefore,
σj,1 = aj,∗H1(mj) where aj,1 is generated in the specific format by the group authority.
The public can obtain aj,1H1(mj) and aj,2H1(mj), and then derive
idjH1(mj) =
H2(pidj,hj ,2)aj,1 −H2(pidj,hj ,1)aj,2
H2(pidj,hj ,2)−H2(pidj,hj ,1)
·H1(mj) (5.13)
By executing the equality checks, the real identity idj of uj will be determined. Note
that, ρ is determined by the group authorities. Different group generate different ρ. We
consider the used two pseudonyms pidj,hj ,1 and pidj,hj ,2 are from the same social group in
the above analysis. We can further require a trusted third authority to coordinate all the
group authorities to generate the same ρ for one user, and then the sybil attacks using
pseudonyms from different groups can be resisted.
We then consider the property P2 of the SrTSE. From a signature σj, the real identity
can be disclosed from aj,∗ which is contained in σj,1 = aj,∗H1(mj) and σj,2 = aj,∗r∗P .
Denote H1(mj) = r
′P . Thus, we have two values
σj,1 = (ρH2(pidj,hj ,∗) + id)r
′P (5.14)
and
σj,2 = (ρH2(pidj,hj ,∗) + id)r∗P . (5.15)
99
If multiple signatures with different pseudonyms are generated toward different mj by uj,
we can obtain the following values:
(ρH2(pidj,hj ,1) + idj)r
′
1P ,
(ρH2(pidj,hj ,1) + idj)r1P ,
(ρH2(pidj,hj ,2) + idj)r
′
2P ,
(ρH2(pidj,hj ,2) + idj)r2P , · · ·
(5.16)
Since (r′1, r1, r
′
2, r2, · · · ) are independent and unknown to the public. The random number
ρ cannot be removed by the linear combination of these values. Therefore, the real identity
idj is always anonymized by ρ, and thus idj is protected.
5.4.5 Numerical Results of Detecting Sybil Attack
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Figure 5.6: Number of calculation on detecting the sybil attack
The SrTSE can resist the sybil attack, i.e., the sybil attack can be detected without the
involvement of the group authorities. In the following, we study the performance of the
SrTSE under the sybil attack. We will evaluate how much computation costs needed to
detect the false reviews by the sybil attack. We first consider the case of a single malicious
user in the SrTSE. The sybil attacker generates x false reviews toward the vendor in time
slot t using its x different pseudonyms. The vendor totally receives y reviews in time slot
t (y ≥ x). From eqn. (5.13), the vendor needs to do every calculation for any pair of the
received reviews. That means, the maximum number of calculation is (y2). We denote the
number of calculations needed to filter all the false reviews by C1(x, y) (≤ (y2)). In fact,
if two reviews have been identified to be associated with the attacker, all the rest false
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reviews can be easily identified by comparing them with the detected false reviews. Thus,
the expected value of C1(x, y) is calculated in eqn. (5.17).
C1(x, y) =
y − x
y
(y − 1 + C1(x, y − 1)) + x
y
(y − 1)
= y − 1 + y − x
y
C1(x, y − 1)
(5.17)
In the above equation, y−x
y
and x
y
represent the probabilities of choosing a valid review
and a false review, respectively. If a valid review is chosen, we need to do y−1 calculations
between the chosen review with the rest y− 1 reviews and C1(x, y− 1) calculations among
y − 1 reviews. If a false review is chosen, we need to do the first y − 1 calculations and
then all the false reviews will be detected. Similarly, we further derive the number of
calculations C2(x1, x2, y) in case of two malicious users, as shown in eqn. (5.18), where x1
and x2 represent the numbers of false reviews of two malicious users, respectively. We have
x1 + x2 ≤ y.
For the initial values, we have C1(x, x) = x− 1, C2(0, x2, y − x1) = C1(x2, y − x1) and
C2(x1, 0, y − x2) = C1(x1, y − x2). If x1 + x2 = y, C2(x1, x2, y) = y − 2 + 2x1x2y .
C2(x1, x2, y) =
y − x1 − x2
y
(y − 1 + C1(x1, x2, y − 1))
+
x1
y
(y − 1 + C2(0, x2, y − x1)) + x2
y
(y − 1 + C2(x1, 0, y − x2))
=y − 1 + y − x1 − x2
y
C1(x1, x2, y − 1)+
+
x1
y
C2(0, x2, y − x1) + x2
y
C2(x1, 0, y − x2)
(5.18)
Then, we plot C1(x, y) and C2(x1, x2, y) and C2(x, y) in terms of x, y, x1 and y1,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 5.6. From Fig. 5.6(a), in case of 1 malicious user, it can be
seen that the number of calculations almost increases linearly as the number of received
reviews increases. When more reviews received at the vendor, more calculation efforts are
needed to find the false reviews. Moreover, when the number of false reviews increases,
the calculation efforts can be reduced because the probability of finding a false review is
larger. From Fig. 5.6(b) and Fig. 5.6(c), we can observe that when the number of false
reviews decreases or the number of received reviews increases, the number of calculations
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to detect all false reviews increases. Note that when x1 = x2 = 15 and y = 30, the number
of calculations is 43. In this case, 30 reviews are all false reviews, and we still need 43
calculations on average to detect them. The reason is that the calculations cannot detect
any false reviews when the two reviews are separately from two users.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the bTSE through trace-based custom
simulations. We choose to compare the bTSE with a non-cooperative system, where each
user directly submits its review to the vendor without any synchronization constraint (use
of tokens). We use the following three performance metrics:
• Submission rate: It is defined as the ratio of the number of successfully submitted
reviews to the total number of generated reviews in the network.
• Submission delay: It is defined as the average duration between the time when a
review is generated and the time when it is successfully received by the vendor.
• Cooperation overhead: It is defined as the total number of times that tokens are
forwarded among users.
Because the non-cooperative system involves only direct review submission, the last
metric is not applicable to it. As we will see, the bTSE achieves significantly (up to
100%) higher submission rate under a defined review rejection attack, and greatly (up to
75%) lower submission delay in general than the non-cooperative system, at the cost of
reasonable cooperation overhead. The SrTSE performs exactly the same as the bTSE in
the review submission.
5.5.1 Simulation Setup
In the simulation, we use the real trace log [79] which has been used in previous chapters.
In the previous chapter, we have shown that how to obtain the top 10 hotspots in Fig. 4.8.
In this chapter, we also choose these 10 hotspots and consider the chosen hotspot as the
place of the vendor.
We define a universal attribute set of 50 elements. The set is known by all users. Users
are organized into 10 social groups, each being tagged with 5 random attributes. Each user
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has a membership with 1 ∼ 5 random social groups, that is, it may have 5 ∼ 25 attributes,
inherited from the belonged social groups. The vendor (precisely, its service) has 3 random
attributes. If a user shares a common attribute with the vendor, it will be interested in the
vendor (service). For simplicity, we do not implement users random state transition from
‘not interested’ to ‘interested’ caused by the recommendation from its friends. Each user
has a transmission range of 80m. The vendor has a transmission range equal to its service
range (SR). A user interested in the vendor wishes to submit a review to the vendor when
it enters the vendor’s service range for the first time. Direct review submission is possible
only when the vendor is within the user’s transmission range. As the trace log covers a
small region and a small period time, we do not implement the token timeout interval θexp
(see Section 5.3.2).
We conduct two sets of simulations under the situations with/without review attacks.
We vary SR between 150m and 300m, and token number TN between 1 and 10. As
analyzed in Section 5.4, the bTSE resists the review linkability and modification attacks
through cryptography techniques and specially-designed review structure, and mitigates
review rejection attack through cooperative review submission. The first two attacks have
no influence on review submission. In our simulation study, we are therefore interested
only in the impact of review rejection attack on the system performance. Each review is
a value ranged in [0, 1]. A review is negative if its value is lower than 0.5. The vendor
performs review rejection action by rejecting all negative reviews. When multiple reviews
are aggregated and submitted together, the vendor accepts them all if their average value
is no less than 0.5, or rejects them all otherwise. We place the vendor at the centers of the
10 hotspots in turn and conduct 50 simulation runs for each placement. Using the total
500 simulation runs, we obtain the average results to be analyzed in the next sub-section.
5.5.2 Simulation Results
Under no Review Rejection Attack: We first study the system performance in relation with
SR. Let us observe Fig. 5.7. When SR goes up, the number of users who enter the service
range and thus generate reviews increases. Recall that each user has a transmission range
much smaller than SR. In the non-cooperative system, users have to move close enough
to the vendor in order to submit their reviews. Hence, the system shows a decreasing
submission rate and increasing submission delay with SR. In the bTSE, review submission
is constrained by token possession in addition to user-to-vendor distance on one hand.
On the other hand, cooperative review submission is triggered when direct submission is
not possible. The interplay of the two factors renders the bTSE exhibiting a performance
trend similar to the non-cooperative system’s in submission rate and submission delay as
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SR varies. From Fig. 5.7(c), the bTSE has greatly lower submission delay than the non-
cooperative system, up to 75% lower. Fig. 5.7(e) depicts the cooperation overhead of the
bTSE. As expected, the larger the vendor’s service range, the more cooperation efforts
from users involved.
We then look at how TN impacts the system performance. Intuitively, when TN goes
up, users have increased opportunity to submit reviews, leading to raised system perfor-
mance. This intuition is confirmed by the results in Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(c). We observe
an arguable phenomenon: submission rate and delay both stabilize after TN is beyond
certain value. In the case of SR = 150, it occurs after TN = 20 and is however not shown
here. The reason for this phenomenon is as follows. When there are more tokens circulat-
ing in the network, initially users can easily get tokens and submit their reviews. Recall
that users no longer participate in the review system once their reviews are submitted to
the vendor or forwarded to others. Over time, the network of participating users becomes
sparse and sparse, and these users have less and less chance to receive a token due to
decreased network density. This can be cross verified by the cooperation
Under Review Rejection Attack: Figures 5.7(b) and 5.7(d) show the performance com-
parison of the bTSE and the non-cooperative system when the vendor launches the re-
view rejection attack. We observe that the non-cooperative system has a performance
drop (> 25%) in submission rate. Indeed, it is not equipped with any security mecha-
nism against the attack and suffers performance degradation. Submission delay does not
show any noticeable change since only direct submission is engaged in the non-cooperative
system and only successfully submitted reviews are considered during delay calculation.
Compared with the case of no review rejection attack, the bTSE only has slightly reduced
(< 10% smaller) submission rate and nearly unchanged submission delay thanks to the
user cooperation and review aggregation mechanisms. The bTSE achieves significantly
higher submission rate than the non-cooperative system, up to 100%. These simulation
results indicate that the bTSE can effectively resist the review rejection attack.
5.6 Related Work
Trust evaluation of service providers is a key component to the success of location based
services in a distributed and autonomous network. Location-based services require a unique
and efficient way to impress the local users and earn their trust so that the service providers
can obtain profits [120,121]. Rajan and Hosamani [122] used an extra monitor deployed at
the untrusted vendor’s site to guarantee the integrity of the evaluation results. Wang and Li
[123] proposed a two-dimensional trust rating aggregation approach to enable a small set of
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Figure 5.7: Performance with/without review rejection attack
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trust vectors to represent a large set of trust ratings. Aydey and Fekri [124] approached the
trust management as an inference problem and proposed a belief propagation algorithm to
efficiently compute the marginal probability distribution functions representing reputation
values. Das and Islam [125] introduced a dynamic trust computation model to cope with
the strategically altering behavior of malicious agents.
Distributed systems are vulnerable to sybil attacks where an adversary manipulates
bogus identities or abuse pseudonyms to compromise the effectiveness of the systems.
For example, in the peer-to-peer networks, Douceur [126] indicated that the sybil attacks
can compromise the redundancy of distributed storage systems. In the sensor networks,
Karlof and Wagner [127] showed that the sybil attacks can damage the routing efficiency.
Newsome et al. [128] proposed many defense mechanisms, such as, radio resource testing,
key validation for random key pre-distribution, and position verification. In vehicular
ad hoc networks, Lu et al. [129] proposed an efficient detection mechanism on double-
registration which can be conducted to mitigate the possible sybil attacks. The sybil attacks
in social networks have attracted great attention recently [66–68]. In social networks, Wei
et al. [68] mentioned the existence of a trusted authority can mitigate the effect of the sybil
attacks, but they considered that such requirements impose additional burdens on users
which is not acceptable.
5.7 Summary
We have introduced a trustworthy service evaluation (TSE) system for service-oriented
mobile social networks (S-MSN). The TSE enables a vendor to receive, record the re-
views from its customers and disseminate the reviews to other nearby users. It helps build
the user-to-vendor trust from the user-to-user trust. Specifically, the TSE engages hier-
archical signature and aggregate signature techniques to transform independent reviews
into structured review chains. This transformation involves distributed user cooperation,
which improves review integrity and greatly reduces vendors’ modification capability. We
have presented three review attacks and shown that the bTSE can effectively resist the re-
view attacks without relying on a trusted authority. We have also considered the notorious
sybil attacks and demonstrated that such attacks cause huge damage to the bTSE. We have
subsequently modified the construction of pseudonyms and the corresponding secret keys
in the bTSE, and obtained a sybil-resist TSE (SrTSE) system. The SrTSE allows users
to leave only one review toward a vendor in a pre-defined time slot. If multiple reviews
with different pseudonyms from one user are generated, the real identity will be disclosed
to the public. The sybil attack is thus prevented in the SrTSE. Numerical results show
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the effectiveness of the SrTSE to resist the sybil attacks. Further trace-based simulation
results demonstrate that the bTSE significantly outperforms a non-cooperative review sys-
tem in terms of submission rate and delay, especially in the presence of the review rejection
attacks.
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Chapter 6
Secure and Efficient Routing
Protocol for Body Area Networks
6.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we discussed the mobile applications in the two-user, user-chain,
and user-star domains. Besides, the MSN includes the single-user domain where multiple
body sensors and the smartphone interact for collecting body physiological signals of an
individual user. In this chapter, we will study some critical research problems in this
domain.
Although WBANs are deployed in a compact spatial region (along the human body),
multi-hop communication rather than single-hop is their main communication pattern.
Previous research [130–132] indicate that, due to the energy absorption of the human
body, the physical channels of WBANs have much higher path loss than those in free
space propagation especially when the communication is non-line of sight (NLOS); this
communication, for example, occurs when the sender is placed on the back and the re-
ceiver on the chest. Alternatively, high power radio frequency (RF) enforced throughout
a large coverage area cannot be used in WBANs because RF energy waves may heat and
damage body tissue by energy absorption. This consideration implies that in WBANs,
multi-hop communication has advantages and sometimes is an absolute requirement. The
experimental study in [133] further confirms that multi-hop communication is most reliable
in WBANs.
It is rather straightforward to perform multi-hop routing in a small-scale static WSN
environment. WBANs are small in size, but they are composed of nodes that move along
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body gestures. Node mobility leads to dynamically changing network topology and signif-
icantly varying RF energy absorption (thus link quality), rendering routing a challenging
task. The openness of the wireless media makes it easy for a malicious adversary to launch
various security attacks and violate the basic security requirements, i.e., data confiden-
tiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. This problem exists in any wireless
network, but it is more serious in WBANs because the network traffic is health-related,
highly personal and user-sensitive [11,25,134]. Pure cryptographic security solutions are of-
ten computation-intensive and vulnerable to data injection attacks given that body sensors
have restricted resources.
A data injection attack aims to consume the resources of a target network node by
sending false data to it. For example, the attacker may eavesdrop the communication
transactions of the target node, retrieve useful authentication information and use it to
send false packets to the target node. Without precaution, the target node will put intensive
efforts to respond to the false packets; even worse, it may retransmit them to other nodes.
In energy-constrained WBANs, data injection attacks can exhaust sensor battery power
quickly and reduce network lifetime. Sensors should be intelligent enough to recognize and
reject false data at minimal cost. Cryptography alone is not sufficient to solve this security
problem.
To ensure secure and reliable routing (toward the data sink) in WBANs, the follow-
ing two requirements must be satisfied, in addition to the aforementioned basic security
requirements:
• Localized reliable data forwarding: A node should be able to select an incidental link
to forward data packets, which is likely to have high quality in the immediate future.
• Resilience against data injection attacks: A node should be able to avoid processing
false and/or irrelevant data injected into the network during a short period of time.
We address the above requirements by proposing a novel distributed Prediction-based
Secure and Reliable routing framework (PSR). Persistent data injection attacks, regarded
as notorious Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and other robust and exhaustive adversaries
are beyond our scope.
It is observed that body sensors may exhibit regular mobility when a user’s physical
activity (e.g., swimming and jogging) contains repeated motions, and as a result, the link
quality and the neighbor sensor set often present periodic changes. This observation serves
as the foundation of the PSR routing framework, which can be combined with any specific
WBAN routing protocol to increase the latter’s security and reliability performance. By
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employing PSR, each node maintains an autoregressive (AR) model [79] for every neighbor,
based on the link quality measurements (characterized by the received signal power at the
other side of the links) between them. Using this model, it predicts the quality of its
incidental links as well as the change of its neighbor set.
By the underlaying routing protocol, a node selects a subset of incidental links that
can be used to forward packets to the data sink; among these links, it chooses the one
that has the highest predicted quality as routing next hop. Each node is equipped with
two novel authentication mechanisms specifically devised for source authentication and
data authentication. It performs lightweight hash-based data authentication for every
received data packet; it disables relatively computation-intensive source authentication
if its neighbor set is not changing according to the prediction results in order to save
computational resources, or enable source authentication otherwise. The logic is that, if
the neighbor set is not changing, source authentication will not be necessary since the
existing neighbors have already been authenticated.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, we present the
frequently-used notations, the network model, and the security model. Then, we propose
the PSR routing framework in Section 6.3, followed by the security analysis in Section 6.4
and the performance evaluation in Section 6.5. Lastly, we review the related work and
draw our summary respectively in Section 6.6 and Section 6.7.
6.2 Notation and Models
Table 6.1: Frequently used notations in PSR
S a set of s body sensor nodes {n1, n2, · · · , ns}
Tc current time slot
λ the length of a single time slot
H {(i, hi)1≤i≤s} represent (index i, hop count hi)
(i, ki) node index and the corresponding secret key
Si,j a secret key shared by nodes ni and nj
Mi a matrix containing link quality measurements
H1, H2, Ha, Hb four cryptographic secure hash functions
(d,m) a hash seed and a positive even integer
N cj a real neighbor set at the end of Tc
Nˆ cj a predicted neighbor set at the beginning of Tc
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Before proceeding further, we define the network model and the security model that
PSR is to be developed upon. A non-exhaustive list of notations to be used throughout
the rest of the chapter can be found in Table 6.1.
6.2.1 Network model
Consider a WBAN composed of s body sensors. We denote by S = {n1, n2, · · · , ns} the
sensor set and n0 the sink. Every sensor is associated with a unique identifier or index
such as MAC address or manufacturer serial number by which it can be distinguished from
others. Two nodes are neighbors if they are within each other’s communication range.
Each node has some fixed neighbors to which it has a constant distance along the surface
of human body in spite of body gestures. For example, a node placed on a wrist may
be a fixed neighbor of a node placed on the elbow of the same arm, and vice versa. A
communication link between two fixed neighbors is called backbone link. The backbone
links alone connect all the nodes together. Considering the critical nature of WBAN
applications, these backbone links are necessary in order to guarantee connectivity. Also,
it is feasible to establish these links since a WBAN is usually deployed manually.
A shortest path tree rooted at the data sink n0 is constructed using backbone links,
as shown in Fig. 6.1. Along this tree, the hop count information H = {(i, hi)1≤i≤s}
is obtained, where i is node index and hi the hop count from ni to n0, and distributed
to each sensor node. Although any existing WBAN routing protocol may be applied on
individual nodes for identifying routing next hop candidates, for simplicity we use a greedy
routing protocol based on the established hop count information to present and evaluate
PSR. We do not use real-time hop count information for two reasons: i) maintaining such
information is costly when the network topology is changing, and ii) delay induced by
using non-shortest paths is not a major concern in such a small-scale network. The logic
of greedy forwarding is to move a packet to a node closer to n0 than the node currently
holding it.
Time is locally slotted by nodes with equal length λ, which is a positive real number,
the same for all the nodes. At the beginning of each time slot, ni chooses appropriate
routing next hop and authentication policies to follow for the current time slot; at the end
of each time slot, it adjusts a few system parameters for better decision making in the next
time slot.
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Figure 6.1: Shortest path tree based on backbone links
6.2.2 Security model
WBANs are subject to both internal attacks and external attacks. Here we consider only
external attacks, which are launched by adversaries outside the network. DoS attacks are
out of the scope of this work. We do not consider lower-layer jamming attacks that block
the traffic between two neighboring nodes. Encryption (e.g. symmetric approaches) and
hashing prevent eavesdropping attacks and data modification attacks at low cost. Signature
approaches realize authenticity and non-repudiation, but with large computation overhead.
Thus we focus on network-layer data injection attacks that make use of the weakness
of signature-based authentication to exhaust sensors’ computational resources including
CPU cycle and battery power. If nodes are unable to resist such attacks, the network will
be paralyzed, and the network lifetime will be shortened. Data injection attacks can be
launched in the following three forms:
• Exhaustive source authentication attacks, where the attacker repeatedly sends false
authentication requests;
• Exhaustive data authentication attacks, where the attacher continuously sends false
data packets to a node;
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• Data replay attacks, where the attacker uses eavesdropped security materials to inject
forged data packets.
6.3 PSR Solutions
6.3.1 Security initialization
Initially, system parameters are configured and embedded in every node as follows. At the
first step, given a security parameter k ∈ Z+, the administrator runs a bilinear pairing
generator (Section 2.4.1) on input k to generate a prime q, two groups G1,G2 of order
q, and an admissible bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. The administrator then chooses
a random generator P ∈ G1, a random s ∈ Z∗q, and four cryptographic hash function
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q, and Ha, Hb : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. The administrator
computes Ppub = sP and sends PP = 〈q,G1,G2, e, P, Ppub, H1〉 to the nodes and the sink.
At the second step, for ni, the administrator computes Qi = H1(ni) ∈ G∗1, and sets its
private key ki = sQi. For the sink node n0, it also computes Q0 = H1(n0) and a private
key k0 = sQ0. All the nodes keep their private keys secretly. At the third step, the
administrator sends hop count information H to every node.
The session key Si,j between nodes ni and nj can be non-interactively calculated as
Si,j = e(H1(ni), H1(nj))
s = e(ki, H1(nj)) = e(H1(ni), kj) by using bilinear pairing property.
Then, if ni uses a symmetric key encryption scheme E to encrypt data with Si,j and sends
the ciphertext C = E(Si,j, data) to nj, nj can decrypt C by a symmetric key decryption
scheme D and obtains data = D(Si,j, C). Since Si,j is known only to nodes ni and nj, nj
is able to secretly obtain data and check if the ciphertext C is generated by ni. Note that
we do not adopt a simple setting in which all the nodes share the same key. The reason
is as follows. Nodes could be compromised (such situation is not considered here though)
and reveal the key to attackers, putting the entire network at risk [135].
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Figure 6.2: Prediction model update along time axis
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Figure 6.3: Link quality matrix Mi of node ni
In this section, we propose a novel distributed Prediction-based Secure and Reliable
routing framework (PSR) for WBANs. PSR can be integrated with any routing protocol
to improve the latter’s reliability and security performance. It is composed of two sub-
algorithms Next-hop selection and Data transmission, both of which employ prediction-
based techniques to help nodes make decisions on routing and data processing. As shown
in Fig. 6.2, at the beginning of each time slot, nodes use the link quality measurements
collected in the past time slots to predict neighborhood conditions (link quality and neigh-
bor set) in the current time slot and run the two algorithms with respect to the prediction
results, and at the end of each time slot, they use real conditions measured during the time
slot to update the prediction model.
Here, we present PSR with autoregressive model [79] being used for prediction due to
its simplicity. But nevertheless, it can be replaced with any other prediction model as
needed. Below we elaborate the two sub-algorithms with respect to an arbitrary sensor
node ni and an arbitrary time slot Tc.
6.3.2 Next Hop Selection
Node ni maintains matrix Mi(s × p) that stores the link quality measurements between
itself and every other node in the network for the immediate past p time slots. Here p is a
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pre-defined system parameter. Link quality is characterized by the received signal power at
the receiver side. In this matrix, each row corresponds to a unique node; the k-th column
indicates the link quality between ni and the other s nodes in Tc−p+k−1 (the current time
slot is Tc). The matrix is initially empty. It is possible that some rows remain to have only
0 values since the corresponding node may have never been neighboring with ni during the
p time slots. Because a WBAN is a small-scale network of only a few nodes, it is feasible
that each node maintains such a link quality matrix. Figure 6.3 comparatively shows Mi
at the beginning of Tc and Tc+1.
Based on this link quality matrix, ni builds an order-p autoregressive model. At the
beginning of Tc, using this model ni predicts the link quality with every other node, and it
chooses a neighbor that has the best predicted link quality among those closer to the sink
than itself as next hop (greedy forwarding). If the prediction model is not established yet,
the backbone-link based shortest path tree will be used conservatively for packet forwarding
as the backbone links have relatively stable quality. In the sequel, ni transmits every data
packet with the selected next hop as a designated receiver.
All the neighbors hear the data transmission of ni and measure the received signal
power (i.e., link quality). They then reply ni with an acknowledgement (ACK) carrying
the measurements whether they are the intended receiver or not. A detailed description
of data transmission and acknowledging is presented in the next subsection. By receiving
ACKs from neighboring nodes, ni knows the average quality of the incidental links to
them during Tc and updatesMi with the average results at the end of Tc. Note that, if an
expected ACK does not arrive from a node, ni will consider the corresponding link quality
measurement to be −∞.
6.3.3 Data Transmission
Node ni shares with another node nj a set of secret tokens if they have successfully authen-
ticated each other. For each data packet to be sent, ni checks if it has a valid token with
every nj in the network. Having a valid token with nj means being recognized by it. Thus,
ni starts the data authentication immediately if the check results are all positive. Other-
wise, it has to first start source authentication with the njs for which the check results are
negative. To tolerate occasional transmission failure, ni initiates source authentication up
to the maximum number of times. After all the authentication retrials or after having a
valid token with every other node, ni proceeds with the data transmission.
The set of tokens shared between ni and nj are a sequence of hash values, such
as 〈Hm(d), Hm−1(d), · · · , H(d)〉, where H is a function defined as H2k(d) = Hka (d) and
115
ni nj
R ∈ G, k ∈ Z∗q
r = e(R,P )k
mi = Tc||m
v = H2(mi, r)
u = vSi + kR
1)i||u||v||mi−−−−−−→ r = e(u,P )
e(Qi,Ppub)v
v
?
= H2(mi, r)
2)h′||j||i←−−−− d = r · Si,j, h′ = Hm+1(d)
Figure 6.4: Source authentication
H2k−1(d) = Hkb (d) for any integer k ≥ 1 (refer to Section 6.3.1 for the definition of func-
tions Ha and Hb). The token set is therefore partitioned evenly into two disjoint portions
used respectively by ni and nj for authenticating packets. In each data transmission, ni
attaches a single token from its portion to the data packet. The token is placed at the
beginning of the packet if nj is the next hop, or at the end otherwise. Tokens are used one
by one in a pre-defined order; once used, they are no longer secrets and become invalid for
future use.
Every data packet sent by ni contains a token for every neighbor nj, which is therefore
able to authenticate the packet. This is because that the valid tokens are secrets shared only
between ni and nj, and outside attackers can obtain valid tokens only if data transmission
failure happens (the analysis can be found in Section 6.3.3). For each authenticated data
packet from ni, nj identifies whether or not it is the intended receiver (i.e., the next hop)
and responsible for packet forwarding by checking the token’s position in the packet, and it
also replies ni with an ACK packet, enabling ni to measure the quality of the link between
them. The ACK packet is authenticated similarly using a token from nj’s portion of the
token set.
Source Authentication
The center of data transmission is obviously the processes of source authentication and data
authentication. We first elaborate source authentication, which enables two neighboring
nodes ni and nj to authenticate each other. Figure 6.4 shows a source authentication
process between these two nodes in Tc. It consists of two steps. At the first step, ni
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ni nj
(d,m) (d,m)
h = Hm−2k+2(d)
Cj = E(Si,j, dk||h) 1)h||j||Cj−−−−−→ h ?= Hm−2k+2(d)
dk||h = D(Si,j, Cj)
h′ = Hm−2k+1(d)
h′ ?= Hm−2k+1(d)
2)h′||i||ACK←−−−−−−− ACK = E(Si,j, qk||h′)
qk||h′ = D(Si,j,ACK)
Figure 6.5: Data authentication
broadcasts i||u||v||mi as a source authentication request to all the neighboring nodes. Here,
mi contains the current time slot Tc and the number m of tokens to be generated, and the
pair (u, v) is an identity based signature on message mi using the signature scheme [81].
Each neighbor nj then verifies the signature by computing r =
e(u,P )
e(Qi,Ppub)v
and checking if
v=H2(mi, r). If the equality holds, nj accepts the signature and replies ni with h
′||j||i at
the second step; otherwise, it stops the authentication process. Here, h′ = Hm+1(d) is a
hash value, where d = r · Si,j. From security initialization (see Section 6.3.1), since Si,j
is only known by ni and nj, they are able to calculate d. In the source authentication
request, if ni receives h
′, ni knows that nj must have received the request and then reveals
h′ in Tc. Notably, r is a random value and d will be generated independently for different
source authentications. They will not use d in data transmissions and therefore others will
not be able to calculate Si,j = d/r. After a successful source authentication, nodes ni and
nj agree upon the use of (d,m) for data authentications.
Data Authentication
It is carried out for every packet and enables receiver nj to ascertain that a packet is indeed
from sender ni as it claims to be. By source authentication, (d,m) are established and
recorded by both nodes ni and nj. After the source authentication, it is required that ni
use token Hm−2k+2(d) for sending the k-th data packet dk to nj and nj then uses token
Hm−2k+1(d) for sending back the corresponding ACK to ni. The sequence information k is
contained in dk. This data authentication process is illustrated in Fig. 6.5. It consists of
two steps. At the first step, ni sends h||j||Cj to nj, where h = Hm−2k+2(d) is a valid token
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and Cj is a ciphertext of the combination of dk and h. At the second step, nj checks whether
the embedded token is used for the first time. It is able to do the check because it knows
all the used tokens. If the token is indeed used for the first time, nj proceeds to decrypt
Cj. If the h obtained by the decryption equals to the one outside Cj, then nj believes in
the integrity of the data packet and replies ni with h
′||i||ACK, where h′ = Hm−2k+1(d) is
a valid token and ACK indicates the successful recipient of dk and reports the link quality
qk. If any of the above checks fails, nj stops the process and ignores the packet. After
receiving the ACK, ni performs similar checks and retrieves qk. Note that tokens h and
h′ can be only used for the k-th data packet of ni after the last source authentication. If
m − 2k + 2 ≤ 0, ni has to start a new source authentication process with nj for a new
tuple (d,m) in Tc+1. Further, if ni does not receive any ACK with valid tokens from nj
within Tc, it marks all the unused tokens with nj invalid, and a new source authentication
is needed in Tc+1.
The data authentication process between ni and nj indicates that each data authenti-
cation consumes a token pair (h, h′) in the shared token set between ni and nj. In fact,
each data authentication has to consume a token pair between ni and its every neighbor
in order for ni to be able to measure the link quality with them. Suppose that ni has k
neighbors {n1i , n2i , · · · , nki } in addition to the next hop nj. Let (hl, h′l) be the token pair
between ni and neighbor n
l
i, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, which are respectively from the token sets that ni
shares with those neighbors. At the first step of data authentication, ni attaches tokens
h1, h2, · · · , hk to the end of a data packet, i.e., h||j||Cj||h1|| · · · ||hk; at the second step,
neighbor nli, 1 ≤ l ≤ k responds with an ACK carrying h′l, i.e., h′l||i||ACK. Note that nli
only verifies the tokens in the data packet without putting any effort on processing Cj,
since its token does not appear at the beginning of the packet (i.e., it is not the intended
receiver) and Cj can be decrypted only by the indented receiver.
6.3.4 Disabling Source Authentication
Source authentication is much more costly than data authentication as it requires decryp-
tion operations while data authentication only involves equality checks. If there are many
false source authentication requests, as a receiver ni will waste significant resources on
processing them. To deal with this problem, ni may adaptively enable or disable its source
authentication function in Tc according to predicted neighborhood change and prediction
accuracy.
Specifically, ni chooses the set Nˆ ci of possible neighbors at the beginning of Tc by
checking the link quality prediction results (see Section 6.3.2): a node is a possible neighbor
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Figure 6.6: Neighbor set
if the corresponding link quality is predicted to have a value beyond certain threshold
(a.k.a. receiver sensitivity). At the end of Tc, ni computes the real neighbor set N ci in
Tc based on the received ACKs during the time slot. Then it decides whether to disable
source authentication for Tc+1, based on N ci , Nˆ ci and Nˆ c−1i . If N ci = Nˆ ci and Nˆ ci = Nˆ c−1i ,
ni is in source authentication disabled mode (SAD) (or source authentication enabled
(SAE) mode otherwise) as shown in Fig. 6.6. This condition implies that the prediction is
accurate and the neighbor set is not expected to change; thus it is not necessary to perform
source authentication. If the link quality prediction model is not established yet, Nˆ ci is
not available. In this case, source authentication has to be enabled by default. Source
authentication is also periodically opened in order to accommodate unexpected legitimate
neighbors.
6.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the PSR framework. Specifically,
following the security model discussed in Section 6.2.2, our analysis focuses on the resilience
of PSR against data injection attacks including exhaustive source authentication attacks,
exhaustive data authentication attacks and data replay attacks.
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6.4.1 Resilience to Exhaustive Source Authentication Attacks
Fig. 6.4 shows the source authentication process. The sender node ni computes an iden-
tity based signature (u, v) on message mi and sends u||v||mi as authentication request to a
node nj at the first step. By checking v=H2(mi, r) where r =
e(u,P )
e(Qi,Ppub)v
, nj knows whether
the request is made by ni or not. Specifically, if r = e(R,P )
x, nj will be able to calculate
u = xR+vsQi. Since vsQi = vki can be only generated by ni using its private key ki, nj is
able to confirm that the signature (u, v) on mi is indeed generated by ni. This confirmation
guarantees that nj detects false source authentication requests. This signature-based ap-
proach consumes relatively intensive computational resources (compared with hash-based
data authentication).
However, nj does not always respond to source authentication requests. It records the
real neighbor sets in the past and uses a prediction model to estimate the future neighbor
sets (one time slot ahead). Such information assists it in making a wise decision: to dis-
able the source authentication function when it is not necessary, i.e., when neighbor set is
not changing and current neighbors have already been authenticated. In this way, most
false source authentication requests can be directly ignored. Such an attack can still con-
sume some computational resources of a receiver node when the node periodically enables
source authentication for accepting new neighboring nodes. But the attack capability is
significantly reduced.
6.4.2 Resilience to Exhaustive Data Authentication Attacks
A receiver node accepts only data packets that contain valid tokens. Recall that the tokens
are created in a reverse order of hash values and initially known only to the sender and
receiver nodes. Therefore, attackers cannot obtain the tokens in advance of the transmis-
sions. Any false data packet will be rejected directly by the receiver node if attached the
token is invalid (either unrecognized or already used).
6.4.3 Resilience to Data Replay Attacks
If a data transmission fails at the receiver node, a data replay attacker may use the in-
tercepted tokens and inject forged information into the network. In this case, the receiver
node has to consume additional computation power to detect these forged data packets
by decryption operations. We show that such attack capability can be limited in terms
of attacking period and numbers of valid tokens. By adopting the hash chain technique,
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if Hm−2x+2(d) is received and the x-th data packet is checked by the receiver node, the
data packet with tokens Hm−2y+2(d) for 1 ≤ y ≤ x will not be accepted anymore. This is
because the y-th data packet cannot arrive later than the x-th data packet (packets are
transmitted sequentially along a single hop). The possible attacking period is therefore
largely reduced (see Theorem 1 below). Theorem 2 further indicates that the attacker can
only obtain a limited number of valid tokens and thus attack the network a limited number
of times. We denote the receive probability of nj on a single transaction by ρ.
Theorem 7 If ni consumes k tokens from a token set for data authentication in every time
slot, then a data replay attacker A has an average attacking period PA = (1−ρ)·λρ·k available
for each eavesdropped token h.
Proof 7 If A eavesdrops a token h from ni’s transaction in Tc, the token may be already
received by nj. Thus A can replay token h to exhaust nj’s computational resources with
probability 1− ρ during time period λ/k. In addition, if the next transaction of ni fails, A
can use h to attack for an additional time period λ/k, totally 2λ/k. Thus, we are able to
obtain the average attacking period for token h as follows: PA = Σ
+∞
x=1ρ(1−ρ)x · xλk = (1−ρ)·λρ·k .
Theorem 8 If ni consumes k tokens from a token set for data authentication in every
time slot, then a data replay attacker A can obtain 2k − 1 valid tokens at most.
Proof 8 If no less than 2k valid tokens are obtained by A, the data authentications by
ni must fail in two or three successive time slots. However, this is impossible as we show
below. If data authentications fail in two successive time slots, ni will not receive any ACKs
from nj in the first time slot and stop using the rest of the tokens. In this case, A can
obtain at most k tokens. If data authentication fail in three successive time slots, ni will
not receive any ACKs from nj in the second time slot and stop using tokens in the third
time slot. In this case, A can obtain at most 2k − 1 tokens. Thus, A obtains 2k − 1 valid
tokens at most.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate PSR through an extensive set of simulations. In current litera-
ture, there are only a few multi-hop routing protocols designed for WBANs, none of which
use link quality as routing metric. We choose to compare PSR (the version described in
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Section 6.3) with a static tree-based routing protocol [136], referred to as Backbone, where
sensors route data packets toward the data sink along a shortest path tree constructed
using backbone links (see Section 6.2.1). The Backbone protocol is reliable compared with
other existing protocols, because the tree is a fixed structure with relatively stable links in
the presence of postural mobility. It can thus be a good benchmark algorithm. As we will
see, PSR outperforms Backbone in reliability and has desired security performance.
6.5.1 Simulation Setup
Received signal power variance between n3 and n0
0-hop node
1-hop node
2-hop node
3-hop node
sitting standing sitting standing sitting
0 100 200 300 400 500
-105
-100
-95
-90
-85
-80
-75
-70
-65
-60
-55
-50
time slot
re
ce
iv
ed
 
sig
na
l p
ow
er
 
(dB
m
)
Figure 6.7: Link quality varying with body movements
We consider a WBAN deployed on the body of a person with height 1.7m. The network
is composed of 12 nodes. As shown in Fig. 6.7, the data sink n0 is placed on the waist;
the others are placed on knees, ankles, shoulders, wrists and head. A shortest path tree
rooted at n0 is built using backbone links (see Section 6.2.1) and shown by dotted lines.
Similar WBAN settings can be found in [131, 136]. A well-defined and simplified channel
model given by IEEE 802.15 task group 6 [137] is adopted in our simulation. The path
loss between any two sensors deployed above body surface is given by:
PL(d)[dB] = a× log10(d) + b+N (6.1)
where a and b are coefficients of linear fitting, d is the direct distance between nodes ni
and nj, N is a random variable of zero-mean normal distribution with standard deviation
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σN . We choose one of the suggested values by IEEE 802.15 task group 6 [137] under
the frequency band 2.4GHz outdoors (a = 29.3, b = −16.8, σN = 6.89). Given the direct
distance between ni and nj, the path loss can be calculated. Furthermore, we consider a
noise model where the received signal power is given by:
Pr(d)[dBm] = Ps − PL(d)−N0 (6.2)
where Ps represents the transmission power, Pr the received signal power, and N0 the noise
power.
On one hand, the transmission power of body sensors must be kept less than an upper
bound (13.98 dBm [137]) in order not to produce any harm to tissues. On the other
hand, it must be strong enough to ensure the successful transmission, i.e., to maintain
Pr at a certain level so that the receiver is able to filter data from noise. Under these
circumstances, we define the minimum requirement of successful delivery with a power
margin, and consider that a packet can be decoded correctly if and only if the ratio of
received signal power to noise power is larger than the power margin. In our simulation,
the power margin is 10 dB and the receiver sensitivity −90 dBm [138].
We repeatedly alternate the body posture between sitting and standing, each of which
lasts a fixed period of time (i.e., 50 or 200 simulated time slots). The postural mobility
has direct impact on link quality. For example, from Fig. 6.7 we can see that the quality
of the link from ankle-mounted sensor n3 to data sink n0 (received signal power at n0) in
sitting status is higher than that in standing status.
6.5.2 Simulation Results
Prediction Accuracy
We set the AR model order p = 20, posture period = 200 time slots, and employ a sliding-
window technique for smoothing the noisy link quality measurements (i.e., received signal
power). Specifically, we slide a window of certain size w (in time slot) along the time series,
compute the average of the measurements within the window, and input the results into
the AR model for prediction. Figures 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) show the predicted values and the
true values between nodes n3 and n0, respectively with w = 1 and w = 20. We observe
that when w = 1 the predicted link quality varies significantly along with the real values.
The big variation is due to random channel noise. It hides the regularity of link quality
brought by periodic postural mobility and renders the prediction results useless. In the
case of w = 20, the regularity can be easily observed. Thus, we choose w = 20 in the rest
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(b) Window size = 20
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(c) Posture period = 50
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(d) Posture period = 200
Figure 6.8: Prediction accuracy
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of our simulation. Figures 6.8(c) and 6.8(d) show the influence of posture period on link
quality prediction with p = 20 and w = 20. It can be seen that the trends of predicted
values well matches that of the real values for the link from n3 to n0 whether posture period
is set to 50 time slots or 200 time slots. The above results indicate that link quality can be
predicted, and the prediction can be exploited to enable better link selection to improve
routing reliability.
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Figure 6.9: Reliability performance
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Figure 6.9(a) shows that n3 is able to find a better link by PSR than by Backbone. We
observe that the packet dropping rate for the single hop from n3 toward n0 is reduced from
0.6 to 0.2. This per-hop reliability gain helps nodes improve end-to-end routing reliability.
We also find out that the gain slightly changes over different window sizes. The reason
is that the channel condition is extremely unstable, and the random channel noise and
vibrating path loss diminish the difference of the results. From Fig. 6.9(b), it is observed
that as transmission power increases, per hope packet dropping rate in both PSR and
Backbone decreases, and PSR slowly loses its advantage over Backbone. This is because
high transmission power increases link quality in general and diminishes the reliability
difference due to algorithm design.
Figures 6.9(c) and 6.9(d) show end-to-end packet dropping rate and average hop count
between different sensors and the data sink n0. It can be observed that PSR outperforms
Backbone in both aspects. The reason is that nodes when adopting PSR are able to find
a better relay path by referring to link quality prediction results. If two nodes become
each other’s neighbor due to the body movement, the node with smaller hop count may
be selected as a relay for the node with larger hop count (subject to link quality check)
in PSR. Such opportunistic routing enables nodes to save more energy by reducing the
number of relaying. For instance, according to Fig. 6.7, n3 may directly transmit a data
packet to n5 for sitting status, rather than going through n4, and the hop count to n0 is
reduced to 2 from 3 (in Backbone).
Security Performance
Data authentication is realized by simple equality check. Hence, we focus on source au-
thentication cost. We examine three source authentication policies in the context of PSR:
exhaustive authentication, periodic authentication, and adaptive authentication. The ex-
haustive authentication policy requires each node to check every source authentication
request in any time slot; periodic authentication policy requires that each node periodi-
cally checks source authentication requests at regular intervals (set to 20 time slots in our
simulation); adaptive authentication policy inherits the periodic authentication policy, and
it additionally requires each node to adaptively disable or enable source authentication (see
Section 6.3.4). We define authentication cost as the number of false source authentication
requests that a node responds to. In our simulation, an attacker sends every node 1000
false source authentication requests, one per time slot. Figure 6.10 shows authentication
cost and end-to-end packet dropping rate of three nodes n3, n6, n11 during 1000 time slots
with the three authentication policies being applied.
Among the three policies, we observe that the exhaustive one achieves the lowest packet
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dropping rate. This is because nodes do not miss any neighbor and are always able to find
the best link (i.e., with highest received signal power at the other side) as next hop.
But this policy has the highest authentication cost due to its exhaustive nature. The
periodic policy leads to the opposite performance: highest packet dropping rate and lowest
authentication cost. It is because nodes are often unable to discover and use quality links
as source authentication is blindly closed at fixed intervals. The performance of adaptive
policy as expected is in between. It achieves low packet dropping rate (comparable to
the exhaustive policy’s) at small authentication cost (comparable to the periodic policy’s)
due to the intelligent source authentication enabling/disabling. In particular, the resultant
authentication cost is less than 300, meaning that over 70% false requests are directly
filtered.
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Figure 6.10: Security performance
6.6 Related Work
Research has been carried out for efficient data communications in accordance with the
multi-hop architecture of WBANs. For example, Latre et al. [136] aim to improve energy
efficiency and communication reliability by activity scheduling. In their solution, a static
routing tree is built in advance, and time is slotted. Time slots are assigned to sensors
according to the routing tree, which then transmit their data only during their assigned time
slots. The assignment is carefully done in a hierarchical and distributed manner to reduce
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idle listening and minimize signal interference. Quwaider et al. [139] propose a dynamic
power assignment, that is, to determine the necessary transmission power for each wireless
link. In their solution, a sender transmits every packet together with the information about
the transmission power used. A receiver node measures the received signal strength and
decides whether the transmission power is too large or too small, and it informs the sender
to adjust the transmission power accordingly, improving communication reliability.
A few researchers focus on efficient routing algorithms, which are the foundation of
data communication. They exploit the delay tolerant network and postural information
[132, 140, 141]. In [140], the authors aim to minimize end-to-end delay by avoid using
nodes that have a high storage/buffering delay due to topological disconnections. They
develop a probabilistic distance-vector packet based routing algorithm. This algorithm uses
a stochastic link cost formulation to capture multi-scale topological localities in human
postural movements. It assumes that, if a link is connected in current time slot, the
probability that the link will remain connected in the next time slot increases at a fixed
rate. This assumption may not hold however in reality. In [141], a few variants of DTN
routing are presented in the WBAN context. They implicitly assume that a link has
constant quality (by ignoring link quality different in routing), which as we previously
discussed is not reasonable due to node mobility and RF energy absorption, and they
require each node to have possibly unrealistic restricted mobility, intermittently coming
within up to 2-hop distance from the sink.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a prediction-based secure and reliable routing framework
(PSR) for WBANs. This framework requires each sensor node to locally maintain a pre-
diction model and obtain the neighborhood conditions in the immediate future. With
the prediction results, the nodes can choose the incidental links of the best quality for
packet relay to improve routing reliability and adaptively enable/disable source authenti-
cation function to resist data injection attacks. Through both analysis and simulation, we
demonstrated that PSR indeed enables secure and reliable routing.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in this thesis, propose our future research
work, and give our final remarks.
7.1 Conclusions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• First, we have studied the profile matching application from a novel perspective,
i.e., user anonymity. We have proposed a novel family of privacy-preserving profile
matching (PPM) protocols including eCPM, iCPM, and iPPM [57]. We have shown
that the eCPM achieves conditional anonymity while iCPM and iPPM achieves full
anonymity. For the eCPM, we have further developed the anonymity-enhancing
technique which enables users to be self-aware of the anonymity risk level and take
appropriate actions to maintain the k-anonymity level where k is a parameter defined
by each individual user.
• Second, by taking the human social behavior, we have studied the data forwarding
strategy in the opportunistic MSN. We have presented a morality-driven privacy-
preserving data forwarding (PDF) protocol [29], while considering multiple factors in
the forwarding utility including forwarding capability, forwarding costs, and morality
factor. Based on the game theoretic analysis, users always maximize their own utility
and decide to forward their packets with certain probability. We have shown that
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the cooperation and privacy preservation, two conflicting goals, can be achieved in
the PDF among a group of users with social morality.
• Third, we have proposed a distributed trustworthy service evaluation (TSE) system
where the local service providers maintain the TSE by themselves. We have studied
the potential malicious attacks conducted by both the service providers and the users.
Note that, it is very challenging to restrict the malicious behavior from the service
providers and the users in an untrusted distributed environment. We have introduced
the possible review attacks and the Sybil attacks [58], and devised effective defensive
mechanisms to resist these attacks.
• Fourth, we have studied the routing problem in WBANs by proposing a distributed
prediction-based secure and reliable routing framework (PSR) [9]. In the PSR, using
past link quality measurements, each node predicts the quality of every incidental
link, and thus any change in the neighbor set as well, for the immediate future. When
there are multiple possible next hops for packet forwarding, the PSR selects the one
with the highest predicted link quality among them. Specially-tailored lightweight
source and data authentication methods are employed by nodes to secure data com-
munication. We have demonstrated that the PSR significantly increases routing reli-
ability and effectively resists data injection attacks through in-depth security analysis
and extensive simulation study.
7.2 Future Work
Our research has already made significant progress in the security and privacy preservation
of mobile social networks. However, since mobile social network is a promising platform
in pervasive environments, there still exist several research directions to be explored to
complement this thesis. Therefore, the following three research topics will be investigated
as a continuation of my Ph.D. thesis work.
Gesture-assisted Secure Information Sharing: Previously, we introduced the pro-
file matching application which is very useful for many social activity in real life. With
the smartphones, our capabilities in sensing and communication are significantly improved,
and our social activities can be carried out in a more secure and efficient way. However, due
to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, it is very difficult to negotiate a shared secret
and implement secure information sharing if two users have no pre-established knowledge.
Gesture-based information sharing is a unique research direction in the MSN. The ges-
ture information is only visible to the close-enough neighbors. The users can make simple
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gestures clear enough such that the target user can repeat it. In order to achieve secure
information sharing, the gesture can be changed per every session. In the meantime, the
accelerometer sensors and gyroscope sensors of smartphones can be used to detect the
gesture and help the users to check if two gestures are the same. One interesting research
direction is how to limit the physical and visual spaces such that the gestures are visible
to only the target user. Besides, it is also interesting to explore more applications using
the gesture-assisted secure information sharing.
Social-context based Private Information Leakage: The information to be shared
by the users in the MSN is closely related to the social context including the profile of
neighboring users and the service of neighboring LSPs. For example, in the shopping mall,
people surrounded by the clothing stores expect to share and receive the discount infor-
mation of clothes; in the conference, participants are willing to discuss research topics and
projects with other research scholars. Based on the social context, the disclosed personal
information can be used to identify an user’s behavior in different levels. In the previous
example, if a research scholar discusses research topics in the shopping mall, his behavior
will be easily distinguished from nearby customers. Thus, to achieve privacy preservation,
the social context should be considered in the MSN communication protocol design. Most
existing privacy-preserving profile matching protocols [28,31] aim at minimizing the profile
information disclosure but neglect the relations between the disclosed information and the
social context. From [57], it is shown that the anonymity variation of an user depends
on the profile information of its nearby users. Thus, the effectiveness of profile matching
protocols in terms of privacy preservation needs to be further validated in different social
contexts. To explore practical social context and propose effective protocols for specific
social contexts is an important research direction.
Trustworthy and Malicious Attacks: Distributed systems are vulnerable to sybil
attacks where an adversary manipulates bogus identities or abuse pseudonyms to com-
promise the effectiveness of the systems. Especially for the MSN, the users often adopt
multiple pseudonyms for protecting their location privacy [29,57]. Thus, it is very challeng-
ing to restrict the sybil attackers who legally have multiple pseudonyms but maliciously use
them. In the MSN, sybil attacks can be extended to a mobile version, called mobile sybil
attacks (MSAs), which can be launched by mobile users anytime anywhere. The MSAs are
hardly to be detected because their behaviors are difficult to be monitored. The previously
introduced TSE system is subject to the MSAs [58]. One solution can be pervasive and
cooperative monitoring, i.e., requiring normal users to monitor other users’ behaviors and
submit the monitoring results to a centralized authority. Then, a centralized authority
can correlate the results and detect the MSAs by viewing the statistic information. This
method is similar to the traditional sybil attack detection [142] in online social networks.
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However, in the MSN, this method requires extensive communication overhead and incurs
unexpected detection delay. Another solution [58] is to embed a secret into the multiple
pseudonyms of one user. When the attacker uses the pseudonyms across the predefined
boundary, its real identity can be calculated from these pseudonyms. In both solutions,
how to define the boundary between the MSAs and the good behavior is very challenging.
Location information can be integrated into the boundary design of the MSAs detection.
7.3 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have presented a suite of security and privacy-preserving protocols for
mobile social networks and applications. In addition, we have also identified couple of
future research topics to complement this thesis. To facilitate our research accomplishments
and findings to benefit the real world situations, we will carry out experiments to further
confirm our research findings.
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